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Introduction to Pension Policy 
 
The U.S. pension system needs fixing. While some of its problems 
are longstanding, the system overall is in decline. Projections of the 
future are not certainties, and some analysts differ, but it appears likely 
that the financial security of current workers when they retire will be 
less than that of current retirees. For workers relying on 401(k) plans 
(which were named after the Internal Revenue Code section that enabled 
them), dramatic declines in the financial markets around the world in 
2008 turned retirement security formerly provided to long-tenure work-
ers by defined benefit plans into a system of retirement roulette. Work-
ers in 401(k) plans are gambling that they will not be retiring in a period 
of dramatic stock market declines, such as experienced in 2008.
By international standards, the U.S. pension system performs poorly. 
When measured in a comparable fashion, the U.S. poverty rate for peo-
ple age 65 and older is more than twice as high as in other high-income 
countries (Pension Rights Center 2007). The move toward 401(k) plans 
has reduced the extent to which the pension system provides annui-
ties and survivors benefits, reducing retirement income security. People 
who work for employers that offer 401(k) plans often do not participate, 
and when they do they tend to make poor financial decisions. Employ-
ers are abandoning defined benefit plans for workers while maintain-
ing generous pensions for executives. People in defined benefit plans 
who are laid off suffer portability losses, while their employers’ plans 
receive corresponding actuarial bonuses. Long-lived retirees in defined 
benefit plans have the real value of their benefits decimated by inflation, 
while long-lived retirees in defined contribution plans risk running out 
of money because of not having annuitized their account balances. 
The pension system is supposed to provide secure and adequate 
retirement income. In both respects, the U.S. system needs better solu-
tions. With the decline in defined benefit plans and the increasing reli-
ance on 401(k) plans, future retirees will have less secure and less 
adequate retirement income than current retirees. While that outcome 
would not occur if all workers covered by 401(k) plans contributed to 
their plans consistently and made wise investment decisions, research 
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shows that many people do not contribute consistently and some do a 
poor job of managing their 401(k) plans.
Pension policy is complex. It involves issues relating to taxation, 
labor economics, finance and behavioral finance, law, actuarial science, 
business administration, and accounting. Drawing on these disciplines, 
but taking an economist’s perspective, this book discusses pension pol-
icy for U.S. private sector employer-provided pension plans. In analyz-
ing pension policy, it addresses two questions: 1) What is the pension 
policy problem? and 2) What are the possible solutions? The book’s 
focus is the search for better solutions for pension policy.
The United States has a federal system of government, where states 
play an important role in the development of policies in some areas. 
The 50 states provide the opportunity for social experimentation on 
policy innovations at a smaller level than the national level. That pos-
sibility for experimentation, however, is not available in the pension 
system because federal law preempts state law on pension issues. For 
this reason, international experience is particularly important in study-
ing innovations in pension policy. Thus, this book presents lessons for 
U.S. policy from the experience of other countries. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PENSIONS
The two main types of pension plans are defined benefit plans and 
defined contribution plans. Hybrid plans combine features of both. 
Defined benefit plans base benefits on a benefit formula that usually 
involves the worker’s years of service and earnings. Examples of types 
of defined benefit plans include final salary plans, where the benefit 
is based on the average of the last few years of earnings, and career 
average plans, where the benefit is based on average earnings over the 
worker’s career. 
Defined contribution plans are retirement savings plans where the 
worker accumulates assets in an individual account. The most promi-
nent U.S. example is 401(k) plans, where the worker generally must 
contribute to participate, and where the employer may contribute based 
on the worker’s contribution. When this book refers to U.S. defined con-
tribution plans, it generally is referring to 401(k) plans, since they have 
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become nearly synonymous with defined contribution plans because of 
their prevalence. In 2005, there were $2.4 trillion in 401(k) plans and 
$0.4 trillion in non-401(k) defined contribution plans (USDOL 2008).1
When the landmark pension legislation, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), was passed, pension coverage 
was primarily provided by defined benefit plans. In part because of the 
effects of that act and of subsequent legislation, pension participation 
has shifted away from defined benefit plans and toward defined contri-
bution plans. According to the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), 
since 1984 more workers have been active participants in defined con-
tribution plans than have been in defined benefit plans. By the early 
2000s, considerably more than twice as many workers were active par-
ticipants in defined contribution plans as were in defined benefit plans 
(USDOL 2008). The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans has meant the shift of investment risk from employers to employ-
ees, but it has reduced risks for job-changing or laid-off employees.
The 401(k) plan is usually participant-directed. That means that 
participants decide their investment, at least for the plan’s assets that 
derive from the participant’s own contributions. In 401(k) plans, 
employee choice plays a large role. Participation is typically voluntary. 
Employees who choose to participate also can choose, within limits, 
what percentage of salary to contribute. They choose investments from 
the options offered by the plan. 
A more recent development in U.S. pensions is a hybrid plan called 
a cash balance plan. These plans are hybrids because they combine fea-
tures of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. To employ-
ees they have many features of defined contribution plans, while to 
employers they are funded like defined benefit plans. In 1995, 3 percent 
of defined benefit participants were in cash balance plans (Elliott and 
Moore 2000). A decade later, cash balance plans accounted for a quarter 
of defined benefit plan participants (USDOL 2008).
Legislation has created several new types of plans. The Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 introduced a new type of hybrid plan, one com-
bining defined benefit and 401(k) features—the DB(k) plan. The legis-
lation enabling that plan will take effect in 2010. Earlier legislation had 
created the Roth IRA and the Roth 401(k). With the two Roth plans, 
contributions are not tax-deductible, but benefits received at retirement 
are tax-free.
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Other countries have also had major changes in pensions. In recent 
years, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Norway, and New 
Zealand have added employer mandates for pension provision, making 
employer mandates a major trend. The Netherlands and Iceland have 
introduced hybrid pension plans. Germany and Japan have introduced 
new types of defined contribution plans.
At the same time that these changes were occurring in the real world, 
economists have advanced the economic analysis of pensions. With the 
development of behavioral economics, we better understand the prob-
lems people encounter interacting with the pension system, particularly 
with 401(k) plans. The development of individual account plans has led 
to a more sophisticated analysis of those plans and to a new emphasis 
on understanding annuities. 
BASIC ISSUES IN PENSION POLICY
To introduce pension policy, this section discusses nine issues that 
affect pension financing. Countries use a wide range of approaches 
in addressing the basic financing issues discussed in this chapter. The 
issues discussed here represent fundamental questions about retirement 
income financing that must be addressed in designing new pension sys-
tems or changing established ones. 
Issue 1: Should the Private Pension System Be Voluntary or 
Mandatory? 
A number of countries, including Australia, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Finland, France, Chile, Mexico, and the Netherlands, require most 
employees to be covered by a pension plan, either by law or by col-
lective bargaining agreements. While U.S. employers have long pro-
vided pensions voluntarily, they also have a long tradition of staunchly 
opposing mandates. Nonetheless, the topic of extending coverage by 
mandate is perennial in the policy debate because of the failure of other 
approaches to cover more than half of the private sector workforce.
To encourage, rather than to mandate, workers to participate in 
pensions, the federal and state governments provide tax incentives, 
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employers provide matching contributions to 401(k) plans, and, increas-
ingly, employers that offer 401(k) plans are automatically enrolling new 
employees. The government has added the Saver’s Credit to increase 
the incentive to participate for low-income workers. The Saver’s Credit 
provides a tax credit to low-income workers with tax liability who par-
ticipate in a pension plan. 
Other countries have gone further, establishing a range of man-
dates with increasingly greater degrees of compulsion—mandates that 
employers provide plans (but that workers don’t need to participate), 
mandates that employers offer matching contributions, mandates for 
automatic enrollment of employees with opt-out, and mandates that 
employees participate. In recent years, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, Norway, and New Zealand have added employer mandates 
for pension provision, but with voluntary employee participation.
Mandates can differ in the way they treat employers and employees. 
In Australia, the mandate requires both that employers offer a plan and 
that employees participate. By contrast, the United Kingdom mandates 
that employers offer a plan, but participation by employees is voluntary. 
U.S. pension law does not require employers to offer a plan, but if they 
do, they must cover most full-time employees. 
Mandates also differ in the extent to which they cover the work-
force. Mandates on employers need to recognize that most employers 
are small employers employing a few people. Many are not even busi-
nesses, but are homeowners employing someone to take care of their 
children or clean their house. Mandates may exclude small employ-
ers who employ, for example, fewer than 10 employees, employees 
working in households, young employees, low-wage employees, and 
employees working fewer than a minimum number of hours or with 
short tenure. In countries where pension plans are voluntarily provided 
by employers, the government may set minimum standards as to which 
workers (or what percentage of the workforce of the employer sponsor-
ing a plan) are included in the plan. 
The United States and nearly all other countries have a mandatory, 
state-operated pension—social security. Some people argue that instead 
of mandating pensions, why not simply increase the generosity of social 
security. Social security, however, is not funded, while private pensions 
are.
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Although mandates are capable of greatly increasing pension cover-
age, they do so at the cost of loss of individual choice. The United States 
has not mandated pensions, but it has moved toward greater degrees of 
encouragement. 
Issue 2: If Private Pensions Are Voluntary, to What Extent Should 
the Government Encourage Them? 
All countries with well-developed voluntary pension systems 
encourage pensions by providing preferential tax treatment. In Canada 
and the United States, pension plans receive tax preferences that allow 
money to accumulate tax-free. Countries, such as New Zealand, that 
have not provided tax preferences for pensions, but have treated them 
like other forms of savings, have had few employers provide pensions. 
A progressive personal income tax provides greater tax incentive 
and greater tax subsidy to higher-income persons than to lower-income 
persons. This incentive is upside down. High-income persons are 
already more likely to save for retirement than are low-income per-
sons. An alternative approach would be to provide everyone a limited 
tax credit for pension savings, which would provide the same marginal 
incentive to workers at different income levels. The tax treatment of 
pensions is considered in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Issue 3: Who Is Best Able to Bear the Inherent Financial and 
Demographic Risks in Pension Plans? 
Pension plans can involve five types of actors: employees, labor 
unions, employers and employers’ organizations, financial service pro-
viders, and government. Risks could be borne by any of these actors. 
The primary decision as to who bears risks is made when policymakers 
or the pension provider decides whether to offer defined benefit, defined 
contribution, or hybrid plans. With defined benefit plans, typically the 
provider bears the financial market risk, as well as the demographic risk 
that the participants will live longer on average than expected. However, 
in cases of bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm, the financial risk can be 
borne by workers. Countries where defined benefit plans predominate 
include Germany, Japan, Canada, Ireland, and the Netherlands. With 
defined contribution plans, the participant bears the financial market 
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risk. If the plan does not provide annuitized benefits, the participant also 
bears the demographic risk that he or she will live longer than expected. 
Countries where defined contribution plans predominate include Aus-
tralia and Sweden. The United States and the United Kingdom, and to 
a lesser degree Canada and Ireland, have seen a trend toward defined 
contribution plans. 
With hybrid plans, the financial and demographic risks can be borne 
in different ways. For example, with cash balance plans, the participant 
may bear some financial market risk (as such risk affects the credit-
ing rate provided by the plan) and may bear life expectancy when not 
annuitizing their account balance. Risk-bearing in pension plans is con-
sidered in more detail in Chapter 6, and hybrid plans are considered in 
Chapter 7.
Issue 4: Should the Government Mandate Insurance or 
Guarantees for Pension Benefits? 
The government requires that benefits in some plans be guaranteed 
in Finland, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the province of Ontario in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In Japan, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United States, mandatory pension 
benefit insurance for defined benefit plans is provided. This insurance 
covers the risk that the sponsoring firms will declare bankruptcy without 
having fully funded their pension plans. Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and 
Switzerland provide some form of insurance or guarantee of account 
balances in defined contribution plans. Pension insurance programs and 
guarantees are discussed in Chapter 6.
Issue 5: Who Should Pay for Pension Plans? 
Ultimately, according to economic theory, regardless of whether 
the employer or employee makes the contribution, the employees bear 
the cost, either through reduced wages relative to what they would be 
without a pension plan or through direct contributions. This process is 
clearly visible in the trade-offs labor unions make in collective bargain-
ing, but this tenet of economic theory is greeted with skepticism among 
noneconomists. 
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The question remains as to who should finance the pension plan. 
Should the funding come from employers, employees, or both? In the 
United States, funding for private sector defined benefit plans comes 
almost entirely from employers. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
most other countries with substantial numbers of defined benefit plans, 
employees contribute to those plans and receive a tax deduction for 
doing so. In some defined benefit plans in Canada, the employees’ con-
tribution rate has been increased as a response to the greater benefit 
costs resulting from longer life expectancy. In the United States, private 
sector employees do not receive a tax deduction for contributions to 
defined benefit plans, but they do receive a tax deduction for contribu-
tions to 401(k) plans. 
The lack of tax deductibility of employee contributions to U.S. 
private sector defined benefit plans is an anomaly. It is not the case 
for employees in U.S. state and local government plans, and it is not 
the case for defined benefit plans in all other countries with significant 
numbers of those plans. The question of who should pay for pensions is 
considered in Chapter 8, including whether employee contributions to 
U.S. private sector defined benefit plans should be tax deductible.
Issue 6: To What Extent Should Pension Portfolios Be Regulated? 
In the United Kingdom and the United States, defined benefit pen-
sion portfolios are governed by the mandate that the portfolios be pru-
dently invested. Investments are not judged in isolation but within the 
context of their role in the pension portfolio. In the United Kingdom, no 
more than 5 percent of the defined benefit plans assets can be invested 
in the securities of the sponsoring employer. In the United States, the 
limit is 10 percent. 
Problems with the investment of pension plans occur in the defined 
contribution sector. For example, employees of Enron lost millions of 
dollars when that company collapsed, because many employees were 
heavily invested in their employer’s stock, counter to basic ideas of risk 
diversification.
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Issue 7: What Types of Organizations Should Be Allowed to 
Sponsor Pension Plans? 
In most countries with private pension systems, employers are 
allowed and encouraged to provide private pension plans. In many coun-
tries, multiemployer, industry, or union organizations are allowed to 
sponsor or cosponsor pension plans. These countries include the Neth-
erlands, Japan, Canada, Germany, and the United States. Proposals for 
raising U.S. pension coverage have included some that would extend 
the role of multiemployer plans to efficiently provide pensions through 
economies of scale for employees who work for small employers. 
Issue 8: What Types of Institutions Should Be Allowed to Manage 
Pension Funds?
In defined contribution plans, the employer has traditionally chosen 
the investments, but in 401(k) plans, generally the employer chooses 
the range of funds from which the employee can choose, and the em-
ployee makes the ultimate choice, at least with respect to the employee’s 
contributions. Some defined benefit plans are jointly trusteed, with a 
committee of both employers and employees making the financial deci-
sions. In many countries, including Canada and the United States, multi- 
employer groups jointly manage plans with labor unions. 
In most countries, including the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, employers are allowed to manage pension plans. In 
Japan, however, pension plans must be managed by financial institu-
tions external to the sponsoring company. In Japan, employers play 
little role, only serving as a collection agent for pension contributions, 
which are transmitted to a pension fund management company. 
Other than employers and unions, a variety of financial institutions 
can manage pension funds. Pension fund management can be provided 
by life insurance companies, mutual funds, banks, or companies spe-
cially constituted to manage pension funds. The organizations can be 
profit-making entities or nonprofit entities. In Chile, only special insti-
tutions established specifically to manage pension funds are allowed to 
do so. In most countries, including Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, insurance companies and investment managers 
are allowed to manage pension funds. In Germany, banks play a major 
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role in managing pension funds, while their role in the United States is 
limited to offering Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).
Pension fund management can be centralized in one or a few enti-
ties, or it can be decentralized. Within that framework, investment man-
agement can be done on an individual or a collective basis.
Issue 9: What Role Should Defined Benefit Plans, Defined 
Contribution Plans, and Hybrid Plans Play? 
The role of defined benefit plans has declined in a number of coun-
tries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Some com-
mentators have argued that defined benefit plans are dinosaurs—they 
will eventually become extinct because of changes in the labor market 
environment. Workers are more mobile, and consequently they tend to 
favor defined contribution plans. However, the decline has been much 
more limited in Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. Canada has a 
long-established policy of maintaining a level playing field as it relates 
to allowable contributions to defined contribution and defined benefit 
plans, which may have played a role in the limited decline of defined 
benefit plans. 
A U.S. government policy, perhaps unintended, is the government’s 
apparent encouragement of defined contribution plans over defined 
benefit plans. As an example of the stricter regulation of defined benefit 
plans than defined contribution plans, pension law requires defined bene- 
fit plans to provide annuities as the default option, requiring spousal 
consent if a different option is chosen. By contrast, 401(k) plans face 
no such requirements. The looser regulation of 401(k) plans may be an 
historical artifact resulting from the origins of 401(k) plans as second-
ary plans provided by employers that offered defined benefit plans.
Discouragement of defined benefit plans also may be an unintended 
consequence of policies that are designed to strengthen defined bene-
fit plans but that also increase their costs. It may result in part from 
government policies designed to reduce the tax expenditure associated 
with defined benefit pensions by giving them tax preferences. It may 
be due to government policies that provide options to 401(k) plans, 
such as deductibility of employee contributions, that are not provided 
to defined benefit plans.
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Both defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans impose 
risks on workers. In U.S. defined benefit plans, if a worker is laid off 
at age 50, his future pension benefit will be based on his wages at age 
50. There will be no adjustment for inflation that occurs from that point 
up to the age when he will be eligible to receive benefits, which could 
be age 65. British workers are protected against this risk by mandatory 
price indexation of deferred vested benefits. Reforms may be warranted 
to provide further protection for workers who are laid off. This could 
be viewed as costly to employers, or it could be viewed as preventing 
employers from receiving an actuarial bonus, and thus an incentive, in 
defined benefit pension plans when they lay off workers. 
In general, however, workers are better off when covered by both 
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. The two types of 
plans together, with their different patterns of risk-bearing, provide risk 
diversification. Hybrid plans blend the risk characteristics of defined 
benefit plans, generally imposing more risks on employees than tradi-
tional defined benefit plans but fewer risks than 401(k) plans. Hybrid 
plans are discussed further in Chapter 7.   
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
This book focuses on current pension policy issues. It takes into 
account the major changes in the prevalence of pension plans of dif-
ferent types, in pension law, and in the economic analysis of pensions. 
The book approaches pension policy from different perspectives. One 
perspective is the international perspective, with a focus on lessons 
from international experience for U.S. pension policymakers. While 
attention is paid to the economic analysis of pensions, the book focuses 
on advancing our understanding of pension policy. The book’s goal is 
to improve pension policy, and ultimately the lives of retirees, in the 
United States and elsewhere.
While the book covers a broad range of topics, pension plans and 
pension policy are both complex, and the coverage is not complete. 
Nonetheless, readers seeking an overall introduction to pension policy 
may read the book from cover to cover; other readers may find it more 
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profitable to read particular chapters for a survey of policy issues of 
particular interest. 
Policy issues addressed include the following four questions:
1) How can pension coverage be increased?
2) What can be done to save defined benefit plans?
3) How can annuitization be increased in defined contribution 
plans?
4) How should pension policy adjust to continuing increases in 
life expectancy?
“Mandates: Pathways to Expanding Private Sector Provision” 
(Chapter 2) analyzes issues relating to making private pensions manda-
tory, including by privatizing social security with individual accounts. 
It expands on the brief discussion of mandates in this chapter. A num-
ber of countries have mandated individual account plans that are man-
aged by pension fund providers. Countries use mandatory individual 
accounts primarily in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, 
but Hong Kong and Sweden are other notable examples. 
Some policy experts have discussed proposals mandating that 
employers withhold from payroll employee contributions, with auto-
matic enrollment but worker opt-out, as an alternative to individual 
accounts being mandated through social security. While social secu-
rity provides a uniform structure of benefits and contributions across 
the workforce, mandatory private pensions allow greater flexibility and 
diversity in the types of arrangements. 
Administrative feasibility, meaning functionality at reasonable cost, 
is a key issue with mandates involving small employers. Many small 
employers do not have automated payroll systems, but instead write 
payroll checks by hand or pay in cash. For those employers, withhold-
ing pension contributions and transmitting them to a pension fund pro-
vider is administratively more costly than it is for large employers with 
automated payroll systems who can make electronic transfers of funds. 
For this reason, some employer mandates exempt employers below 
a certain size, such as 10 full-time employees. Administrative issues 
relating to employer mandates are discussed in Chapter 2.
“Extending Pension Coverage” (Chapter 3) analyzes a wide range 
of issues relating to pension coverage. It discusses measures of pen-
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sion coverage in defined contribution plans. The standard measure of 
coverage overstates the percentage of workers accruing benefits based 
on their current work. A measure of pension coverage that requires that 
the worker actually be accruing pension benefits, rather than that the 
worker just have a 401(k) account, yields lower coverage than do tra-
ditional measures (Turner, Muller, and Verma 2003). The chapter also 
discusses the sensitivity of pension coverage to changes in income tax 
rates (Reagan and Turner 2000). 
Pension coverage patterns differ if examined within the context of 
a family rather than an individual. Because fewer women are married 
than in the past, the rising pension coverage rate for women as workers 
is partially offset by declining pension coverage of women as spouses 
of men with coverage (Even and Turner 1999).
Only about half of all workers participate in any type of pension 
plan at a given point in time. Some workers do not contribute to a 
401(k) plan even though their employer offers a matching contribution. 
The chapter discusses the role of inertia versus economic incentives as 
an explanation for why workers turn down pension coverage (Turner 
and Verma 2007). At least five reasons may explain nonparticipation by 
workers eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan. Besides the traditional 
economic reason of lack of economic incentives, four other reasons 
apply to workers who do not fit the classic definition of being well-
informed and rational: 1) high discount rates causing them to place little 
value on future benefits, 2) lack of information, 3) lack of willpower to 
follow through on a decision, and 4) failure to make a decision because 
of passivity, ambivalence, and other similar behavioral factors. The last 
two reasons are often grouped together as inertia. Understanding the 
different reasons may aid in developing effective policies that would 
help workers achieve good pension outcomes. 
“Labor Market Policy: Portability and Retirement” (Chapter 4) 
considers how pension plans—in this case particularly defined benefit 
plans—affect people who change jobs or are laid off. A worker laid off 
in his 50s will generally see the investments in his defined contribution 
plan continue to increase in value. However, his defined benefit plan 
will continuously decline in value because the nominal wages used to 
calculate his benefits will be eroded by inflation occurring between the 
point of layoff and the point of eligibility for benefits, which could be 
as late as age 65.
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Many workers favor phased retirement as a way to gradually tran-
sition into retirement rather than a cliff-style retirement of going from 
full-time work to zero work (Latulippe and Turner 2000). Early retire-
ment in certain physically demanding occupations is facilitated by pen-
sions. Discussions of retirement age policy often focus on people with 
physically demanding jobs where postponed retirement would be dif-
ficult (Turner and Guenther 2005). 
While it is often assumed that defined contribution plans do not 
affect retirement decisions, empirical evidence suggests that workers 
postpone retirement during economic downturns because of the asso-
ciated decline in their account balances, possibly destabilizing labor 
markets by increasing supply at the same time that demand is reduced 
(Ghilarducci and Turner 2007). 
“Tax Policy: Influencing Coverage and the Structure of Pensions” 
(Chapter 5) discusses the tax treatment of the tax basis in contribu-
tory pension plans. Tax basis will increasingly be an important issue for 
baby boomer retirees because it arises in IRAs and 401(k) plans when 
workers make nondeductible contributions. The tax basis is not indexed 
for inflation. Thus, its real value erodes over a worker’s career because 
of inflation. Roth 401(k) plans provide eligible workers a choice as to 
the tax treatment of their pension contributions, in that they have tax-
able contributions but tax-free benefits. These plans thus do not have 
the problem of inflation eroding the tax basis or of the worker need-
ing to provide years of contribution records to prove the tax status of 
withdrawals.
The tax code contains a number of penalties and requirements asso-
ciated with fixed ages as they relate to pension plans. An example is the 
age of 70 ½, which is the age at which pension distributions must occur 
if the participant is no longer employed with the sponsoring employer. 
Employees who withdraw 401(k) plan money from their plans before 
age 59 ½ and are still working for the sponsoring employer must pay 
a 10 percent penalty, as well as paying income taxes. This chapter dis-
cusses the role of fixed ages in pension tax law and whether these ages 
should be raised or indexed as life expectancy increases.
“Managing Pension Risk” (Chapter 6) investigates a broad range of 
risks facing pension participants and plan sponsors. For workers hav-
ing long careers with a single employer, defined benefit plans promise 
retirement benefits with substantially less risk than the retirement bene-
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fits promised by 401(k) plans. Defined benefit plans, however, can be 
risky for workers who change jobs or are laid off. 
Sponsors of defined benefit plans face longevity risk relating to the 
longevity of their retirees. Both the cohort and idiosyncratic (individual) 
risks of increased life expectancy are borne by sponsors of defined 
benefit plans but are borne by individual participants in 401(k) plans. 
Cohort life expectancy risk is the risk that on average people in a cohort 
will live longer than expected. Idiosyncratic life expectancy risk is the 
risk that a particular individual will live longer than expected. While the 
idiosyncratic risks can easily be diversified away through risk pooling 
for a large number of people, pooling does not reduce the cohort risk. 
Cohort life expectancy risk can be borne by individuals at low cost, 
while it is expensive for plan sponsors. The opposite pattern holds for 
risk-bearing of idiosyncratic risk, which is expensive for individuals 
but not for plan sponsors because they can diversify it away. 
The chapter also discusses the UK Pension Protection Fund (PPF), 
which is based on an attempt to learn from the U.S. experience with 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). After more than 30 
years, the PBGC continues to face serious problems, including a large 
deficit. 
“Hybrid Plans: The Best of Both Worlds?” (Chapter 7) focuses on 
the ways that pension plans can be structured to share risks between 
workers and employers. Hybrid defined benefit plans may be desirable 
as a way of preserving the positive aspects for workers of defined bene-
fit plans while reducing the risks that employers face, such as invest-
ment risk and longevity risk. 
While hybrid plans have features of both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans, some are more like defined benefit plans in that they 
define benefits with a benefit formula; however, they do contain some 
defined contribution features. Hybrid plans that are essentially defined 
benefit plans with defined contribution features shift some of the risk 
traditionally borne by employers to workers. Hybrid pension plans that 
are basically defined contribution plans because the benefit is tied to the 
rate of return on an account balance usually add a rate of return guaran-
tee (Turner and Rajnes 2003). 
Cash balance plans are the best-known U.S. hybrid plans (Turner 
2003a), but employers have also offered other types, such as pension 
equity plans. The new DB(k) plan can be offered starting in 2010. 
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The Netherlands has recently adopted hybrid plans with defined bene- 
fit plan benefit formulas, but in which the workers bear the invest-
ment and demographic risks through variable contribution rates that 
they pay. Iceland has mandatory plans that are hybrids, and the United 
Kingdom has some types of hybrid plans. The ABP plan in the Nether-
lands, which is a hybrid plan, is the largest plan in the world in terms of 
assets. These plans all shift cohort life expectancy risk to participants. 
In addition, a number of types of hybrid plans have been proposed, 
such as life expectancy–indexed defined benefit plans (Chapter 10 and 
Muir and Turner 2007). The chapter discusses reasons for the growing 
role of cash balance plans in the U.S. pension system (Lichtenstein and 
Turner 2005). 
“Financing Pensions for Adequacy and Security” (Chapter 8) 
includes a discussion of the financial decisions made by participants 
in defined contribution plans. This chapter incorporates insights from 
behavioral finance concerning the errors participants make in managing 
their pension investments. Gender differences in pension investments 
are discussed (Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner 1997). 
An assumption underlying the U.S. system of voluntary employee 
participation in defined contribution plans is that individuals make good 
financial decisions. A major weakness of this approach is that many indi-
viduals make poor financial decisions, especially when long planning 
horizons are involved, resulting in retirement income that is insufficient 
to maintain their preretirement living standards. Behavioral finance has 
documented these choices and how they result in outcomes that are 
unfavorable to workers in the long run. Behavioral finance theorists 
have used their insight into the roles that inertia and procrastination 
play in worker behavior to propose defaults that preserve worker choice 
while arguably achieving better long-run outcomes for many workers. 
Once a worker has decided to participate in a 401(k) plan, the fac-
tor most affecting the amount of assets accumulated at retirement is 
how much the participant and employer contribute to the plan. Finan-
cial education can be used to influence the decisions participants make 
(McCarthy and Turner 2000). Defaults in defined contribution plans 
can have large effects on worker participation, but the degree to which 
these effects persist over long periods of time and the degree to which 
they work in different types of financial markets have not been investi-
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gated (Turner 2006). One default that has been proposed is a gradually 
increasing contribution rate. 
The level and disclosure of fees in 401(k) plans is a multibillion 
dollar issue. Pension participants in 401(k) plans annually pay billions 
of dollars in fees. With defined benefit plans, the plans’ expenses are 
borne by the sponsoring employer, but with defined contribution plans, 
most of the expenses are borne by the participants. Participants with 
substantial account balances can easily pay hundreds or even thousands 
of dollars in fees every year. 
In spite of the large amounts of money involved, participants rarely 
know how much they are paying in fees, and thus are not able to make 
informed decisions between alternative options (Turner and Korczyk 
2004). They are purchasing services without knowing the price. While 
transparency is a desirable attribute concerning fees, 401(k) fees are 
opaque. The topic is also important because of the size of the effect 
of apparently small fees on account balances. A fee of 1 percent can 
reduce the account balance of a 401(k) plan by 12 percent over a period 
of 20 years (Muller and Turner 2008). 
While some researchers and organizations have focused on extend-
ing coverage or strengthening 401(k) plans, the policy community for 
the most part appears to have given up on saving defined benefit plans. 
However, policies might strengthen defined benefit plans and slow or 
reverse their decline. A strong retirement income system would ide-
ally contain both defined benefit and defined contribution plans because 
both types provided together do a better job of helping workers deal 
with various risks than either do when provided alone. 
“Pension Benefit Policy: The Search for Lost Pensions and Other 
Issues” (Chapter 9) notes that benefits can be provided to participants 
in defined contribution plans in five ways: 1) as annuities, 2) as lump 
sums, 3) as phased withdrawals, 4) as installment payments, and 5) as 
a series of ad hoc payments. Three issues concerning benefit receipt are 
as follows:
1) What happens to workers’ accounts when they change jobs 
before retirement? 
2) Are workers’ accounts annuitized, taken as a lump sum, taken 
as a phased withdrawal, or taken in installments at retirement? 
3) Are survivor benefits provided?
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Pension law requires defined benefit plans to provide survivor bene-
fits as an option. It does not require 401(k) plans that do not provide 
annuities as an option—which are most 401(k) plans—to provide survi-
vor benefits.2 Because of the complex issues associated with annuities, 
Chapter 10 is devoted to them. This chapter discusses the effect of the 
move toward defined contribution plans on the income inequality of 
pension beneficiaries.
Lost pensions are a problem for some job-changers. This problem is 
the focus of efforts by pension assistance programs and a program run 
by the PBGC, but it has received little attention from economists. The 
United Kingdom and Australia have gone far beyond the United States 
in developing policy to deal with this problem (Blake and Turner 2002). 
Pensions may be lost in the sense that job-leavers subsequently cannot 
find their former employer to claim benefits. That problem is especially 
likely to occur when the sponsoring firm has changed location or name, 
perhaps as a result of having been bought out. 
“The Decline in Annuitization and How to Reverse It” (Chapter 
10) is an important issue because annuities provided by pensions are 
decreasing. They are decreasing because of the decline in traditional 
defined benefit plans—historically a key source of low-cost guaranteed 
lifetime income—and the shift to cash balance plans. Cash balance 
plans are required to provide annuities, but perhaps because the bene-
fit is expressed in terms of an account balance, workers typically take 
their benefits as lump sums. Annuities can be particularly valuable for 
women because women tend to outlive the men in their lives, and their 
risk of poverty at the end of life is greater than for men.
Annuities could potentially play an important role in 401(k) plans. 
While it has been expected that workers would increasingly annuitize 
their 401(k) plans with the decline in defined benefit plans, that has not 
occurred. Annuities have been analyzed extensively in the context of 
Social Security reform, and in the context of individually purchased 
annuities, but little attention has been paid to them in the context of the 
unisex requirement in the 401(k) plan setting. With unisex annuities, 
sometimes single men can receive higher benefits outside the pension 
plan than inside it. Thus, an unintended consequence of the unisex rul-
ings by the Supreme Court may have been that the resulting adverse 
selection has caused most 401(k) plan sponsors not to offer annuities. 
Recently, some plan sponsors have begun offering annuities outside the 
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plan through third-party providers. These annuities take into account 
the different mortality risks of men and women.
The concluding chapter, “Finding Better Solutions,” (Chapter 11) 
discusses the main policy proposals for both 401(k) plans and defined 
benefit plans. In addition, with the goal of maintaining a role for defined 
benefit plans in the retirement income system, it proposes a new type 
of hybrid pension plan—the life-indexed DB plan—that preserves key 
aspects of defined benefit plans while shifting some risk and cost to 
workers. 
Notes
 1. Authors differ in the exact terminology they use to refer to different types of plans. 
In this paper, “pension plans” refers to both defined benefit and defined contribu-
tion plans. Because 401(k) plans so dominate the defined contribution plans in the 
United States, generally 401(k) plans are discussed.  






Pathways to Expanding Private Sector Provision
 
How can pension coverage be expanded? How can retirement bene-
fits and retirement savings be increased? How can the range of indi-
vidual choice with respect to retirement income be enlarged? Roughly 
half of U.S. workers are covered by a pension, with older workers and 
higher income workers being more likely to be covered than their coun-
terparts (Purcell 2006). Workers in small firms are much less likely to 
be covered than workers in large firms.1
Mandating private pensions (Ghilarducci 2008) or individual 
accounts as part of Social Security (President’s Commission to 
Strengthen Social Security 2001) has been proposed as the answer to 
those questions. While the debate is heated at times, and apparently dor-
mant at others, it is a continuing area of disagreement among pension 
experts. Mandating appeals to some people on both economic and ideo-
logical grounds. On economic grounds, they argue that mandatory indi-
vidual accounts would increase savings. Some liberals favor mandating 
private pensions as the only way to extend pension coverage to most 
of the workforce. Some conservatives argue that mandatory individual 
accounts as a partial replacement for Social Security would enhance 
individual freedom, private property ownership, and personal respon-
sibility while reducing the government’s role in the economy (ibid.). 
At the heart of the debate is whether mandates should supplement 
Social Security or partially replace it. Some people oppose mandates 
that replace Social Security, arguing that individual accounts may entail 
too much financial market risk, especially for financially vulnerable 
retirees (Gillion et al. 2000). Individual accounts that partially replace 
Social Security are also accompanied by high transition costs to pay the 
benefits already promised under the old Social Security system. 
Individual accounts that are add-ons to Social Security, however, 
may be viewed differently because they retain Social Security as the tra-
ditional base of retirement income. They also do not require transition 
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costs because they do not reduce the funds allocated to pay for Social 
Security benefits already promised. They result in higher contributions 
being paid by workers and employers to the retirement income system, 
but in some cases that may be desirable when inadequate resources are 
being set aside for future retirements.
FOUR PATHWAYS TO PENSION COVERAGE—DEGREES OF 
COMPULSION
Countries have developed a variety of policies to encourage the 
development of pension plans. These policies, however, can be grouped 
into four pathways to pension coverage that are differentiated by the 
degree of incentive or compulsion provided to workers to participate 
in the plan (Rein and Turner 2001). These pathways vary from 1) unre-
strained choice for the worker (including whether to participate in a 
pension plan), to 2) a choice between two alternatives—participating 
in a government-provided pension versus a private-sector-provided 
one—to 3) a mandatory arrangement determined by collective bargain-
ing between employers and trade unions, to 4) a government-imposed 
mandate. The focus of this chapter is on mandating, but by way of intro-
duction all four approaches are compared.
Voluntary participation, with tax incentives. The pathway the 
United States uses to encourage employers to provide pension coverage 
is voluntary with tax incentives. Pension law does not require employ-
ers to provide pensions, and employees are not required to be covered. 
Regulations require an employer who offers a plan to cover a minimum 
percentage of full-time workers. 
A weakness of this approach is that, practically without exception, 
countries that have used this approach have not raised pension coverage 
above 50 percent for private sector workers. With this approach, cover-
age rates tend to be relatively low among low-wage workers (Hinz and 
Turner 1998). 
Labor contracting. A second pathway with an element of mandat-
ing is widespread labor contracting. In some countries where all or most 
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of the labor force is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, a 
high percentage of the labor force has pension coverage through pen-
sion plans resulting from collective bargaining. Countries using this 
approach include France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden. This approach can only be used in countries where a high per-
centage of the labor force is covered by a union or where, as in the 
Netherlands, under labor law a collective bargaining agreement can be 
mandatorily extended to other firms in the same industry. 
Contracting out. Contracting out involves requiring participation 
in a retirement income plan but permitting a choice between participat-
ing in social security or in an alternative private plan. With contract-
ing out, the employer and workers reduce their contribution to social 
security if they participate in a private sector plan that provides benefits 
meeting at least minimum requirements. For those workers choosing 
to contract out, the reduced contribution to social security reduces the 
benefit the worker ultimately receives from social security, but the 
worker receives an added benefit through the individual account. Con-
tracting out maintains free choice, and it may encourage private sector 
employers to provide pension plans.
 This approach is called “a voluntary carve-out” in the United 
States. In Japan, contracting out has been provided on a fairly neutral 
basis with respect to incentive for participation, with the government 
neither subsidizing nor disfavoring it. The United Kingdom, by con-
trast, encourages contracting out by subsidizing it. This approach was 
proposed for the United States by President Bush in 2005 in his second 
inaugural address and subsequent State of the Union message.
A problem that may arise with contracting out, because of its vol-
untary nature, and a reason why full mandating is sometimes viewed 
as preferable, is adverse selection. With adverse selection, the workers 
who most benefit from contracting out leave the social security system, 
eroding its financial base. For example, in the United States, depending 
on the way the contracting out would be structured, and to the extent 
that the social security system redistributes income from upper-income 
to lower-income workers, upper-income workers may be more likely to 
contract out of the system than lower-income workers. 
U.S. Social Security has a progressive benefit formula, providing 
a higher replacement rate for lower-income workers than for higher-
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income workers. This aspect of progressivity is offset by the higher 
mortality rates of low-income workers than high-income workers at 
older ages, which means that high-income workers receive their bene-
fits for more years, on average. 
Mandating. Increasing retirement income by mandating private 
pensions is an alternative to making Social Security more generous. 
While Social Security provides a uniform structure of benefits and con-
tributions across the workforce, mandatory private pensions generally 
allow greater flexibility and diversity in the types of arrangements, in-
cluding differences in early retirement age. The mandatory pension ap-
proach can either require employers to provide a pension plan for their 
workers or require workers to have an individual account plan with a 
third-party provider. 
Australia and Switzerland mandate that employers provide pen-
sions. Sweden mandates individual accounts managed by a government 
agency. The government collects the pension contributions and distrib-
utes them to the mutual funds chosen by workers, with the employer’s 
only role being to transmit the workers’ contributions to the government. 
Mandatory pension systems that supplement a traditional social 
security system often do not cover all workers. They often exclude low-
wage, part-time workers and short-tenure workers. Even with these 
exclusions, mandatory pension systems tend to have high coverage 
rates.  
Relationship to Social Security
An alternative approach to the pathways approach to understanding 
the types of pension arrangements is to categorize pensions according 
to their relationship to social security. Pensions can either be add-ons to 
or carve-outs from social security. An add-on is a pension plan that sup-
plements the social security benefit. The add-on does not affect social 
security benefit levels. A carve-out, by comparison, replaces part or all 
of the social security benefit. Though in reforms that completely replace 
an old system with a new one (such as in Sweden) this distinction can 
get blurred, in reforms such as the type being considered in the United 
States this is a major distinction.
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Add-ons and carve-outs can be either voluntary or mandatory. This 
taxonomy results in four categories of pension plans: voluntary add-ons, 
mandatory add-ons, voluntary carve-outs, and mandatory carve-outs. 
VOLUNTARY CARVE-OUT ACCOUNTS
With a voluntary carve-out, for example as proposed by President 
Bush, workers have a choice. They can remain in the Social Security 
system or withdraw from it, either partially or fully, depending on the 
structure of the voluntary carve-out. In exchange for a reduction in both 
current taxes and future social security benefits, the worker is obliged 
to contribute to an individual account. The employer’s contributions to 
social security also may be transferred to the individual account. 
The United Kingdom has such a system of “contracting out” of 
social security, known as the State Second Pension (S2P) Scheme 
(Blake 1995).2 Rebates of social security contributions are paid into 
the individual accounts of people who give up their right to receive 
the State Second Pension or its forerunner, the State Earnings-Related 
Pension. Workers can invest these rebates in contracted-out company or 
personal pensions. 
The United Kingdom was late in establishing an earnings-related 
social security program, which it did not do until the 1970s. At that 
time, a well-established private pension system was already in place. 
Voluntary carve-outs were permitted in the United Kingdom not to 
reduce a preexisting social security program but to protect a preexisting 
defined benefit private pension system. Later, for ideological reasons, 
workers were allowed to establish private accounts to reduce their par-
ticipation in social security.
Generosity of the Trade-Off 
The trade-off between contributions to an individual account and 
reductions in future social security benefits is the most important aspect 
of the structure of voluntary carve-outs, but it is difficult to calibrate 
the generosity of the trade-off. The smaller the reduction in the work-
er’s future social security benefits that accompanies the reduction in 
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the worker’s social security payroll taxes, the more favorable to the 
worker is the voluntary carve-out—consequently, the more likely it is 
that the worker will choose it. However, another directly related trade-
off exists: the more favorable the voluntary carve-out is to the worker, 
the more costly it is to the government. A generous voluntary carve-out 
may result in a substantial subsidy of individual accounts by the tradi-
tional social security system or by government general revenue.
The trade-off, or benefit offset, determines the voluntary carve-out’s 
effect on social security’s long-run solvency. If the worker is required to 
forgo a part of benefits actuarially equivalent to the benefits that would 
have been paid for by the reduction in his social security payroll taxes, 
social security’s finances will not be affected over the long run. A transi-
tion effect occurs, however, as social security contributions are reduced 
years before the outflows are reduced. If the benefit offset deviates from 
actuarial equivalence, it will affect the desirability to workers of tak-
ing the carve-out, and will have a long-term effect on social security 
finances that could be either positive or negative. 
The carve-out functions like a long-term loan to the worker from 
the social security system. The worker borrows from his future social 
security benefits, with the loan principal being the reduction in the 
worker’s social security contributions. The worker receives the rate of 
return earned on his investment of his individual account, which would 
be an expected 3 percent real (but with interest rate risk) if he or she 
were to invest in U.S. Treasury bonds. The worker repays the loan 
through reduced receipt of social security benefits at the rate specified 
by the carve-out. If that rate were 2 percent real, workers would receive 
a government subsidy of 1 percent per year on the account balances in 
their individual accounts because they would be effectively borrowing 
from the government at 2 percent and receiving a rate of return on the 
investment of the loan at 3 percent. 
The interest rate credited to workers’ hypothetical accounts for 
determining the benefit offset is a risk-free interest rate since it is applied 
to the account with certainty. In contrast, the investment earnings rate 
workers receive on their accounts is a risky rate. Whether workers 
would take the voluntary carve-out would depend on three factors: 
1) how risk-averse they are, 2) what other investments they have, and 
3) what special tax incentives, if any, the government provides.
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The Structure of the Trade-Off between Reduced Contributions 
and Reduced Benefits
For a voluntary carve-out account, the trade-off between reduced 
contributions to social security and reduced benefits from it can be struc-
tured other ways. For example, the reduction in social security bene- 
fits can be the same percentage as the reduction in the worker’s social 
security contributions. The reduction in social security benefits with a 
carve-out can be set as an equal percentage reduction in social security 
benefits for all workers choosing to take the carve-out. For instance, if 
social security contributions by the worker are reduced by x percent, the 
future benefits accrued during that period are also reduced by x percent. 
This way is arguably the simplest administratively. 
Age neutrality. An additional complexity in designing carve-outs 
is to make the reduction in social security benefits age neutral. With age 
neutrality, if a worker finds it optimal to take the voluntary carve-out at 
one age, the worker will find it optimal to continue opting out at older 
ages. This desirable, conceptually simple feature is difficult to achieve 
because of the difference in accrual patterns between traditional defined 
benefit social security plans and individual accounts. 
For defined benefit plans and individual accounts with equal bene-
fits at retirement, generally the individual account accrues benefits more 
rapidly for workers at young ages. In contrast, the defined benefit plan 
accrues benefits more rapidly for workers at older ages, because defined 
benefit plans tend to be backloaded in their benefit accruals. These dif-
ferent patterns of accrual create an incentive for workers to take the vol-
untary carve-out when young but not when older. The problem of the 
switching incentives this causes can be addressed by requiring that once 
a worker has chosen a carve-out, the decision is irrevocable. Such an 
arrangement raises issues of equity, however, if the terms of the trade-
off are subsequently amended, which they almost certainly would be. 
The United Kingdom’s system demonstrates why these terms would 
likely be amended over time. Rather than having a single rebate rate for 
all workers, the United Kingdom has an array of rebate rates, depend-
ing on the worker’s age. Younger workers receive lower rebates on their 
payroll taxes (known as National Insurance contributions) than older 
workers since individual accounts of equal lifetime generosity are more 
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favorable than defined benefit plans for younger workers. In 2001–2002, 
a 20-year-old received a 4 percent rebate, while a 50-year-old received 
the maximum rebate of 9 percent. Age-related rebates designed to keep 
the contracting-out arrangements age neutral are complex, expensive to 
administer, and probably poorly understood by workers. 
The rebate’s size is not fixed for all time in a voluntary carve-out 
system, but can be expected to change over time. The UK rebate struc-
ture is reevaluated by the Government Actuary every five years to incor-
porate changes in life expectancy and interest rates. The rebates have 
been calculated based on the expense in the private sector of providing 
a replacement benefit, with an additional amount added to the rebate as 
an incentive to take it. 
Gender neutrality. A further problem in designing voluntary carve-
out individual accounts is to structure the trade-off so that it is gender 
neutral. Because women have a longer life expectancy than men, a 
gender-blind trade-off will not be gender neutral in effect. The trade-
off in the United Kingdom is not gender neutral. Instead, it encourages 
men and women to take the voluntary carve-out at different ages. For 
example, in the late 1990s, 93 percent of eligible men in Britain aged 
45–54 chose the individual account, compared to only 32 percent of 
eligible women in that age group (Whitehouse 1998). 
For many years, Japan structured its voluntary carve-out with dif-
ferent rebates for men and women. With changed views of gender eq-
uity, that is no longer the case (Turner and Watanabe 1995). An addi-
tional issue relates to how changes in life expectancy affect benefits in 
a voluntary carve-out account and in social security.
In sum, the experience in the United Kingdom demonstrates that 
voluntary carve-out accounts are complex to structure and operate. It 
is difficult to set the relationship between the amount going into the 
carve-out account and the corresponding reduction in the worker’s 
social security benefits. 
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PENSION PRIVATIZATION IN OECD COUNTRIES
While mandatory employer-provided pensions have long been 
favored by some people, they have not been at the top of the U.S. agenda 
for possible implementation for several decades. However, a number of 
countries have adopted them as they have sought to expand coverage 
from the lower coverage rates provided by a voluntary system. 
Australia
Unlike in other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the basic social security benefit 
in Australia is an income-tested and asset-tested benefit, which about 
70 percent of retirees receive. To qualify for this benefit, workers must 
prove that their income and assets fall below a set level. Australia is 
unique among developed countries in that it has never had an earnings-
related social security program. 
To supplement the income-tested benefit, Australia has introduced a 
privatized retirement income system, called the Superannuation Guar-
antee, less formally known as Super. That system involves requiring 
private sector employers to provide pensions that are primarily indi-
vidual accounts. The contribution rate is 9 percent of salary. Since the 
government pension is unfunded, the change represents a move from an 
unfunded toward a funded system.  
Because contributions are mandated by legislation and paid into 
funds administered and invested by the private sector, the government 
has introduced extensive safeguards to ensure that employees’ pension 
entitlements are secure. This regulation has resulted in increased com-
plexity and added costs. The safeguards place a heavy burden on trustee 
boards responsible for overseeing the funds’ management. 
Sweden
Sweden has instituted a mandatory individual account system that 
incorporates lessons learned from the experiences of Chile and other 
countries, particularly in ways to reduce administrative costs. This 
individual account system reflects a desire to increase the amount of 
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prefunding in the Swedish retirement income system, and to move to 
a system with greater emphasis on the role of the capital market and 
individualism (Harrysson and O’Brien 2003). 
Through measures that took effect in 1999 and 2000, Sweden 
replaced its traditional defined benefit social security program with 
a notional account plan supplemented by a mandatory, funded indi-
vidual account. A notional account system is one where each worker 
has an account that is credited with contributions and interest earnings. 
However, the system is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, so the indi- 
vidual accounts are not funded, and the account balances are bookkeep-
ing entries. Out of a total contribution rate of 18.5 percent of earned 
income, 16.0 percent is for the notional account system and 2.5 per-
cent is for individual accounts, called the Premium Pension. Starting 
in 2000, Swedish workers were allowed to choose from 460 pension 
funds to manage their pension investments, with the default fund being 
a government-run fund. By 2005, the number of funds had grown to 
more than 600. 
The Premium Pension system is administered by a new govern-
ment agency, the Premium Pension Authority (PPM, or Premipensions-
myndigheten in Swedish). The PPM acts as a clearinghouse and record 
keeper for the funded individual account system. This new agency was 
needed because the individual account system includes a broad range of 
new activities that would have been difficult to undertake within the tra-
ditional functions of the National Insurance Board. In addition, a cen-
tral agency is expected to help keep administrative costs low because of 
scale economies in administration (Palmer 2001). 
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has encouraged contracting out to individual 
account plans, but it is continuing to make changes in its retirement 
income system (Blake and Turner 2002). While every developed coun-
try has a social security system, the United Kingdom is unusual in giv-
ing every employer and every employee the option of contracting out 
part of social security. By comparison, contracting out in Japan is avail-
able only through employer-provided defined benefit plans. 
Contracting out in the United Kingdom has developed into a highly 
complex system. In 1986, the United Kingdom passed an act designed 
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to encourage contracting out from the State Earnings-Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS), a defined benefit plan, using individual accounts. 
Previously, contracting out had only been possible with employer- 
provided defined benefit plans. That act enabled occupational plans to 
contract out by providing an individual account. It also enabled indi-
viduals to contract out of SERPS or out of their employer-provided 
contracted-out defined benefit plan using a personal pension called an 
Approved Personal Pension. Workers with personal pensions are per-
mitted to recontract into social security if that later appears to be favor-
able, and many do so. 
The United Kingdom replaced SERPS with a new pension program 
called the State Second Pension (S2P), which took effect in April 2002. 
Workers and employers are permitted to contract out of the State Sec-
ond Pension. The S2P was initially earnings-related, but in April 2007 
it became a flat rate benefit, even though contributions are earnings- 
related. While the State Second Pension is a flat rate pension, the rebates 
paid to workers opting out remain related to earnings. This arrangement 
provides greater incentive for lower-income earners to stay in the plan 
and for middle- and higher-income earners to opt out. 
Employees who contract out of S2P receive a rebate on their social 
security contributions. The rebate is intended to reflect the savings to 
the government from not having to pay the pension to that participant. 
The rebate is paid directly into the employee’s contracted-out pension 
fund.
CONCLUSION
This chapter presents an overview of mandating pension provi-
sion around the world. It discusses both contracting out and pension 
mandating, and it also discusses issues relating to mandatory individual 
accounts. The chapter describes the main features of mandated and 
privatized systems in several countries. Mandating has been far more 
common an approach than voluntary carve-outs. 
While voluntary carve-outs may appeal because they expand the 
range of choice, the feasibility of managing such a system hinges in part 
on the complexities of structuring the rebate for the voluntary carve-
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out. The idea of offering the choice to participate in a funded individual 
account pension rather than in the social security program is appealing 
on ideological grounds to some people. However, it is difficult to struc-
ture voluntary carve-outs so that they are age and gender neutral and so 
that they are neutral in their effect on the financing of the social security 
program. These difficulties are among the reasons few countries have 
adopted voluntary carve-outs.  
Notes
 1. This chapter draws heavily from Turner (2006). 





Roughly half of U.S. private sector workers are not covered by a 
pension. Policymakers have long struggled with the question of how 
pension coverage can be expanded within a voluntary pension system. 
The United States has instituted numerous pension policy innovations 
over the past several decades, including, notably, 401(k) plans. Rais-
ing pension coverage has been a policy goal over this period. Pension 
coverage, however, has remained stagnant at roughly 50 percent of pri-
vate sector workers for full-time employees (BLS 2003). Frustration 
over the failure of pension policy to increase coverage has raised the 
question of what we can learn from countries with considerably higher 
pension coverage rates. 
A worker is covered by a pension when the worker is eligible to 
participate in a plan offered by his or her employer. The term cover-
age traditionally has also been used to refer to pension participation 
because in defined benefit plans, but not defined contribution plans, the 
two are equivalent. Pension participation is the ultimate goal, and it 
occurs when the worker is accruing future benefits in the plan. While 
most of this book focuses on workers who are pension participants, this 
chapter examines reasons why roughly half of full-time workers are not 
pension participants. 
Countries with well-developed pension systems use a considerable 
variety of policies to increase pension coverage rates. While the United 
States relies on voluntary provision by employers and uses tax incen-
tives for motivation, that approach does not lead to high coverage rates. 
As a result, other countries, such as Australia and Switzerland, have 
mandated that employers provide occupational pensions, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. Still other countries, such as the Netherlands 
and Sweden, have widespread pension coverage because labor unions 
have a pervasive role in their labor markets. This chapter focuses on 
pension policy to extend coverage and participation within a voluntary 
pension system. 
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MEASURES OF COVERAGE
The goal of pension coverage is to provide income for families in 
retirement. The traditional measure of coverage is the percentage of 
workers participating in a pension plan at a particular point in time. 
Other measures, however, may better indicate the extent to which the 
goal is being met.
Family Rather Than Individual Coverage Rates
While pension coverage is traditionally measured as the percentage 
of workers eligible to participate in a pension, this approach is not con-
sistent with the emphasis in public policy on the family or household as 
the economic unit. Coverage rates are higher for families or households 
than they are for individuals because the family would be considered 
as covered if one member had pension coverage. Over time, changes 
in family structure affect coverage rates. For example, when consider-
ing the coverage of women, the coverage rate is higher using a family 
measure than a worker measure. However, with increasing divorce rates 
and women increasingly living without a spouse, those changes reduce 
women’s coverage rates over time (Even and Turner 1999).
Persistency of Coverage
Pension coverage only provides meaningful benefits if it persists 
over time. One study finds that contributors generally persisted in mak-
ing contributions, but that the contribution rate tended to vary over 
time. Smith, Johnson, and Muller (2004) use the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) to look at the persistency of employee 
contributions to 401(k) plans for up to 12 years. Nineteen percent of 
contributors were intermittent (i.e., had breaks in their contributions). 
Paul Smith (2001), using a sample of tax returns from 1987 to 1996, 
finds a high rate of drop-off in contributions to Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs). Of those contributing in 1987, only 45 percent were 
still contributing in 1992, and 40 percent were contributing through 
1996. Sarah Smith (2006), using the British Household Panel Survey, 
finds a link between pension contributions and changes in an indi- 
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vidual’s income needs, as measured by financial circumstances, health, 
having a baby, and moving to a new house. 
Pension Coverage in Defined Contribution Plans
While coverage is synonymous with participation in defined benefit 
plans in the United States, in 401(k) plans covered workers generally 
must also contribute. Not all choose to do so. 
To assess progress in improving pension participation, policy ana-
lysts need empirical measures of participation. Measures are needed 
that are consistent with the underlying goal of increasing the amount 
of retirement income provided through the private pension system. For 
comparability across plan types, the measure of pension participation 
for defined contribution plans should be consistent with the measure for 
defined benefit plans. Concepts that have been developed for defined 
benefit plans do not always transfer directly to defined contribution 
plans.
This section discusses the meaning of participation in a defined con-
tribution plan. It presents a measure of active participation that requires 
that the worker be earning a benefit based on current contributions, 
made either by himself or by his employer. It compares that measure 
with a more traditional measure of participation (Turner, Muller, and 
Verma 2003). 
Four definitions of participation in defined contribution plans have 
been used in empirical studies and reports. First, prior to 2007, an active 
participant in a defined contribution plan was defined by the Department 
of Labor in the Form 5500 statistics as a worker with a positive account 
balance in a defined contribution plan offered through his or her current 
employer. Total participants include beneficiaries and vested partici-
pants who have terminated employment with that employer. Thus, it is 
possible under this definition for workers and their employers to not be 
contributing to their defined contribution plan and still be counted as 
participating in the plan. 
Second, as of 2007, the Department of Labor changed its definition 
of active participants to include any worker who is eligible to partici-
pate in a 401(k) plan, whether or not they do so. This definition of active 
participation is not an economically meaningful definition since it in-
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cludes workers who are not participating and thus have zero account 
balances. 
Third, in studies using data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), workers generally are 
counted as participating if they respond that they are participating. 
Thus, the worker decides the definition of pension participation. It is not 
known what definition or definitions workers are implicitly using when 
responding that they are pension participants. In defined contribution 
plans, some workers may mean that they have a defined contribution 
plan with a positive account balance with their current employer, but 
others may be basing their response on the more restrictive definition of 
contributing to their plan. 
Fourth, some analysts—for example, Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox 
(1998) and Clark and Schieber (1998)—count only those employees 
contributing to the plan in a given year as participants that year. This 
definition does not include as participants employees who did not con-
tribute but who had employers that contributed in their behalf. Thus, 
this definition does not apply to non-401(k)-type plans because employ-
ees do not contribute to those plans.
Active Pension Participation 
Workers who are enrolled in a defined contribution plan or who 
have the option to be enrolled, but for whom no contributions are being 
made, are not participating in a meaningful economic sense. Workers 
who do not contribute during a year and for whom their employer does 
not contribute are not considered to be active participants in a defined 
contribution plan. That definition is consistent with the definition used 
for defined benefit plans, where workers are participants if they are ac-
cruing future benefits. This situation of no contribution being made for 
a worker who has a plan with an account balance with his or her current 
employer arises in profit sharing plans, because pension law does not 
require employers to contribute to those plans every year. It arises in 
401(k) plans, where the employer’s contribution typically depends on 
the employee having made a contribution. Also, if an employee makes 
a hardship withdrawal—for example, for a large medical expenditure—
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the employer may temporarily suspend both employer and employee 
contributions. 
One study suggests that nearly 30 percent of workers with 401(k) 
accounts may not be contributing to those accounts in a given year. 
The 1993 April CPS asked workers with 401(k) accounts whether they 
planned to contribute to their accounts, and only 68 percent responded 
that they did plan to contribute. However, others responded that they 
did not know whether they would contribute or refused to answer, and 
for some their employer may have contributed (Honig and Dushi 2003). 
A more recent study finds that possibly more than 20 percent of par-
ticipants with a 401(k) account were not active participants because 
they did not contribute to the account, nor did their employer (Turner, 
Muller, and Verma 2003). These studies suggest a serious problem 
affecting the retirement account balances of a substantial number of 
workers participating in 401(k) plans. 
POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE EMPLOYERS TO PROVIDE 
PENSION PLANS
The employer’s willingness to provide pensions in a voluntary 
system is key. Aspects of pension policy affect the costs that employ-
ers face. For example, accounting and regulatory standards can limit 
employers’ flexibility as to the timing of pension contributions, as dis-
cussed in the chapter on financing. Standards that limit the maximum 
amount of overfunding during economic boom periods may force plan 
sponsors to contribute more during economic slumps, when it is more 
difficult for them to contribute. Accounting and regulatory standards 
can limit their flexibility as to choice of portfolio composition. For in-
stance, standards that discouraged plan investments in equity would 
cause a shift from equities to bonds, which could increase the cost of 
providing pensions.
With the voluntary approach, pension law does not require employ-
ers to provide pensions, and employees are not required to participate. 
If an employer chooses to provide pension coverage, however, nondis-
crimination regulations may require that the employer offer coverage 
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to most full-time workers. Part-time U.S. workers working less than 
1,000 hours a year are excluded from the requirement. Nondiscrimi-
nation rules arguably have at least two effects. First, they cause some 
workers to be covered in firms offering pensions who might otherwise 
not be covered. Second, they cause some workers not to be covered in 
firms not offering pensions who might otherwise be covered if the firm 
could be more selective in its offering. Empirical research is needed to 
determine which effect predominates. 
The voluntary approach to pension participation differs consider-
ably between defined benefit and defined contribution pensions. With a 
defined benefit pension, if the employer provides a pension to a worker, 
the worker’s participation is automatic. If an employer offers a defined 
contribution pension, participation by workers may be automatic—and 
some have proposed that it should be—but generally in 401(k) plans it 
depends on the worker choosing to contribute.
The economic costs and benefits of pension coverage, and thus the 
factors affecting whether it is provided by a firm, can be considered at 
three different locations in the firm’s organizational structure.
• First, and the usual focus of analysis, are the tax and other in-
centives provided to employees to participate in a pension. The 
incentives provided by government policy create a demand by 
workers for pension coverage.
• Second, the compensation incentives provided through the pen-
sion plan to top management, who are the key decision makers 
in the firm, may be a factor in whether a firm offers a pension 
plan. These employees are the top-paid employees in the firm, 
so the focus is on the incentives provided for pension coverage 
to highly-paid workers. For example, some proposals would 
raise the limits on tax-deductible benefits highly compensated 
workers could receive.
• Third, there are costs and benefits to the firm and its share-
holders in terms of how the profitability of the firm is affected 
by providing pension coverage. For example, firm profitability 
could be enhanced by its use of the pension to attract and retain 
talented employees. A firm’s decision to offer a pension pre-
sumably is based on these three considerations. 
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Pension Coverage at Small Firms
Pension coverage at small firms is low relative to coverage at large 
firms, but has risen in recent years (Even and Macpherson 2008). Many 
small employers do not provide pension plans for their employees. 
This lack of pension provision may be because their employees place 
a higher priority on health insurance or on wages than on coverage by 
a pension plan. Coverage is low in part because workers at small firms 
tend to have low wages. It may also be low because pensions are more 
expensive to provide at small firms because of economies of scale. 
IRAs 
One factor shaping U.S. pension policy is the focus on individual 
responsibility. With this focus, all workers are covered by a pension 
plan—the Individual Retirement Account (IRA). They will receive a 
tax deduction (provided they are liable for taxes) if they contribute to 
the account.
IRA-Based Plans
One of the approaches that policymakers have taken to encourage 
employers to offer plans is to provide them with low-cost plan options. 
There are three IRA-based plan options: 1) the Payroll Deduction IRA, 
2) the SEP (Simplified Employee Pension plan), and 3) the SIMPLE 
(Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees) IRA. While the Payroll 
Deduction IRA and the SEP can be set up by any employer, the SIMPLE 
IRA can only be established by employers with 100 or fewer employees 
and no other type of pension plan. All three types of plans have no an-
nual filing requirement for the employer. The Payroll Deduction IRA 
accepts employee contributions only, the SEP accepts employer contri-
butions only, and the SIMPLE accepts both types of contributions. The 
three types of plans differ considerably in the maximum contributions 
allowed, which ranged in 2007 from $4,000 for a Payroll Deduction 
IRA to $45,000 for the SEP.
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POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE WORKERS TO PARTICIPATE
With a progressive income tax system, under which marginal tax 
rates rise with worker income, low-income workers have less incentive 
to participate in a pension plan than do high-income workers. This ap-
proach targets incentives to higher-income workers because they have 
higher marginal tax rates. There is a trade-off between the cost to the 
government from the tax incentives offered and the amount by which 
pension participation is increased. Also, there may be a trade-off in a 
tax-based system between encouraging low-income workers to partici-
pate and providing too much in incentives to higher-wage workers, who 
are more likely to participate in any case.
U.S. employers and policymakers have used a number of approaches 
to encourage workers to participate in 401(k) plans. These approaches 
have included increasing the financial incentive for employees to par-
ticipate, increasing the appeal of pensions through particular features, 
and making it easier for employees to participate. 
First, employers can encourage workers to participate in 401(k) 
plans by offering a match for employee contributions. The match, for 
example, could be dollar-for-dollar up to a certain level of employee 
contributions, with a lower match rate, or no match, beyond that. A 
number of empirical studies find that employer matching contributions 
increase employee participation, but the marginal effect on employee 
contributions of a higher match rate is generally small (Clark and 
Schieber 1998; Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor 2000; Papke and Poterba 
1995). 
Second, with automatic enrollment, workers are automatically 
enrolled in 401(k) plans as the default option; however, workers may 
choose to not participate. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued 
rulings indicating that it is permissible for employers to automatically 
enroll participants in 401(k) plans provided that the employee is notified 
in advance and is permitted to leave the plan if he or she chooses to do 
so (Purcell 2004). With automatic enrollment, part of the participant’s 
pay is contributed to a 401(k) plan and invested in a default investment 
option without any action required by the worker. Automatic enrollment 
has been adopted by a minority of plans, but the number is growing. As 
Extending Pension Coverage   41
of 2004, only 11 percent of all 401(k) plans, and 31 percent of plans 
with more than 5,000 participants, had adopted automatic enrollment 
(Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America 2005). Plans with automatic 
enrollment tend to be large plans.
Automatic enrollment has been shown to substantially increase 
pension coverage in studies of a few firms, but the wider applicability 
of the studies has not been demonstrated. For example, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that automatic enrollment may have little effect on 
pension participation during periods of dramatic decline in the stock 
market. Automatic enrollment is most effective when it makes it easier 
for people to do something they already wanted to do.
Automatic enrollment might lead to some employees having re-
duced benefits because they would have participated and contributed at 
a higher rate than the default rate, but with automatic enrollment they 
contribute at the default rate. Similarly, efforts to promote the automatic 
enrollment IRA could lead new or growing firms to choose auto-IRAs, 
which have no employer match and no ERISA protections for workers, 
rather than choosing a 401(k) plan.
A problem that may arise with automatic enrollment is lost pension-
ers. In firms where there is high job turnover, workers may quit without 
informing the firm, leaving behind small pension amounts in defined 
contribution plans. These small accounts are vested because of the re-
quirement of immediate vesting of employee contributions, and they 
can be expensive for employers to maintain. 
A British study interviewed employers at 14 firms that had con-
sidered implementing automatic enrollment but had rejected the idea 
(Horack and Wood 2005). It finds that employers were concerned about 
enrolling workers in plans without their prior knowledge or consent, 
especially when the workers were required to contribute. They were 
concerned that such a move would be disadvantageous to some em-
ployees. They also were concerned about their increased costs because 
of the need to make matching contributions for more workers, some of 
whom would not appreciate the expense to the employer. 
Third, participation in 401(k) plans may be encouraged by requir-
ing in a given time frame a decision on whether to enroll in the plan. 
For example, workers may be required to decide within the first couple 
of months of work on a new job (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006; 
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Horack and Wood 2005). Active decisions are best used as the approach 
to enrolling workers when workers have differing needs and prefer-
ences and have a strong propensity to procrastinate. Under standard 
enrollment, which requires greater initiative by the employee, pension 
enrollment tends to increase with employee tenure. Active enrollment 
leads to workers enrolling more quickly and to higher enrollment levels. 
After three months with active enrollment, the percentage of workers 
enrolled equaled that which had been achieved previously after three 
years of standard enrollment. Even after 30 months, for the one firm in 
the study (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006), participation for employ-
ees required to choose still exceeded that of those under the standard 
enrollment regime, by 83 percent to 69 percent. 
Fourth, employers can encourage workers to participate by offer-
ing attractive features in their 401(k) plan. For example, offsetting the 
illiquidity of pension assets by offering loans from a 401(k) plan may 
encourage participation. In 1997, the General Accounting Office—now 
called the Government Accountability Office (GAO)—found that par-
ticipation rates in plans that allowed loans were 6 percentage points 
higher than in plans that did not allow loans (GAO 1997). One study 
finds that allowing participant direction of investments increases worker 
participation (Papke 2004).
A plan design feature adversely affecting participation may be the 
complexity of the investment decision. One study finds a strong nega-
tive relationship between the number of investment options offered by 
a 401(k) plan and the participation rate. Increasing by 10 the number of 
funds offered led to a 1.5 to 2.0 percentage point decline in the average 
participation rate (Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang 2003). 
A UK study, however, finds that simplifying the application form 
had little effect. In some cases, all the worker had to do was to sign 
a form that contained information the employer already had obtained 
from payroll records (Horack and Wood 2005). This approach may 
have had little effect because workers still faced the problem of how 
to invest their pension money. Workers with no experience with invest-
ments may be reluctant to participate in a 401(k) plan, since they do not 
know what investments to choose.
Fifth, employers can encourage workers to participate by providing 
them with financial education about the need for adequate retirement 
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savings (Bernheim and Garrett 2003; McCarthy and Turner 2000). 
Although it provides workers with additional information, financial 
education raises the costs of their plan, which workers may bear through 
added fees unless paid for directly by the employer.
A sixth possible option is to require married workers who do not 
participate in the individual account plan offered by their employer to 
get spousal consent to this decision. A related alternative would be that 
the spouse would be notified of the decision not to participate. These 
options, to our knowledge, are untried.
Seventh, an approach that has been discussed in Congress, but not 
enacted into law, links the pension coverage of executives with rank-
and-file workers. It requires employers that provide a pension plan for 
executives to provide a defined benefit plan for rank-and-file workers.
The voluntary approach to pension participation maintains freedom 
of choice for individuals and employers. A weakness is that, practi-
cally without exception, countries that have used this approach have 
not raised pension coverage above 50 percent for private sector work-
ers. With this approach, coverage rates tend to be relatively low among 
low-wage workers (Hinz and Turner 1998). Because tax incentives are 
provided by exempting contributions and investment earnings from in-
come taxation, this approach offers greater incentives to higher-income 
workers than lower-income workers in a progressive income tax system 
because higher-income workers have higher marginal tax rates (Reagan 
and Turner 2000). 
Within the voluntary approach, a relatively high degree of compul-
sion (incentive) would be achieved if employers offering a pension were 
required to cover all workers, if benefits were locked in until retirement, 
and if tax credits were offered. A relatively low degree of compulsion 
(incentive) would be achieved if the marginal tax rates workers faced 
were low, if the amounts that could be contributed were low, and if the 
tax treatment was relatively unfavorable—for example, by employee 
contributions not being tax-exempt.
Pension Coverage for Low-Wage Workers
In the United States and other countries with voluntary pension 
systems, the participation rate is considerably higher for high-income 
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workers than for low-income workers. The participation rate in the 
United States was higher than 75 percent for groups with income higher 
than $80,000 a year in 1997, while it was only 22 percent for those 
workers with annual income under $20,000 (CBO 2003). Because, in a 
voluntary pension system, coverage rates tend to be lower for low-wage 
workers than for high-wage workers, this section focuses on efforts to 
raise the pension coverage rate for low-wage workers. 
These efforts may be limited, without a subsidy, by concerns over 
reducing the already low wages of low-wage workers. Because of the 
pension-wage trade-off, providing pensions for low-wage workers 
would presumably result in a reduction in their wages. In any case, 
coverage is already available to all U.S. workers because they can con-
tribute to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), though few do.
Unions can play an important role in the coverage of low-wage 
workers. One study finds that while 34 percent of low-wage men were 
covered by a pension, 71 percent of low-wage men who were union 
members were covered by a pension (Ghilarducci and Lee 2005).
Within the basic voluntary framework of tax preferences for pen-
sions, other policies can further encourage low-wage workers to 
participate. Small businesses can claim a tax credit for certain costs 
of starting a new plan for their employees. Low-wage workers work 
disproportionately at small businesses, and small businesses are more 
likely than large businesses to not provide pensions. 
Tax preferences provide minimal incentives to the majority of 
American households—those who are in the 15 percent, 10 percent, 
or zero income tax brackets. The Saver’s Credit, enacted in 2001, was 
designed to address this problem. Eligible moderate- and lower-income 
employees may be able to claim a tax credit for half of their pension 
contributions up to a maximum credit of $1,000 through the Saver’s 
Credit for contributions to a retirement plan starting in 2002. As the 
only major pension tax incentive targeted specifically to the majority of 
American households, it was designed to level the playing field in terms 
of tax incentives received by upper- and lower-income taxpayers by 
giving taxpayers earning less than $50,000 a tax credit for contributions 
to 401(k) plans, IRAs, and similar retirement savings plans. The Pen-
sion Protection Act of 2006 made it permanent and indexed its income 
eligibility limits to inflation. Because the Saver’s Credit is nonrefund-
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able, it merely offsets a taxpayer’s tax liability; it provides no saving 
incentive for about 50 million lower-income households that have no 
income tax liability. 
Automatic enrollment is another policy to encourage low-wage 
workers to participate. Once they are automatically enrolled, inertia 
may keep them enrolled, though this effect has not been investigated 
over more than a few years. Furthermore, its effects may be undone at 
job change if workers withdraw their account balances. The positive 
effect on retirement savings may be short-lived, with workers cashing it 
out when they change jobs.
Coverage of Nonworking Spouses
Pension participation is generally limited to workers. However, 
workers are permitted to establish an Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA) for a nonworking spouse. This option is not available through 
401(k) plans but would be a possible extension. In Sweden, the man-
datory Premium Pension Plan permits a worker to contribute to the 
account of a spouse. Pension participation could be extended further to 
nonworkers by permitting anyone with income to establish a pension 
account, or even by permitting a pension account to be established for 
anyone—even for those without income. The account could be estab-
lished, for example, by parents of nonworking or disabled children.
Participation in 401(k) Plans
One of the surprises of pension policy during the 1990s was that 
some workers do not contribute to a 401(k) plan even though their em-
ployer offers a matching contribution. It was thought that the matching 
contribution, on top of the tax incentive, would provide a powerful in-
centive. At least five reasons may explain noncontribution, and thus 
nonparticipation, by workers eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan 
(Turner and Verma 2007). The first is the traditional economic reason 
of lack of economic incentives to participate. In addition to that reason, 
four reasons apply to workers who do not fit the classic definition of 
being well-informed and rational: 
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1) high discount rates causing them to place little value on future 
consumption, 
2) lack of information as to the economic benefits of participating 
in a pension plan, 
3) lack of willpower to follow through on a decision, and 
4) failure to make a decision because of passivity, ambivalence, 
or inertia.
Understanding the different reasons for nonparticipation by work-
ers may aid in developing effective policies that would help workers 
achieve good pension outcomes.
The term “high discount rates” refers to the time discounting of 
future consumption by workers. If workers place a low value on fu-
ture consumption relative to present consumption, they are less likely 
to save, including by participating in a pension plan. Some workers may 
not participate in a plan because they lack information about the plan, 
or perhaps they lack information about the need to save for retirement. 
Some workers may understand the need to save, but they are unable to 
discipline themselves when faced with the temptations of current con-
sumption. Other workers may not register for coverage when coverage 
is not automatic because they have ambivalent feelings, because they 
mistrust financial institutions, or because they have a passive attitude 
toward this type of decision making.
Research in behavioral finance has provided lessons for plan de-
sign that may raise participation in 401(k) plans. Behavioral finance 
considers psychological issues affecting how workers make financial 
decisions. An insight from behavioral finance is the importance of de-
faults. Judicious choice of defaults by pension plan sponsors, so that 
coverage is the default option, may have the result that workers are 
more likely to have pension coverage. 
Coverage Insights from Behavioral Economics and 
Behavioral Finance
An assumption underlying the system of voluntary employee par-
ticipation in defined contribution plans is that individuals make good 
financial decisions that they are able to implement. The reality is that 
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many individuals are passive, accepting the default, or make poor 
choices, resulting in retirement income that is insufficient to maintain 
their preretirement living standards. Behavioral finance theorists have 
used their insight into the roles that inertia and procrastination play in 
worker behavior to propose solutions that preserve worker choice while 
arguably achieving better long-run outcomes for many workers. 
Behavioral finance and behavioral economics focus on psychologi-
cal factors affecting individuals’ decision making. These factors include 
how individuals deal with problems arising from the quantity and qual-
ity of information available to them. This approach expands on the 
methodology of traditional finance and economics, which focuses on 
the behavior of well-informed persons who are psychologically capable 
of implementing the decisions they make. 
Encouraging Participation
The most commonly used arrangement for enrolling workers in 
401(k) plans, called “standard enrollment,” is that workers must sign up 
to participate. The default if the worker takes no action is nonparticipa-
tion. The worker who participates must choose how much to contribute, 
whether to change the contribution rate over time, and the asset alloca-
tion for his or her account.
Some workers whose employer offers a 401(k) plan may not par-
ticipate in it because they are ineligible or because they do not choose to 
participate. Data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) for 2003 indicate that those who are eligible but do not participate 
constitute 22 percent of private sector workers eligible to participate in 
defined contribution plans (Turner and Verma 2005). Employees who 
work in firms that offer 401(k) plans but who do not participate in any 
plan offered by their employer tend to be younger than participants, to 
be female, and to have lower education, earnings, and tenure (Hinz and 
Turner 1998; Turner and Verma 2005). 
Economic studies of pension participation (Hinz, Turner, and 
Fernandez 1994) indicate characteristics of workers who do not partici-
pate when offered a pension plan. They generally do not examine the 
workers’ reasons for why they do not participate. For example, it is un-
clear whether workers’ nonparticipation reflects an affirmative choice 
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made by them or reflects inertia which has caused them not to make 
an active choice. Furthermore, inertia could be caused by different fac-
tors—indecisiveness, lack of interest, or inability to act on a decision. 
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for 2003 
asked nonparticipating workers who were offered a pension why they 
did not participate (Table 3.1). More than 40 percent of nonpartici-
pating men and nearly 40 percent of women replied that they could 
not afford to contribute. Roughly 20 percent of nonparticipating men 
and nearly 30 percent of women indicated that they did not want to tie 
up the money. The next most common reason given by both men and 
women (more than 14 percent of each not participating) was that they 
hadn’t thought about it. Other responses included that the worker did 
not need the plan, or that the worker or spouse had other pension cover-
age. With this set of questions, most participants gave economic, rather 
than behavioral, reasons for not participating—they couldn’t afford to, 
they didn’t want to tie up their money, or they didn’t need the coverage.
These responses can be compared to those from an earlier study of 
federal government workers who did not choose to participate in the 
Thrift Savings Plan (Hinz and Turner 1998). The Thrift Savings Plan 
Table 3.1  Reasons Why Workers Who Are Eligible to Participate in a 
Pension Plan Do Not Participate (%)
Reasons for not contributing Men Women
Cannot afford to contribute 43.6 39.7
Do not want to tie up money 21.6 28.8
Haven’t thought about it 14.4 14.5
Do not plan to be on job long enough 7.2 4.6
Have an IRA or other pension coverage 4.6 4.6
Spouse has a pension plan 4.2 1.4
Employer doesn’t contribute or doesn’t 
contribute enough
3.7 4.2
Do not need it 3.6 3.5
Started job too close to retirement 2.3 1.2
Some other reason 23.2 25.6
NOTE: Figures represent percentage of noncontributing eligible workers. Percentages 
sum to more than 100 because workers can provide multiple answers.
SOURCE: 2003 SIPP data set (Turner and Verma 2005).
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was designed to be similar to 401(k) plans. The most common answer, 
given by more than a fourth of men (29 percent) and a third of women 
(34 percent), was that they could not afford to contribute (Table 3.2). 
However, factors other than income were clearly among the determi-
nants of the response that the worker could not afford to contribute. 
Most (81 percent) of the workers in the lowest income quartile did not 
give that response, while a few (7 percent) of the workers in the highest 
quartile did give that response. 
The SIPP data give two possible responses for not contributing 
that may relate to noneconomic reasons (“Haven’t thought about it” 
and “Some other reason”). In contrast, the data used in the Hinz and 
Turner (1998) study provide a number of noneconomic reasons as op-
tions. Nearly one in six men and women (16 percent of each) did not 
contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan because, they reported, they did 
not understand the plan, and nearly as many (12 percent of men and 
15 percent of women) did not contribute because, they reported, they 
did not have enough information. A tenth of the noncontributors (10 
percent each of men and women) did not contribute because they had 
not considered whether to do so. More than one-eighth of women (14 
Table 3.2  Reasons for Not Contributing to the Federal Thrift 
Savings Plan (%)
Reasons for not contributing Men Women
Can’t spare the money 28.7 34.2
Prefer other investments 24.2 19.7
Too close to retirement 16.7 13.1
Don’t understand the Thrift Savings Plan 13.7 16.0
Don’t want money tied up 14.2 14.2
Don’t have enough information 12.0 14.5
No confidence in the plan 10.3 5.8
Haven’t considered the Thrift Savings Plan 10.1 9.6
Never got around to it 7.3 13.7
May not stay in federal government 3.9 3.8
NOTE: Figures represent percentage of noncontributing eligible workers; multiple 
responses were possible.
SOURCE: Hinz and Turner (1998); computations from 1990 Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Board data.
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percent), but fewer men (7 percent), did not contribute because, as they 
reported, they had not bothered to sign up to do so. 
Information problems. How much workers and their spouses 
should save for retirement is a complex problem. The answer depends 
on factors such as the age at which they started saving for retirement, 
their expected age at retirement and what their life expectancy is at that 
age, the expected rate of return and risk associated with their invest-
ments, whether they have employer-provided retiree health insurance, 
and whether they own their home and expect to have paid off the mort-
gage by retirement. Some workers may not participate in a pension 
plan because they do not understand how much they need to save for 
retirement or the consequences of saving inadequately. Some may not 
participate because they find pensions too complex to feel comfortable 
making that decision, especially since it involves substantial sums of 
money. 
Undersaving for retirement may occur because some workers 
underestimate their life expectancy. They may do so because they are 
unaware of how quickly life expectancy is improving, basing their own 
life expectancy on that of their older relatives. Thus, “demographic lit-
eracy” as well as “financial literacy” may be a source of problems in 
individuals’ planning for retirement.
A study by the Society of Actuaries (2004) finds that a majority (67 
percent of preretirees) of the male respondents underestimated the life 
expectancy of the average 65-year-old man. Of that group, 42 percent 
underestimated average life expectancy by five years or more. Roughly 
half (54 percent) of preretiree females underestimated the life expec-
tancy of the average 65-year-old woman. A British study finds that on 
average people over a range of ages underestimated their life expec-
tancy by 4.6 years for males and 6.0 years for females. Males ages 30 to 
39, an age range where they may be considering seeking employment 
that provides pension coverage, underestimated their life expectancy 
by 6.3 years, while females in that age range underestimated their life 
expectancy by 6.5 years (O’Brien, Fenn, and Diacon 2005). These find-
ings suggest that a substantial part of the population may considerably 
underestimate its life expectancy, which could be a cause of undersav-
ing for retirement.
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Choice of defaults. If all workers actively made wise decisions 
concerning their pension participation, defaults in designing 401(k) 
plans would be irrelevant. However, some workers do not make a 
choice and are automatically placed in the status determined by the de-
fault. Defaults may have a socially desirable function when they can 
be structured so that workers end up in a situation that increases their 
retirement savings.
Evidence from U.S. studies suggests that automatic enrollment may 
be a more successful way to increase pension coverage than employer 
matching contributions. For example, Madrian and Shea (2001) find 
that automatic enrollment led to substantially higher enrollment among 
new employees in one firm than a system that relied solely on offer-
ing a match. Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2004), using data for three 
firms, find that automatic enrollment had its largest effect on participa-
tion at short job tenure, but after three years of tenure, the participation 
rate among employees hired under automatic enrollment was still 30 
percentage points higher than among employees hired under standard 
enrollment with the same tenure. 
For workers who are uncertain about how to invest, automatic 
enrollment has the advantage that the investment choice is made by 
default. A British study suggests that automatic enrollment is success-
ful in part because some workers who do not choose to participate are 
intimidated by the choice of investments (Horack and Wood 2005). 
These studies have been based on a small number of large firms 
that have been innovators in how they provide benefits. The experience 
in these firms may not be typical of that across the U.S. labor market, 
especially in smaller firms and in firms with predominantly low-wage 
workforces. The extent to which the results can be generalized to the 
entire private sector workforce has not been assessed. 
Some changes have been made in federal law to encourage automat-
ic enrollment. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 clarified that federal 
law in this area preempts state law. In addition, federal law could be 
changed so that employees who were automatically enrolled but ac-
cumulated only small amounts and wished to withdraw the funds from 
their accounts could do so without penalty. To increase the incentive for 
firms to offer automatic enrollment, Congress could limit the current 
safe harbor rules concerning antidiscrimination to only those plans that 
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offer automatic enrollment and automatic increases in contributions, so 
as to assure that workers taking the default are contributing a sufficient 
amount (Gale, Iwry, and Orszag 2005). 
Other factors affect workers’ decisions to participate. For example, 
several studies find that workers covered by a defined benefit plan pro-
vided by their employer are less likely to participate in a 401(k) plan 
the employer provides than workers who are not covered by a defined 
benefit plan (Andrews 1992, Bernheim and Garrett 2003). Since the 
early 1980s, roughly 15 percent of the private sector wage and salaried 
workforce has been covered by both a defined benefit and a defined 
contribution plan (USDOL 2005a).
CONCLUSION
Several 401(k) policy options could encourage workers to partici-
pate. Many of the ideas discussed here have resulted from developments 
in behavioral finance and relate to the choice of defaults. Studies suggest 
that the choice of defaults can have a large effect on workers’ behavior, 
and that the judicious choice of defaults may ultimately lead to work-
ers’ having larger 401(k) plan account balances at retirement. However, 
these studies have been done for only a few large firms and may not be 
generalizable to small firms. The findings also may not be generalizable 
to periods when the stock market is falling. Further, its effect appears 
to dissipate over time, and may be undone at job change by workers’ 
withdrawing money from their accounts.
Traditionally, the default for workers unable to decide whether to 
participate in a 401(k) plan has been nonparticipation. However, some 
plan sponsors have established defaults that preserve freedom of choice 
for workers wishing to make a choice but that result in good decisions 
for workers who are uncertain as to what to do. These defaults start with 
automatic enrollment in the plan unless workers affirmatively decide to 
not participate. 
Automatic enrollment creates problems of inadequate buildup of 
assets if the default contribution rate is low and the default investment is 
highly conservative. Thus, some firms have established a default contri-
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bution rate that starts low but gradually increases over a period of years. 
Some firms have made the default investment a life-cycle fund, where 
the default investment is more heavily weighted to stocks for younger 
workers but gradually shifts towards bonds as workers’ expected retire-
ment approaches. If workers change jobs, the default in some 401(k) 
plans is that the plan assets are rolled over into an IRA.
While defaults may not be optimal for all workers, such as short-
tenure workers, in a 401(k) plan they help assure that more workers will 
accumulate assets that are available to finance retirement consumption. 
The effects of the defaults on women, minorities, and low-wage work-






Pension plans contain labor market incentives and disincentives that 
may affect important life decisions of workers. These incentives may 
affect whether workers change jobs and the age at which they retire. 
The incentives, and the resulting decisions, may affect the efficiency of 
the matching of workers to jobs in labor markets, impeding or encour-
aging attachment of workers to particular jobs.
PORTABILITY
Pension portability is an issue primarily for workers in defined 
benefit plans. It is the ability of workers to change jobs without losing 
future pension benefits. The extent to which this feature is part of a pen-
sion system depends on the particular design of the pension plans in the 
system, which may be affected by government regulations establishing 
minimum standards. 
Two factors have made pension portability an important policy 
issue. First, U.S. workers have a relatively high level of job change. 
Second, Social Security benefits are relatively modest, which has led 
U.S. workers to rely more on employer-provided pensions than workers 
in most other countries. 
Job tenure has decreased for older male workers. While average 
job tenure has increased when one considers workers of all ages, that 
has occurred because of the aging of the workforce, since older workers 
have higher average job tenure than younger workers. For male work-
ers ages 45–54, their median job tenure declined from 12.8 years to 
8.1 years, a decline of 37 percent, from 1983 to 2006 (Valletta 2007). 
Median job tenure increased for women, but because it is lower than 
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for men the influx of women into the labor market lowered average job 
tenure. 
Portability losses vary by type of plan. Workers in defined con-
tribution plans suffer negligible portability losses because their vested 
benefits continue to be invested the same as if no job change had oc-
curred. Workers in multiemployer plans have no portability losses to the 
extent that they change employers within the plan. However, workers 
with single-employer, final-average-pay plans can suffer sizable porta-
bility losses (Turner 1993).
Workers who change jobs and are covered by defined benefit plans 
often suffer pension losses that result in reduced retirement income. 
Facing such a loss, a worker may decide not to make a job change 
that would otherwise be desirable, raising concerns for labor market 
efficiency. Because of penalties for workers who leave a job before re-
tirement, defined benefit plans can inhibit workers from making job 
changes that would otherwise be desirable for them and for the efficient 
functioning of the labor market. 
As well as affecting job changers, defined benefit plans can penal-
ize workers who are laid off, suggesting the possible need for policy to 
protect those workers when healthy firms reorganize. Defined benefit 
plans may also penalize people who must quit jobs because of family 
responsibilities, which is particularly a problem for women.
This section describes ways that pension portability for U.S. job 
changers has been achieved. It describes both the minimum standards 
mandated by law and the arrangements that some employers have made 
that exceed those requirements. While it indicates the most commonly 
used methods to achieve portability, it discusses other, less commonly 
used methods because they are possible models for extending porta-
bility to more workers. 
Portability losses are only one aspect of the risks facing workers 
who participate in pensions. While portability is achieved more readily 
in defined contribution plans than in defined benefit plans, risks also oc-
cur in defined contribution plans with respect to investment in financial 
markets and converting account balances to annuities that do not occur 
in defined benefit plans. 
Pension portability has traditionally been considered to be the 
ability of a worker to carry a pension from one pension plan to another. 
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More recently, policy analysts have expanded its meaning to include 
the ability of workers to preserve the value of pension benefits at job 
change. 
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Plans
Pension portability largely presents a problem only for traditional 
single-employer defined benefit plans. For defined contribution plans, 
such as 401(k) plans, portability is not a serious problem. Workers gen-
erally do not suffer portability losses in defined contribution plans once 
they have vested. “Vested” means that the worker has an irrevocable 
right to a future benefit. 
The most common type of U.S. defined benefit plan is the single 
employer plan. Typically, workers who participate in that type of plan 
and who leave a job before they are eligible for retirement benefits 
suffer a loss in future benefits. There are two important exceptions, 
however—cash balance plans and multiemployer plans. 
Cash balance plans are hybrids incorporating features of both de-
fined benefit and defined contribution plans. Under U.S. pension law, all 
plans must be categorized as either defined benefit or defined contribu-
tion plans. It would be desirable to amend U.S. pension law to recognize 
hybrid plans, such as cash balance plans, as a separate category with its 
own regulatory framework. Cash balance plans are categorized as de-
fined benefit plans because the employer must provide a promised level 
of benefits. They accrue benefits in a pattern similar to defined contri-
bution plans, which is more favorable to short-term workers than the 
accrual pattern in traditional defined benefit plans. With a cash balance 
plan, each worker has an individual account to which contributions are 
credited, and interest is credited on the account balance. However, the 
individual account is purely an accounting entry, and thus is considered 
“notional.” No assets are assigned specifically to the account, and the 
crediting interest rate is not related to the return received on assets held 
by the plan. The plan differs from a defined contribution plan in that the 
interest crediting is fixed in advance or is tied to an index rather than 
being tied to the investment earnings on the assets held by the plan. 
Multiemployer defined benefit plans are typically provided when 
one union has contracts with a number of employers. Multiemployer 
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plans are more common in some European countries than they are in 
the United States; they play an important role in the pension systems in 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Causes of Pension Loss for Job Changers
When workers change jobs or are laid off, they suffer a loss of 
benefits in single-employer defined benefit plans. Portability losses can 
be grouped into two categories: 1) loss of real value of benefits the 
worker has accrued to date, and 2) the worker’s loss of the right to an 
increase in benefit generosity with increased job tenure. Some types of 
pension plans reward workers with long tenure, and loss of that aspect 
of benefit generosity causes many workers who change jobs to have 
lower pension benefits at retirement than those who stay with a single 
employer.
Loss of benefits accrued to date. Portability loss for job chang-
ers includes the loss of pension assets because of lack of full vesting. 
This loss occurs in both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. 
When workers start participating in a pension plan, they begin accruing 
benefits, but they do not have full ownership rights to those benefits un-
til they have vested. The loss of benefits due to a worker failing to vest 
is generally relatively small in defined benefit plans because workers 
accrue relatively little in the way of pension benefits in their first few 
years of work. That occurs in part because their wages are relatively 
low and in part because of back-loading, which, when calculating pen-
sion benefits, places relatively little value on earnings received early in 
life. However, as the worker approaches the point of vesting in a plan 
that requires five years of covered work for vesting, the size of the por-
tability loss grows. For young workers, the loss in benefits that would 
have been received at retirement from the failure to vest a small account 
balance in a defined contribution plan can be substantial because of the 
growth in investment earnings over many years.
Portability loss also includes a loss in the real value of pension 
benefits accrued in a defined benefit plan at the point of job change 
compared to the value of accrued benefits at job change if the worker 
were to remain in the job until retirement age. In defined benefit plans, 
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when a worker changes jobs or is laid off, his pension benefit is based 
on his nominal earnings at the point of job termination. U.S. defined 
benefit plans do not index for inflation between the time of job change 
and the time the worker starts receiving pension benefits. Thus, infla-
tion may seriously erode the pension’s real value. Portability loss tends 
to be highest for long-term workers who change jobs or are laid off a 
few years before they are eligible for retirement benefits (Turner 1993). 
These workers have accumulated significant benefits, but they still have 
a number of years over which inflation erodes the real value of their ac-
cumulated benefits.
UK pension law requires defined benefit plans to index the benefits 
of vested terminated workers for inflation up to a maximum of five per-
cent per year (Blake and Turner 2002). A similar requirement exists in 
Ireland. These requirements greatly reduce portability loss, both for job 
changers and for people who are laid off. 
A simplified view of pension benefit loss for job changers may fo-
cus only on two factors. The first is the loss due to lack of vesting. The 
second is the loss in defined benefit plans due to the lack of inflation in-
dexing between the point of job change and the point of commencement 
of benefit receipt of wages used to calculate the benefits of job leavers. 
Of these two factors, the lack of inflation indexing is far more signifi-
cant as a source of portability loss. Ending that source of loss of pension 
benefits by requiring employers to price-index wages used in benefit 
calculations would go a long ways toward eliminating portability losses 
in defined benefit plans, but also would be expensive for employers. In 
a voluntary pension system, policy changes that place added cost on 
employers may induce some to stop providing a pension plan.
A third aspect of portability loss not discussed in previous analy-
ses is the problem of lost pensions and lost pensioners. When workers 
change jobs or leave the labor market and leave a pension benefit with 
a former employer, they ultimately may be unable to find that employer 
to claim a benefit at retirement age. This problem occurs in both de-
fined benefit and defined contribution plans, but is more prevalent in 
defined benefit plans because they are less likely to provide portability 
(Bruce, Turner, and Lee 2005). The employer may have changed loca-
tion, changed names, been bought out by another firm, merged with 
another firm, gone bankrupt, or simply gone out of business. Because 
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of these changes, workers may encounter difficulties finding their pen-
sion plans to claim benefits. Similarly, an employer attempting to find a 
former employee who has moved may be unable to do so. 
The lost pension problem has been largely solved for Australian 
and British job changers. Both countries have national pension regis-
tries. The registries, however, do not solve the problem for workers who 
do not realize they are eligible to receive a pension. Pension portability 
helps to resolve the problem to the extent that workers are able to main-
tain a single pension plan with their current employer, or to maintain an 
IRA. Employees can readily claim their benefits from these plans. 
Loss of the option to receive future tenure-based accruals. A 
more complete view of portability considers several other aspects of 
pension benefit loss. These aspects include features that cause benefits 
to accrue more rapidly for long-tenure workers or for workers near re-
tirement than for short-tenure workers. 
First, portability loss includes the job changer’s loss of the right to 
generous future pension accruals when pension accrual rates increase 
with job tenure. This feature can occur in either defined benefit or de-
fined contribution plans, but is much more common in defined benefit 
plans.
Second, job changers may suffer a benefit loss in a defined benefit 
plan because of the difference in generosity between normal and early 
retirement benefits. Job changers’ benefits usually are calculated based 
on retirement at normal retirement age, rather than at early retirement 
age. Benefits at early retirement age often are more generous in terms 
of the lifetime value of benefits than those received at normal retirement 
age. Employers may structure benefit formulas this way to encourage 
workers to work until the early retirement age and then take early retire-
ment. For example, a plan may specify that benefits are reduced by 6 
percent per year before the normal retirement age if the worker leaves 
before the early retirement age, but only by 3 percent per year from the 
benefit receivable at the normal retirement age if the worker leaves at 
the early retirement age (Gustman and Steinmeier 1995).
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The Accrual and Transferability of Pension Benefit Rights 
The following sections discuss portability issues for job changers 
relating to the accrual and transferability of benefit rights. The issues 
occur with both defined contribution and defined benefit plans. 
Vesting. The benefit protection workers receive by vesting differs 
greatly between defined benefit and defined contribution plans. With 
vesting, workers in a defined benefit plan acquire a right to a nominal 
benefit (not indexed for inflation) that workers retain if they change 
jobs. In a defined contribution plan, workers acquire a right to their 
account balance. Since account balances in defined contribution plans 
continue to benefit from investment experience, they generally continue 
to grow in real value after a worker leaves a pension plan. The reverse 
happens for defined benefit plans, where inflation erodes the real value 
of the nominal earnings used to calculate benefits.
Vesting standards for private sector pension plans, set by U.S. pen-
sion law, establish the maximum period allowed before vesting occurs. 
Firms can choose to provide vesting earlier. U.S. pension law gives 
employers some flexibility in choosing how rapidly to provide full vest-
ing. Under the standard many employers choose, workers must vest in 
their pension benefits within five years of participation in the plan. This 
vesting rule is called cliff vesting because the employer can provide 
zero vesting up to the time when the employee has five years of par-
ticipation, followed by 100 percent vesting at five years. Under graded 
vesting, the employer must provide 20 percent vesting after three years 
of participation, following which the percentage of vesting increases 
by 20 percent a year, so that the employee reaches 100 percent vesting 
after seven years of participation. In either case, if a pension plan termi-
nates, all employees fully vest immediately. 
Some policy analysts have argued for shorter vesting requirements, 
such as are in place in some European countries, which permit short 
vesting periods. Vesting occurs after nine months in Denmark, one year 
in Belgium, and two years in Ireland and the United Kingdom (Com-
mission of the European Communities 2002).
Employees accruing creditable service for vesting must work a 
minimum number of hours in a year. That minimum is set in pension 
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law at no greater than 1,000 hours, which is approximately half-time 
work for a year. With this minimum, a worker could work a substantial 
amount of time for many years and never be covered by the plan pro-
vided by his or her employer. Some participants’ advocates have argued 
for lowering the exclusion level to 750 hours per year.
Employee contributions (both voluntary and mandatory) to their 
pension plans vest immediately. If employees change jobs, they can 
receive refunds of those contributions plus the earnings on those con-
tributions. Employee contributions are common in defined contribution 
plans but rare in U.S. private sector defined benefit plans because em-
ployee contributions to defined contribution plans are exempt from 
taxable income but contributions made to private sector defined benefit 
plans are not. Most public sector defined benefit plans require employee 
contributions, and those contributions are tax deductible for state and lo-
cal government employees. Tax deductible employee contributions are 
common in pension plans in Canada, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom.
Employers often make matching contributions in 401(k) defined 
contribution plans. These contributions match contributions made by 
employees where, for example, the employer contributes up to three 
percent of pay when the employee contributes an equal amount. Em-
ployer matching contributions must vest within three years for cliff 
vesting, or with graded vesting must be 20 percent vested after two 
years, increasing in 20-percentage-point increments up to full vesting 
after six years. 
Defined contribution plans often provide vesting after shorter pe-
riods than required by law, while defined benefit plans generally do 
not. Thus, defined contribution plans tend to provide quicker vesting 
than defined benefit plans. The reason for this difference may be that 
employers tend not to use defined contribution plans as a personnel tool 
to encourage worker attachment to their firms, while they may view 
defined benefit plans as serving that purpose. An alternative explana-
tion may relate to the need to encourage the participation of low-wage 
workers in order to meet nondiscrimination rules.
Transferability of benefit rights—rollovers. One advantage to 
workers of pension portability is convenience: it is simpler for workers 
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to keep all their pension assets in a single plan rather than in multiple 
plans, including plans from former employers. It is also more efficient 
for workers to have one larger pension account rather than several 
smaller ones, because of economies of scale in the cost of managing 
accounts. This results in lower total fees. 
A pension rollover occurs when a worker transfers pension assets 
from one plan to another plan. The transfer of assets from one pension 
plan or individual account to another occurs without current income tax 
liability to the pension participant. It allows job changers to consolidate 
their pension plans. Rollovers occur more commonly from defined con-
tribution plans than from defined benefit plans because not all defined 
benefit plans permit them. They almost always are made to defined con-
tribution plans. 
Rollovers generally are voluntary. Workers voluntarily make them. 
Firms voluntarily offer them as an option to departing workers. Plans 
voluntarily accept them from new workers.
Portability across persons. The concept of portability usually re-
fers to portability across plans for a given worker, but it can be extended 
to include the transfer of pension benefits between people. The Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001 
expanded the types of pension plans that are eligible for rollovers from 
survivors. A surviving spouse now has the same rollover opportunities 
as the participant would have enjoyed. For example, surviving spouses 
can roll their deceased spouse’s pension plan benefits into their own 
defined contribution plan if the surviving spouse’s employer’s plan 
permits it. Portability between persons could be expanded further by 
allowing it between same-sex partners, between parents and children, 
or between any two persons.
Permitting rollovers from defined benefit plans to defined contri-
bution plans may eliminate benefits for surviving spouses. In a U.S. 
defined benefit plan, a joint and survivors’ annuity must be an option. 
Furthermore, the worker must choose that option unless the worker’s 
spouse signs a notarized statement waiving his or her right to that op-
tion. When the funds are transferred to a defined contribution plan, 
however, survivors’ benefits are not provided. However, defined benefit 
plans do not typically provide benefits for surviving children, although 
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the remaining account balance can be inherited by the surviving chil-
dren of a single parent.
Back-loading of Benefits
Portability broadly means that both short-tenure and long-tenure 
workers receive pension benefits of roughly equal generosity relative 
to their compensation. Generosity of benefits received by short-tenure 
workers depends on the extent to which benefits are front-loaded or 
back-loaded. Front-loaded benefits accrue relatively more rapidly for 
workers beginning their careers, while back-loaded benefits accrue rela- 
tively more rapidly later in one’s career. To protect the benefit rights 
of short-tenure workers, pension law limits the extent of back-loading.
In defined benefit plans, the extent of back-loading of accruals de-
pends on the benefit formula. The law specifies that plans must satisfy 
one of three tests. One of the tests is that the accrual rate in any future 
year of service may not be more than one-third higher than the accrual 
rate for the current year. Benefits amounts under this test may be ex-
pressed as dollar amounts or as a specified percentage of compensation. 
This rule must be used for all defined benefit plans having a career 
average formula.
Plans based on final average earnings are back-loaded and may be 
of little benefit to employees who change jobs several times during their 
careers. These plans are back-loaded because the benefits accumulate at 
a more rapid rate relative to compensation later in a worker’s career. As 
a worker gains more experience, one larger amount—the worker’s pay, 
which generally grows over his or her career—is multiplied by another 
rising amount, years worked. The multiplication in the benefit formula 
of two factors that are both growing with tenure yields benefit accrual 
rates that increase with tenure. 
Cash balance plans provide workers greater portability than tra-
ditional defined benefit plans. Workers have a readily determinable 
balance in their accounts, and the value of the balance is not affected 
by job change. With cash balance plans, benefits generally accrue more 
rapidly for short tenure than is typically the case in traditional defined 
benefit plans. The extent to which these plans favor short-tenure work-
ers compared to other defined benefit plans, however, depends on the 
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plans’ parameters. With cash balance plans, for a given level of gener-
osity over a full career, the greater the contribution rate and the lower the 
crediting rate, the more favorable is the plan to short-service workers. 
For a given level of generosity, the higher the crediting rate, the more 
back-loaded the plan. Also, however, most cash balance plans provide 
pay credits that increase based on the participant’s age or service, which 
adds an element of back-loading. A survey of cash balance plans pro-
vided by Fortune 1000 companies found that only 35 percent paid level 
pay credits for all participants, meaning that all workers received the 
same crediting rate relative to their compensation. For example, one 
plan provides annual pay credits of 3 percent for participants having 
four years of service or less, with incremental increases up to 9 percent 
for participants with 25 or more years of service (GAO 2000).
Portability in Defined Contribution Plans
The growing importance of defined contribution plans is improving 
the portability provided by the U.S. pension system. Once a worker has 
vested in a defined contribution plan, that worker may change jobs with 
no loss of accrued benefits. 
Many workers, particularly those with short tenure and small ac-
count balances, when they change jobs, take the money out of their 
pension plans. Pension law has changed the default so that when a 
worker leaves a job with a small amount in his pension account—be-
tween $1,000 and $5,000—the employer rolls it over into an Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA) rather than the worker cashing it out. This 
policy is designed to discourage workers from cashing out their 401(k) 
accounts and to encourage them to keep their accumulated pension as-
sets in the retirement income system. When a worker leaves a job with 
a larger amount, it might be desirable for pension plan sponsors to make 
automatic rollover into an IRA the default to discourage workers from 
taking the account balance as a lump sum.
Pooling assets across employers is easily achievable for defined 
contribution plans. Because generally no portability losses are as-
sociated with vested assets in defined contribution plans, pooling of 
assets is mainly a convenience so that workers do not maintain account 
balances in different plans. Pooling across employers is achieved for 
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most university professors through the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association and the related College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-
CREF), which both offer defined contribution plans. TIAA-CREF 
covers 12,000 nonprofit institutions, including government and private 
universities, other educational institutions, nonprofit research organiza-
tions, and some museums. In this network, U.S. university professors 
can change jobs among most colleges, universities, and nonprofit re-
search institutions and maintain their defined contribution pension 
account with TIAA-CREF.
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are not tied to a particular 
employer. When a worker changes jobs and receives a preretirement 
distribution from his or her pension plan, that distribution can be de-
posited into the worker’s IRA without tax consequences, as long as it is 
done within a certain number of days after receiving the distribution or 
it is sent to the IRA directly by the plan of the former employer. A large 
part of the assets in IRAs are due to these deposits. If a worker declares 
bankruptcy, IRAs are not protected from the worker’s creditors, while 
other pension plans are protected. Thus, a worker loses bankruptcy pro-
tection by rolling over an employer-sponsored pension into an IRA.
Portability in Defined Benefit Plans
Portability in defined benefit plans can be achieved three ways: 1) 
preserving the real value of benefits or assets within a single employer 
plan, 2) pooling pension assets across employers in a multiemployer 
plan, and 3) transferring pension assets or credited service between 
plans. 
Preserving the real value of benefits or pension assets in a single 
employer plan. For most U.S. single-employer defined benefit plans 
that are not cash balance plans, workers suffer a portability loss when 
they change jobs. This loss occurs in part because the benefits accrued to 
date but received later at retirement are based on the worker’s nominal 
earnings at the point of job change, which are not indexed for inflation 
between that time and the date at which the worker reaches retirement 
age and is eligible to collect those benefits. In a cash balance plan, by 
contrast, the worker has an account to which interest continues to be 
credited after he changes jobs.  
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Pooling assets across employers in a multiemployer plan. Multi-
employer plans offer a number of positive features for workers. Pooling 
assets across employers occurs when multiple employers establish a 
multiemployer pension plan in which their employees may participate. 
Pooling pension assets across employers may help employers reduce 
administrative costs because of economies of scale. This type of pooling 
arrangement allows workers to change jobs among employers partici-
pating in the plan without changing plans and without a portability loss. 
U.S. multiemployer pension plans are predominantly defined benefit 
plans. They provide portability of service in that workers can change 
employers within the plan and their service with the different employers 
counts without penalty towards the accrual of retirement benefits. 
U.S. multiemployer plans generally are established as a result of 
a collective bargaining agreement between a union and a number of 
employers. They cover many occupations in one industry, or one occu-
pation in many industries. They tend to encompass a limited geographic 
area, such as the metropolitan area associated with a large city. In re-
cent years, some multiemployer plans have merged; combining in this 
way provides enhanced portability across jobs because more jobs are 
covered within a single plan. This trend may have been facilitated by 
developments in computer technology that have simplified the adminis-
tration of plans with many employers.
Multiemployer plans tend to develop in industries with many small 
firms. The workers in the industry generally are skilled, and all of them 
belong to the same labor union. The industry tends to have both a high 
turnover of firms and a high turnover of workers across firms. In the 
construction industry, for example, carpenters and plumbers typically 
work on one project until it is completed, then work on another project 
with a different employer. The decline of unionism has reduced the im-
portance of multiemployer plans. 
An example of a geographically based multiemployer plan is the 
Unified Food and Commercial Workers Fund in Northern California. 
The International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union and the Amalgam-
ated Clothing and Textile Workers Union merged in 1995 to form the 
Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), 
which covers production workers in the needle trades. By contrast, 
unions for the sheet metal workers, bricklayers, carpenters, and other 
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building trades have funds that cover particular trades in many indus-
tries (Ghilarducci 2001). 
Years worked for different employers participating in the same 
multiemployer plan all count toward vesting. Once vested, workers 
continue to be vested if they work for other employers within the plan. 
A further advantage of such pooling arrangements is that there may 
be economies of scale in plan administration and investment manage-
ment, particularly compared to each participating employer’s having 
a separate plan. Pooling is also an advantage to small firms because it 
overcomes the problem of providing pension benefits that arises after 
the short lifespan of many small firms.
Firms must cooperate with one another to coordinate the establish-
ment of a multiemployer plan. Because of the difficulty of doing this 
among firms competing against each other in the same industry, most 
multiemployer plans are coordinated by a union or are in a nonprofit 
setting. Another disadvantage is that the arrangements are voluntary. 
When one firm sees itself as subsidizing other firms, it has an incentive 
to leave the plan (Ghilarducci 2001).
An example of portability having a different structure from that 
provided by most multiemployer plans is the arrangement for musi-
cians. Many professional musicians belong to the American Federation 
of Musicians, a labor union affiliated with the AFL-CIO. Musicians of-
ten work part time. They may work for a number of employers in a year, 
doing short-term jobs, some not lasting more than a few hours, and 
receiving pension contributions paid by their employers to the union. 
Thus, this pension plan provides portability for highly transient workers. 
In this situation, the portability feature is part of the contract provided to 
employers hiring musicians for union-related jobs. The monthly benefit 
at retirement is based on a crediting rate, which varies by age at retire-
ment. The crediting rate is applied to the total of contributions made to 
the plan on behalf of the worker. This type of benefit formula is unusual, 
but it provides an alternative approach for achieving portability.
Transfers of Service or Assets across Plans
Transfers across plans for job-changing workers, depending on the 
two plans, can include transfers of service and transfers of assets. The 
transfer of assets directly to another plan, instead of to the worker in 
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the form of a lump sum distribution, is rare in defined benefit plans, af-
fecting less than one percent of employees in private sector plans (BLS 
2000).
Transfer of service. In a defined benefit plan, benefits are gener-
ally based on the worker’s years of service and earnings. Therefore, one 
way portability can be achieved is through the transfer of service credits 
from one plan to the next. With transfer of service, participants are al-
lowed to count their years of service with a previous employer when 
determining benefits from a subsequent employer. For example, one 
plan, either a defined benefit or a defined contribution plan, may recog-
nize that a worker achieved vesting in another plan and automatically 
vest the worker in the new employer’s plan. The employee ultimately 
receives benefits from both plans. 
Reciprocity agreements. Reciprocity agreements are transfer ar-
rangements for workers changing jobs among two or more plans. Those 
agreements allow the transfer of benefits, service, or assets among plans 
when the employee changes jobs (Harris 1998). In some cases, each 
plan counts the service in both plans when determining vested status 
or benefits. In other cases, plans transfer the full credit and the funds 
for that credit. In this way, the final employer is responsible for the full 
benefit. Reciprocity agreements are common among multiemployer 
plans covering members of local unions within the same international 
union, where the plans agree to give pension credit for service under 
any of the plans. The agreements benefit both employers and employees 
in the construction industry, allowing employees to move from areas 
where construction work is scarce to areas where it is booming. 
Both transfer of service and reciprocity agreements are rare. They 
are discussed here not because of their prevalence but because of the 
possible model they provide. Nonetheless, they are difficult to arrange 
because of differences between defined benefit plans that complicate 
the calculations of equivalence.
Purchase of service credits in defined benefit plans. A defined 
benefit plan may establish the rule that it recognizes the service in an-
other plan only if the worker buys service in the new plan. If both plans 
are defined benefit plans and the new plan is more generous than the 
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old one, transferring assets directly from one plan to the other would 
buy less service than the worker had accumulated in the old plan, but 
comparable benefits.  
Workers’ ability to purchase service credits in a defined benefit plan 
using accumulated retirement savings in a defined contribution plan 
is one way to make benefits portable between the two types of plans. 
Similarly, a government plan participant who terminated employment 
without sufficient tenure to vest, but was later rehired, may repay any 
contributions or investment earnings that were refunded earlier because 
of having terminated employment. Workers typically would receive a 
refund of their own contributions, possibly with interest, if they termi-
nated employment before vesting. Payment may be made to that plan or 
another plan maintained by a state or local government employer within 
the same state. 
Transfer of assets out of a defined benefit plan. Portability may 
involve the transfer of assets out of a defined benefit plan, generally as a 
lump sum distribution or as a rollover, into a defined contribution plan. 
When an employer calculates a lump sum payment or transfer from 
a defined benefit plan, U.S. pension law requires that its value be at 
least the present value of the annuity if it had been taken at normal 
retirement age. The plan, at its discretion, can base the lump sum on 
a subsidized early retirement benefit, which would provide workers a 
larger lump sum benefit. To protect participants from plans using un-
favorable assumptions that would reduce the value of their benefits, 
ERISA specifies discount rate and life table valuation factors in dis-
counting retirement benefits. In calculating the value of a lump sum 
benefit, U.S. pension law requires that the plans use the same mortality 
rates for both males and females, even though the actual mortality rates 
for females are lower. The present value of the annuity computed us-
ing this interest rate and mortality table is the minimum that the plan 
can pay a participant. Using unisex mortality rates in this case is ad-
vantageous to men, since those rates produce a higher present value of 
benefits than would male mortality rates.
In calculating the amount of assets to be transferred, defined benefit 
plans are not required to take into account future cost-of-living adjust-
ments unless those are written into the plan, which is rare but does 
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occur in some plans. A plan may have an unwritten policy of making 
ad hoc cost-of-living adjustments depending on the extent of inflation. 
It would not be required to take this practice into account in calculating 
the value of benefits for someone changing jobs. 
When assets are transferred out of a defined benefit plan for a 
worker who has terminated his employment, though the minimum 
value allowable is regulated by law, the question sometimes arises as 
to the appropriate calculation of the lump sum amount that the worker 
has accrued. A study in 2002 by the Inspector General of the U.S. De-
partment of Labor found that 22 percent of companies studied that had 
converted defined benefit plans to cash balance plans had given workers 
who had changed jobs too little in pension benefits as a result of errors 
in calculating how much in benefits workers were owed from their cash 
balance plans (USDOL 2002). The errors occurred at least in part, how-
ever, because of complexities of cash balance plans that do not apply 
to other types of plans. The study found that for the traditional defined 
benefit plans maintained by companies in the sample, there were no 
problems in calculating the benefit amount to be transferred. However, 
it did find that in two plans the present value calculation was based on 
constant value annuities, although the plans specified that the benefit 
would increase with inflation.
Portability network or clearinghouse. A portability network or 
clearinghouse can facilitate the transfer of assets between plans. It 
holds pension funds and combined benefits from multiple plans. Some 
networks, such as the National Automobile Dealers Association, 
were started by employer associations. These networks cover a single 
industry’s workers and permit service portability for workers transfer-
ring between employers in the network. Portability clearinghouses are 
widely used in the Netherlands to transfer deferred vested benefits in 
defined benefit plans.
Portability Policy Options
With a voluntary pension system, government is limited in what 
costs it can impose on employers by the employers’ willingness to con-
tinue offering pension plans. Thus, while it may be considered desirable 
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from the public policy perspective to mandate a feature that would in-
crease the portability of pensions, if doing so causes employers to stop 
offering pension plans, the indirect consequences of the policy would 
outweigh the direct beneficial consequences. This consideration needs 
to be borne in mind in when considering the following policy options:
• Encourage development of industry-based multiemployer 
plans. Industry-based pensions allow workers to change jobs 
within their industry without changing pension plans. The use-
fulness of this policy, however, is limited by the extent that 
the workforce is unionized, because these plans generally are 
sponsored by unions.
• Encourage development of cash balance plans. Among defined 
benefit plans, cash balance plans provide better portability than 
single-employer defined benefit plans. A policy encouraging 
the development of cash balance plans would need to protect 
the benefit rights and future benefit accruals of older workers 
when a traditional defined benefit plan is converted to a cash 
balance plan.
• For workers who are laid off by financially healthy employ-
ers, require price indexing of benefits in defined benefit plans 
for inflation up to the participant’s early retirement age. This 
change would protect laid-off workers from portability loss for 
a job change that they had not initiated.
Summary
This section discusses ways that pension portability has been 
achieved by describing relevant aspects of U.S. pension law and sur-
veying the existing portability arrangements that pension plans provide. 
Pension portability is achieved most easily through defined contribution 
plans. It is generally difficult to achieve with traditional single-employer 
defined benefit plans. Cash balance plans, however, provide better 
portability than do other single-employer defined benefit plans. Multi-
employer defined benefit plans allow workers to change jobs among 
participating firms and suffer no portability loss. Portability for single 
employer defined benefit plans could be improved by requiring price or 
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wage indexing of wages used in calculating pension benefits at retire-
ment, but that would be expensive for employers and probably would 
cause some employers to stop offering defined benefit plans. 
Portability losses are only one aspect of the risks facing workers 
who participate in pensions. While portability is achieved more readily 
in defined contribution plans than in defined benefit plans, risks also 
occur in defined contribution plans that do not occur in defined benefit 
plans with respect to investment in financial markets and converting 
account balances to annuities. 
RETIREMENT
This section considers ways that pensions affect older workers’ de-
cisions to reduce their hours of work or to retire.
Phased Retirement
Phased retirement allows workers to gradually transition into re-
tirement (Latulippe and Turner 2000). Some older workers may suffer 
poor health or develop a physical disability that limits their ability to 
work. Other people may have to provide caregiving services to family 
members. These concerns may be eased by employment and pension 
arrangements that allow workers flexibility to gradually retire by phas-
ing out of work over time.
Phased retirement also may help workers who need to work past 
their desired retirement age to supplement their retirement benefits. 
Others may wish to work to enhance their standard of living or for non-
financial reasons, such as for the social interactions that work provides. 
For these purposes, many people would prefer not to work full time. 
Surveys corroborate that some people prefer retiring from work 
gradually rather than abruptly. For example, according to the 2001 Re-
tirement Risk Survey, sponsored by the Society of Actuaries, two-thirds 
of preretirees (66 percent) and almost half of retirees (47 percent) said 
they were or would have been very or somewhat interested in being 
able to gradually cut back on the hours they worked at their current 
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job, rather than stopping work all at once. Moreover, almost two in 
ten retirees (19 percent) described their retirement process as closest to 
“gradually reduced the number of hours you worked before stopping 
completely” (Society of Actuaries 2004). 
Phased retirement may provide benefits to workers and society. For 
many workers, a gradual transition is better than one that is abrupt. 
For society, such an arrangement could offset the expected labor force 
shortage with the retirement of the baby boom generation. It also helps 
contain the cost of pensions. And from a business perspective, it may be 
important to retain and use long-service employees to mentor and train 
younger workers. 
Despite their positive effects, formal phased retirement arrange-
ments are rare. That is at least in part because of barriers to their 
implementation. An employer wishing to offer flexible employment 
faces numerous hurdles arising from tax law, as found in the Internal 
Revenue Code; pension law, as found in the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA); and age discrimination law, as found in 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) [Chen and Scott 
2003; Penner, Perun, and Steuerle 2007]. 
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 permits distributions from de-
fined benefit plans to workers still working for the employer sponsoring 
the pension, starting at age 62. This change in law was designed to 
make phased retirement feasible, with receipt of a pension and contin-
ued work, but the implementing regulation largely vitiated the effect. 
Because it is often difficult for workers to collect a pension while phas-
ing out work, people may retire earlier than they really want to, doing 
so to access their pension. 
Though in principle hardly anyone opposes phased retirement, 
it seems workers do not find employers’ offers for phased retirement 
attractive (Hutchens and Chen 2007). Among the legal issues associ-
ated with some options for phased retirement are issues concerning 
extending health insurance to phased retirees, when that is not part of 
a formal program but is done in special circumstances where employ-
ers especially want a full-time worker to stay on working part time. 
An example of “special circumstances” might be a worker who moves 
from full-time to part-time employment after attaining a minimum of, 
say, 10 years of job tenure. Since the main barrier to this proposal is 
Labor Market Policy   75
the nondiscrimination rules promulgated by the IRS, the issue is about 
whether this enhanced health insurance for phased retirees favors high-
wage workers.
Employers apparently prefer to provide phased retirement through 
ad hoc arrangements rather than through formal programs. Ad hoc 
arrangements may provide employers greater flexibility as to who is 
eligible for phased retirement.
While taking phased retirement has some advantages for workers, 
they may find that it is disadvantageous in two respects. First, if they are 
covered by a defined benefit plan based on the highest years of salary, 
the extra work at a relatively low annual salary because of the reduced 
hours may not affect their defined benefit plan benefits.
Second, if they have already worked 35 years under Social Security, 
they may find that the extra work also does not affect their Social Secu-
rity benefits, even though they continue paying Social Security taxes. If 
the wages from their part-time work are less than their indexed covered 
earnings in their previous years of work and they already have 35 years 
of covered work, the extra work, and extra Social Security payroll taxes 
paid, will not affect their Social Security benefits. Thus, workers tak-
ing phased retirement could pay thousands of dollars in Social Security 
taxes without raising their benefits.
Benefit Receipt While Working 
Benefit receipt while working permits workers to take partial retire-
ment, receiving income both from part-time work and from a pension. 
Allowing partial retirement, with part-time work and receipt of a pen-
sion, permits workers to gradually reduce their work hours and adjust 
their lifestyle as they approach full retirement. Arrangements for partial 
retirement can be provided more easily in a defined contribution system 
than in a traditional defined benefit system because partially annuitized 
benefits can be provided more easily in a defined contribution system. 
Partial receipt of benefits from a defined benefit system would require 
complex actuarial calculations. 
Phased retirement is facilitated in defined contribution plans by the 
possibility of receiving in-service distributions from a defined contribu-
tion plan at age 59 ½. In-service distributions cannot be received from 
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a defined benefit plan until age 62. As an aspect of leveling the playing 
field between the two types of pensions, the ages should be equalized. 
With phased retirement options, it is not known whether, on balance, 
workers reduce their hours of work earlier than they otherwise would, 
whether they continue working longer than otherwise, or whether some 
workers may be affected one way and other workers affected the other 
way.
In most pension plans, older workers can retire and receive pension 
benefits from a former employer while working for a different em-
ployer. However, in collectively bargained plans, the worker’s benefit 
can be suspended if he or she works for any employer in the same indus-
try, even if it is a nonunion job. This policy is an example of disparate 
treatment of workers in similar circumstances, and thus consideration 
should be given to changing it.
In Sweden, Chile, and the United Kingdom, workers can continue 
working while receiving benefits. The Swedish workers can claim 
full or partial (one-quarter, one-half, or three-quarters) benefits from 
the mandatory individual account system starting at age 61. They can 
continue working while they draw benefits, in which case they would 
continue contributing.
Chilean workers need not stop working to collect benefits if they 
meet minimum requirements. This feature allows workers to take partial 
retirement or phased retirement, combining either full-time or part-time 
work and the receipt of pension benefits. As a tax incentive to continue 
working, workers receiving benefits from the individual accounts sys-
tem do not need to continue contributing to the system. Since 1988, 
workers could receive benefits but continue working once their replace-
ment rate reached 50 percent of their own wage and 110 percent of the 
minimum benefit guarantee. In 2004, these limits were raised to 70 per-
cent of their wage and 150 percent of the minimum benefit guarantee to 
encourage workers to accrue higher benefit levels. A high proportion of 
workers have met these conditions in their early 50s (James, Martinez, 
and Iglesias 2006).
British workers can continue working while receiving benefits. The 
United Kingdom permits the phased purchase over time of annuities. 
Workers can draw down the rest of the pension fund gradually after 
retirement.
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Because women are more likely to work part time than men, receipt 
of benefits while working may be an option that is particularly valuable 
for women.
Defined Benefit Plans and Phased Retirement
This section considers how defined benefit plans hinder or facilitate 
phased retirement. Early retirement in physically demanding occupa-
tions can be facilitated by defined benefit pensions. Discussions of 
retirement age policy often focus on people with physically demand-
ing jobs where postponed retirement would be difficult (Turner and 
Guenther 2005). 
Early retirement age. Social security systems establish a minimum 
age (62 in the United States) at which benefits can first be received. 
Without such a minimum age, some shortsighted people would take 
their benefits at an earlier age, which they would later regret because 
they would have insufficient money to finance their long retirement 
period. A policy trade-off exists, however, between raising the retire-
ment income of people who might take benefits too early versus giving 
people the ability to allocate their lifetime consumption as they see fit 
(Liebman 2002).
With continued increases in life expectancy at older ages, the annual 
benefit that a given account balance can finance decreases for successive 
cohorts. The level of payments is reduced to take into account increas-
ing life expectancy at retirement. With increased life expectancy, for 
a given account balance the level of annual benefits for future cohorts 
will fall. Eventually, benefits will fall so much that the replacement rate 
that they provide relative to preretirement income will fall below the 
level deemed acceptable by policymakers and retirees. At that point, 
policy options include increasing the age at which benefits could be 
received, or imposing the attainment of a minimum benefit level as a 
qualifying condition for benefit receipt.
Because picking the appropriate early retirement age is a complex 
problem, many countries follow a rule of thumb for their social security 
programs. The rule of thumb most countries used originally to pick an 
age was that the age be divisible by five—55, 60, 65, and, in the ear-
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lier years of the last century, 70 (Turner 2006). Since establishing their 
original retirement ages, the systems have been incrementally modified, 
and the prevalence of ages divisible by five has decreased.
Retirement Age
Defined benefit plans often provide subsidized early retirement 
benefits. In addition, some plans favor retirement at a particular age 
by structuring the benefit formula so that increased years of work are 
penalized by relatively little increase in annual pension benefits and 
a decrease in the lifetime value of benefits. Thus, these plans reward 
workers who have long careers and retire at the early retirement date. 
For that reason, these plans tend to favor high-wage males over low-
wage workers and females. High-wage workers who have other job 
opportunities are more likely to retire at the early retirement age and 
change jobs, doing similar work for another employer. Workers whose 
alternative job opportunities are not as favorable relative to their current 
job are more likely to continue working past the early retirement age 
and not to benefit from the early retirement subsidy. Thus, these plans 
can have adverse incentives from the perspective of the employer, en-
couraging the best employees to retire and the less productive retirees 
to continue working. These plans are also adverse to women, who are 
less likely than men to have a long career that continues through to the 
early retirement age.
Some employers interested in downsizing, such as General Motors 
and Chrysler, have used defined benefit plans to encourage early re-
tirement. They have offered generous lump sum benefits through the 
pension plan to encourage eligible workers to retire. Because these bene- 
fits are offered through the pension plan, workers are able to take the 
lump sum and roll it over into an IRA, thus avoiding having to pay taxes 
at that point on the amount. By contrast, if the company had paid them 
the lump sum from outside the pension plan, the workers would have 
had an immediate tax liability, at a relatively high marginal tax rate.
While it is often assumed that defined contribution plans do not 
affect retirement decisions, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. 
Workers postpone retirement during economic downturns because 
of the decline in their account balances, possibly destabilizing labor 
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markets by increasing labor supply at a time when demand is reduced 
(Hermes and Ghilarducci 2007). From the perspective of workers, how-
ever, this behavior offsets the capital market risk they face because of 
reduced account balances in their pension plans.
Maximum age for first receipt. Some countries set a maximum 
age by which workers must receive benefits. They do so to assure that 
retirees use benefits to finance retirement consumption rather than to 
bequeath wealth to survivors.
The issue of wealthy participants accumulating bequeathable pen-
sion wealth does not arise in the Swedish system because workers cannot 
bequeath their account balances to their survivors. Chilean workers, by 
contrast, are allowed to bequeath their account balances. A maximum 
age for first receipt is a feature that generally only affects upper income 
workers, and for this reason is more likely to affect men than women.
Countries That Have Raised the Earliest Age at Which Employer-
Provided Pension Benefits Can Be Received
Some countries have raised the earliest age at which benefits from 
employer-provided pensions can be received. This survey indicates 
international experience with respect to the earliest retirement age in 
occupational pension plans. 
Australia. In June 1992, the Australian government announced 
that it would increase the retirement age for the mandatory employer- 
provided pensions, called the superannuation benefit, from 55 to 60. 
The new rules took effect on July 1, 1999. The minimum retirement age 
is 55 for both men and women born before July 1, 1960. For those born 
after that date but before July 1, 1961, the minimum age is 56. In similar 
fashion, the minimum age rises by one year for every subsequent an-
nual birth cohort until it reaches age 60 for persons born after June 30, 
1964 (Kehl 2002).
Belgium. In 2003, a pension law was passed in Belgium stipulating 
that occupational pension benefits cannot be paid before age 60. Previ-
ously benefits could be received at age 58 or earlier. For all existing 
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plans, current rules are applicable until January 1, 2010 (Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide 2003).
Switzerland. In 2005, Switzerland raised the early retirement age 
for employer-provided pension plans to 58.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has raised the minimum 
age at which occupational pensions can be received from 50 to 55. 
U.S. Defined Benefit Plan Responses to Increased 
Worker Longevity
With increasing life expectancy raising pension costs, it might be 
expected that defined benefit plan sponsors would adjust by raising 
the plans’ early and normal retirement ages. The “early” and “nor-
mal” retirement ages do not refer to the ages at which workers retire 
or start collecting benefits, but rather to ages specified in pension plan 
documents. Employers could argue that employees are healthier and 
more able to work at older ages than in the past, and that work is less 
physically demanding for many workers, which are factors that make it 
feasible for workers generally to retire at older ages. 
Other factors, however, have also changed. The large increases in 
life expectancy that workers have experienced at older ages have been 
accompanied by, and probably are in part due to, large increases in per 
capita wealth. Thus, the resulting positive wealth effect on the demand 
for leisure might translate into pressure to maintain current pension plan 
retirement ages to ensure a longer retirement period for workers. 
While large increases in life expectancy have occurred, U.S. pension 
law has not raised the minimum age at which benefits can be received, 
and has not raised the maximum normal retirement age, which is age 
65. U.S. pension plans have generally not raised their early retirement 
ages, though they could do so. Several hypotheses may explain that 
result. 
Employers have a number of cost-cutting options to respond to the 
increased pension costs caused by increased life expectancy. They can-
not reduce benefits that workers have already earned, defined in terms 
of annual benefits at the normal retirement age, but prospectively they 
can reduce benefits received at normal retirement or cut early retire-
ment benefits. 
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While the move by employers from traditional defined benefit 
plans to cash balance plans may be done primarily for other reasons, 
it eliminates the impact of increased worker life expectancy on the 
plans’ liabilities because benefits are accrued in the form of an account 
balance. In addition, most conversions to cash balance plans involved 
ending subsidized early retirement, which was a feature of the defined 
benefit plans that were being replaced. 
Employers could raise the early retirement age, but making this 
change is administratively complex when done for current employees. 
It could be done more easily for new employees. Such an approach 
would be legal under pension law, and might be viewed by employees 
as fair, since it would become part of their labor agreement at time of 
hire. Alternatively, employers could reduce the generosity of benefits 
for new hires. Some companies have done this a couple of times over 
the past decade.
CONCLUSION
Workers who participate in defined benefit plans and who change 
jobs or are laid off by their employers suffer benefit losses. They suffer 
benefit losses because their benefits are frozen in nominal terms at the 
point of job termination, and the real value of those benefits is eroded 
by inflation between that point and the point at which they qualify for 
retirement benefits. Plans can make these workers wait until age 65 to 
receive benefits. For laid-off workers, the loss of pension benefits can 
be more serious than the loss of wages, while providing an actuarial 
bonus to employers. This suggests that, at least for healthy employers, 
it would be desirable to require price indexing of benefits up to retire-
ment, as is done in the United Kingdom for workers leaving before 
being eligible to receive benefits. 
As life expectancy at older ages has increased, a number of countries 
have raised the earliest age at which pension benefits can be received. 






Influencing Coverage and the Structure of Pensions
Tax policy concerning pensions has come under increasing scru-
tiny. That scrutiny is due to the high cost of pensions in terms of lost 
tax revenue. It is also due to the fact that tax policy provides larger 
incentives for higher-income workers than for lower-income workers 
because higher-income workers have higher marginal tax rates. Thus, 
the tax system provides the largest incentives to workers who are most 
likely to save and provides the smallest incentives to workers who are 
least likely to save. 
While governments in a number of countries are using increas- 
ingly aggressive policies to encourage or mandate private pensions, tax 
policy is the engine of pension policy for the U.S. pension system. It 
encourages the growth of the private pension system by providing fa-
vorable tax treatment of private pension assets relative to other assets. 
All countries with well-developed voluntary pension systems provide 
tax preferences for saving through pensions, and no country lacking a 
tax preference for pensions has a robust pension system. 
Tax policy, along with regulations, also provides brakes on the pen-
sion system. It sets limits as to the types of pension plans that receive 
preferential tax treatment. Some tax provisions, such as those relating 
to early distributions, are not designed to raise government tax revenue 
but rather are designed to regulate pension plans by influencing the be-
havior of pension plan sponsors or participants.
While the broad goals of pension tax policy are similar across de-
veloped countries, specific policies and practices vary considerably. 
This chapter examines pension tax policy across countries. Differing 
policies and practices demonstrate the range of options available to 
policymakers.
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OVERVIEW 
Pensions function by means of three transactions: 1) contributions, 
2) investment earnings, and 3) benefit payments. The most common ap-
proach to taxing pensions in countries providing preferential treatment 
combines tax deduction of contributions, tax exemption of investment 
earnings, and taxation of benefits under the personal income tax. This 
is the U.S. approach. For workers facing the same marginal income tax 
rates while working and in retirement, they earn the preincome tax rate 
of return on their pension savings because the investment earnings on 
pension funds are not taxed under the personal income tax. This ap-
proach is called “exempt, exempt, taxed,” or EET, for the tax treatment 
of the three stages of the worker’s participation in the pension plan.
This tax arrangement is referred to as an expenditure or consumption 
tax because savings are not taxed. The personal tax only is levied when 
the benefit is received and presumably spent. Under a consumption tax, 
retirees generally pay higher taxes than under a personal income tax 
that raises equal revenue. A consumption tax avoids the double taxa-
tion of savings that occurs when 1) income is taxed when received and 
2) the income on investments is also taxed. This avoidance of double 
taxation is a desirable aspect of a tax system, given the concern over 
inadequate savings, but its effect on total savings may be diminished by 
workers’ reducing savings in other forms. 
Under this approach, U.S. pension holdings in equities are not ex-
empt from the corporate income tax paid by the corporations for which 
the pension fund holds shares. The United Kingdom provides relief 
to pension funds for the corporate income tax paid on the shares they 
hold.
Defined benefit pensions hold a tax advantage over 401(k) plans. 
No Social Security payroll tax is paid on pension contributions to de-
fined benefit plans because defined benefit plans are financed almost 
entirely by employer contributions. By contrast, the Social Security 
(FICA) payroll tax is levied on workers’ contributions to 401(k) plans. 
This tax treatment of employee contributions to 401(k) plans limits the 
erosion of the Social Security payroll tax base and is done to bolster 
Social Security financing.
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A fundamental assumption of retirement income policy is that 
people will not save adequately for retirement on their own. That as-
sumption justifies preferential tax treatment for pensions, compared to 
the taxation of most other forms of savings, because it encourages re-
tirement savings. Without a tax subsidy, families arguably would save 
even less for retirement. Explanations for families saving insufficiently 
include that they are myopic, not adequately anticipating future needs, 
or that they lack discipline to save for the future needs that they recog-
nize. However, workers contributing to a pension give up liquidity in 
that they often cannot access the money until retirement, or can access 
it only after paying a penalty. A tax incentive is needed to overcome this 
disincentive to participating in a pension.
By encouraging pensions through favorable tax treatment, govern-
ments incur a cost in lost tax revenue. Revenue is lost compared to what 
the government would have received if the pensions had been taxed in 
the same way as taxable savings accounts. The lost revenue is called a 
“tax expenditure” because it is equivalent in some respects to a govern-
ment expenditure to finance pension benefits. 
Some policy analysts are concerned about the distributional aspects 
of the tax expenditure. Because of the pattern of pension coverage, the 
tax expenditure disproportionately favors middle- and upper-income 
workers. Arguably, however, distributional issues should be considered 
within the larger framework of retirement income policy, including So-
cial Security.
These tax subsidies, which take the form of income tax deductions 
or exclusions, deliver tax savings in proportion to the worker’s marginal 
tax rate. This arrangement is “upside down,” because it provides mini-
mal incentives to the majority of American households—those who are 
in the 15 percent, 10 percent, or zero income tax brackets and who most 
need to save more to provide for basic needs in retirement—while re-
serving the largest incentives for the highest-income households. 
Moreover, as a strategy for promoting national saving, these subsi-
dies are poorly targeted. Higher-income taxpayers are likely to respond 
by shifting existing assets from taxable to tax-preferred accounts (Gale, 
Iwry, and Walters 2007). For these reasons, a tax credit, which would 
provide an incentive per dollar contributed to a pension for all partici-
pants paying taxes, arguably would be more efficient in encouraging 
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savings than the current system which provides higher subsidies per 
dollar contributed to a pension for people in higher tax brackets. Higher- 
income participants would still have an advantage because of the tax 
exemption of investment earnings on pension accounts.
Tax law plays a major regulatory function. To be “tax-qualified,” a 
plan must meet minimum standards concerning participation, vesting, 
and fair treatment of lower-paid employees (nondiscrimination rules). 
When plans do not meet these requirements, the employer’s contribu-
tion to the plan must be included in the employee’s taxable income to 
be tax deductible for the employer, a situation that employees do not 
want. 
PENSION TAX POLICY IN OECD COUNTRIES
Most high-income countries in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) use the EET approach to the 
tax treatment of pensions.1 Ten countries—Austria, Canada, Finland, 
Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and the 
United States—come close to the pure EET approach in which pension 
benefits are subject to the same progressive income tax rates as other 
retirement income. Another twelve countries—Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—also use the EET approach, 
but withdrawals are generally taxed more leniently than in the first 
group of countries, or contributions are granted a tax credit rather 
than a deduction (Yoo and de Serres 2005). For instance, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, France, Mexico, and Turkey allow a partial 
tax-free withdrawal of benefits in the form of a lump sum, while France, 
Germany, and Turkey allow a similar tax privilege to annuity pension 
income. In Mexico, Turkey, and the Slovak Republic, pension income 
up to a specified limit is tax free, while income above the limit is taxed 
at a relatively low rate. 
While social security programs sometimes provide more gener-
ous benefits to larger families through benefits that are linked to family 
structure, employer-provided pensions and individual account plans 
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rarely have such a feature. In Germany, however, contributions to the 
individual account pensions called Riester pensions receive a subsidy 
that is larger the greater the number of children in the family. This tax 
treatment of pension contributions is consistent with a general German 
tax policy of encouraging families to have children.   
The practice in other OECD countries differs from the EET ap-
proach because contributions or investment income are taxed. In Italy, 
Denmark, and Sweden, the tax treatment of private pensions is closer 
to the model of exempt (E), taxed (T), and taxed (T) concerning the 
treatment of contributions, investment earnings, and benefit payments. 
While these three countries allow for the deferral of taxation on con-
tributions, they tax accrued income from fund investment—albeit at 
preferential rates—and pension benefits at withdrawal. In Sweden, 
for example, all capital income is taxed at a preferential flat rate of 15 
percent on the theory that because capital is more mobile than labor, 
Sweden cannot tax capital at the same rate that it taxes labor income. 
This tax treatment of capital income is carried over to the taxation of the 
investment earnings of pension funds at a flat rate of 15 percent.
Australia, New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Luxem-
bourg tax contributions to private pension schemes. In the latter three 
countries, either employees’ or employers’ contributions are exempt 
from taxation, but not both. In the United States, employee contribu-
tions to 401(k) plans are tax exempt, but employee contributions to 
private sector defined benefit plans are not. 
TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
This chapter now discusses in greater detail effects of the tax 
treatment of pension contributions, investment earnings, and benefit 
payments. Tax systems can be analyzed in terms of whether they af-
fect the choices made by workers and employers by causing them to 
take actions they would not have done in the absence of the taxes. Pen-
sion taxation can affect decisions concerning wages, deferred wages, 
other employee benefits (such as health insurance), defined benefit ver-
sus defined contribution pension plans, employee contributions versus 
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employer contributions, self-employment versus employee status, lump 
sum benefits versus annuities, and equity versus bond investments in 
pension portfolios. 
Contributions
Contributions can be made both by employers and employees, and 
the tax treatment differs in the United States.
Employer contributions. The United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and most other countries with well-developed pension sys-
tems allow a tax deduction for employer contributions to pensions. In 
this way, employer contributions for wages and pension contributions 
receive equal tax treatment under the corporate income tax. 
U.S. employer contributions to a pension plan are not taxed as in-
come to the employee, avoiding both personal income taxes and Social 
Security taxes. The exemption from Social Security taxes reduces the 
current tax burden on workers, but it also reduces their future Social 
Security pension benefits in the United States, where future benefits are 
tied to Social Security–covered compensation. 
Employee contributions. In the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
most other OECD countries, employee contributions are also tax de-
ductible to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. This 
treatment creates equality of tax treatment between the two types of 
plans. In the United States, however, employee contributions are not 
tax deductible to defined benefit plans in the private sector. The tax 
treatment differs between the public and private sectors. Employee con-
tributions are tax deductible for state and local government employees. 
Thus, the nondeductibility of employee contributions to U.S. private 
sector defined benefit plans is an oddity in the pension world.
Employee contributions are tax deductible for certain types of de-
fined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, but not others, such as 
money purchase plans. Perhaps because of this feature, 401(k) plans 
are by far the most popular type of defined contribution plan. Employee 
contributions to those plans are tax deductible under the personal in-
come tax but still are taxed under the Social Security payroll tax so 
as to not erode the tax basis for Social Security. In pension parlance, 
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employee tax deductible contributions are equivalent to a salary reduc-
tion contribution. If an employee contribution reduces the employee’s 
taxable salary, it is equivalent to a tax deductible contribution.
Providing the option of tax deductible employee contributions to 
defined benefit plans might make defined benefit plans more attractive 
to employers. Employee contributions could provide an assured steady 
source of funding for those plans. Presumably, when employees are re-
quired to contribute to their pension plans, wages adjust upwards in 
comparison to what they would be in a similar job where the employer 
was responsible entirely for the funding of the defined benefit plan. This 
assumption of economists, based on the theory of compensating differ-
entials, is not accepted by many pension practitioners, but it is clearly 
visible in the setting of collective bargaining.
If a U.S. employee does not fully make use of his or her tax de-
duction to the pension plan for the plan year by making the maximum 
allowable contribution, the missed contribution cannot be made up in 
the future. By contrast, the system in Canada allows workers greater 
flexibility as to the timing of their contributions. An individual’s unused 
contribution in a year is carried forward indefinitely for use in subse-
quent years, subject to certain dollar limits. Similarly, contributions not 
deductible in the year they are paid because they exceed the allowable 
amount may be deducted in subsequent years.
This flexibility in Canada for contributions to defined contribution 
plans was introduced to achieve equal footing with the flexibility avail-
able to employers for contributions to defined benefit plans. In most 
countries, employers with well-funded plans have flexibility as to the 
timing of their contributions, so long as their plans are not overfunded 
to the extent that further contributions are not allowed or underfunded 
to the extent that large contributions are required.
The tax preferences provide weak incentives to the majority of 
American households—those who are in the 15 percent, 10 percent, 
or zero income tax brackets. The Saver’s Credit, enacted in 2001, was 
designed to address this problem. As the only major pension tax incen-
tive targeted specifically at the majority of American households, it was 
designed to level the playing field by giving taxpayers earning less than 
$50,000 a year a tax credit for contributions to 401(k) plans, IRAs, and 
similar retirement savings plans. Although it was originally proposed 
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as a permanent tax credit, Congress sought to save revenue for other 
purposes by enacting the Saver’s Credit with a 2006 sunset date. The 
Pension Protection Act of 2006 has made the Saver’s’ Credit permanent 
and indexed its income eligibility limits to inflation (Gale, Iwry, and 
Walters 2007). Because the Saver’s Credit is nonrefundable, it offsets a 
taxpayer’s tax liability; it provides no saving incentive for lower-income 
households that have no income tax liability. 
Employee nondeductible contributions. Three reasons explain 
why employees may make nondeductible contributions to pension 
plans. First, employee contributions to defined benefit plans are not de-
ductible. While it is unusual in the private sector, a few defined benefit 
plans require employee contributions, which are nondeductible. Sec-
ond, some employees make nondeductible contributions to Individual 
Retirement Accounts because they wish to contribute to those accounts 
and they are not eligible to make deductible contributions. Third, some 
employees make nondeductible contributions to 401(k) plans because 
they wish to contribute more than the allowable limits on deductible 
contributions.
When employees claim benefits, they are not taxed on that part of 
the benefits that equals the nominal value of the nondeductible contribu-
tions they made. Contributions made 20 years earlier or more, however, 
could easily have lost half their value as a deduction because of infla-
tion. Thus, this treatment of nondeductible contributions, which does 
not recognize the eroding effect of inflation on the value of past nomi-
nal contributions, results in unfavorable tax treatment because of the 
limited deduction for those contributions when benefits are received.
Table 5.1 summarizes the tax treatment of employee contributions 
and highlights the lack of deductibility for contributions to private sector 
defined benefit plans. Contributions are tax deductible for contributions 
to 401(k)-type plans in both the private and public sectors. Employee 
contributions are tax deductible for defined benefit plans for state and 
local government employees but not federal government employees. 
The major exception to the tax deductibility of employee pension con-
tributions in the United States, and indeed around the world, is for U.S. 
private sector defined benefit plans.
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Contribution limits. Countries generally set a maximum on allow-
able tax deductible contributions that can be made by, or on behalf of, a 
worker. The maximum is expressed both as an absolute amount and as 
a percentage of the worker’s pay, with the lower maximum being effec-
tive. Maximums are set to limit the government’s loss of tax revenue. 
Also, as a matter of fairness to low-income taxpayers, the maximums 
limit benefit amounts and tax preferences received by high-income 
workers.
The tax treatment of pensions in Canada is based on the principle 
that all workers should have equal access to a tax-preferenced pension, 
whether or not their employer provides a pension plan. This principle 
is viewed as an important policy aspect of interpersonal equity, and it is 
not an aspect of the U.S. pension system. To achieve it, each worker’s 
maximum allowable contribution to a Registered Retirement Savings 
Plan (RRSP) is reduced by a pension adjustment to reflect the worker’s 
accruals in an employer-provided defined benefit or defined contribu-
tion plan. RRSPs are the Canadian equivalent of Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) in that they are individual plans established by work-
ers without the involvement of employers. Integrating contribution 
limits for employer-provided plans with individual plans assures that all 
workers may set aside a roughly equivalent amount in tax-preferenced 
pension plans. This policy differs considerably from the tax treatment 
of U.S. pensions, where employer-provided plans are heavily favored 
relative to individual plans in terms of allowable contributions.
The maximum allowable tax deductible contribution for UK per-
sonal pension plans increases with the worker’s age. It rises from 17.5 
percent of earnings for those under age 36 to 40 percent for those ages 
61 to 74. The idea behind this policy is that older workers are more 
aware of their retirement income needs and may be more motivated to 
Table 5.1  Tax Treatment of Employee Pension Contributions
Defined benefit 401(k)-type plans
Private sector Not tax deductible Tax deductible
State and local government Tax deductible Tax deductible
NOTE: Employee contributions to defined benefit plans are not tax deductible for fed-
eral government employees. Employee contributions to non-401(k)-type defined con-
tribution plans are not tax deductible.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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save for retirement. The United States has adopted a simplified variant 
of this approach; it allows higher tax deductible contributions, called 
“catch up” contributions, for workers age 50 and older than for younger 
workers. That policy could be extended by allowing even higher catch-
up contributions for workers age 60 and older.
Perhaps because the aging of populations has raised the level of to-
tal tax deductions for pensions in many countries, a trend has occurred 
toward reducing the maximum amount that a worker can deduct (rela-
tive to wages). This reduction has occurred in Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, where maximum contributions 
are considerably lower in real terms than they were in the past.
Investment Earnings
In Canada, the United States, and the majority of countries with 
well-developed private pension systems, the investment earnings on 
pension funds accumulate tax free, which is the second E in the EET 
tax system for pensions. This is not the case, however, in Australia, 
Belgium, and Sweden.
Defined benefit plans in the UK offer employers the chance for a 
windfall tax shelter for surplus pension funds. Because an employer 
withdrawing surplus funds will have received the benefit of tax prefer-
ences, employers have an incentive to contribute more to their pension 
plans than is required to assure adequate funding. British employers are 
allowed to withdraw surplus funds without terminating a plan, whereas 
the only way a U.S. employer can withdraw surplus funds is to ter-
minate the plan, and then the surplus funds are subject to extra taxes. 
These taxes have basically ended that strategy. By denying tax deduct-
ibility to contributions when funding reaches a certain level, the UK’s 
Inland Revenue (the tax collection authority) has limited contributions 
to plans with surpluses. 
Some U.S. policy analysts have discussed the possibility of encour-
aging greater funding by creating “sidecar trusts,” also called solvency 
trusts. The money employers contribute to these trusts could be used 
to fund a defined benefit pension if needed or could be used to finance 
other employee benefits, such as retiree health, if the associated defined 
benefit pension fund had surplus assets. 
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Assets
Pension assets are not taxed in most countries. However, as they 
grow in size in conjunction with an aging population and the maturing 
of pension systems, the political pressure to tap this potential source 
of revenue may grow. Pension assets are taxed, for example, in Japan, 
Australia, and Belgium. 
Disbursements
The tax system can be used to favor particular forms of benefit 
receipt. For example, taxation can be used to favor or discourage work-
ers’ taking lump sum benefits as compared to annuitized benefits. The 
progressive taxation of benefits can cause income redistribution toward 
lower-income taxpayers. Sweden, Chile, and the United Kingdom tax 
benefits the same as wages. Progressive taxation of pension benefits 
tends to favor women because they generally have lower incomes than 
men.
Taxing pension benefits as ordinary income received by retirees 
is the most common way for pension disbursements to be taxed. Any 
payment from a Canadian or U.S. pension plan, whether at death, re-
tirement, or end of service, is taxable income, except for payments that 
are essentially repayments of contributions that were taxable, which is 
called “basis” in U.S. tax terminology. 
While it is commonly assumed that contributing more to a tax- 
favored pension plan is financially advantageous, that may not always 
be the case, for three reasons. First, taxable withdrawals in retirement 
can put the participant in a higher tax bracket in retirement. Second, 
withdrawals can cause the participant’s Social Security benefits to be 
taxed. Third, the tax rates could be higher in retirement than while 
working (ESPlanner 2005). 
An important aspect of pension benefit policy is whether the money 
contributed to a pension plan is “locked in” until retirement. In the 
United States, pension payments received before retirement are subject 
to a penalty tax, while in Canada pension payments cannot be made 
until retirement age.
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Pension policy analysts generally favor annuities over lump sum 
distributions. Annuities provide insurance against retirees outliving 
their pension benefits. Some countries provide special tax treatment for 
annuities. In Japan, pension annuities are subject to preferential income 
tax treatment. They are tax free up to a certain amount per year, with a 
deduction that declines in percentage terms in increments for benefits 
exceeding a certain level. In 2006, Spain reduced the generosity of the 
tax treatment of lump sum benefits to encourage workers to purchase 
annuities (Social Security Administration 2007).
Tax Treatment of High Earners
One of the policy debates is over the extent to which high earn-
ers should benefit from the tax preferences afforded pensions. One 
argument, based on a particular concept of fairness, favors limiting the 
maximum benefits and maximum contributions to a lower level to limit 
the tax preferences going to higher earners. The opposite argument, 
based on a supposed incentive effect, favors higher limits for benefits 
and contributions to encourage national savings and because high earn-
ers may be more likely to support providing pensions for lower-income 
workers. Sometimes trade-offs are suggested, such as allowing for 
higher maximum benefits and contributions for high earners if the com-
pany covers all of its employees.
Plan Terminations
If a U.S. plan sponsor terminates an overfunded defined benefit 
plan and reverts the excess assets to the employer, the sponsor must 
pay a 50 percent tax on the reversion. This tax is in addition to a 35 per-
cent corporate income tax and state income taxes. Together, the taxes 
rise nearly to 100 percent, with the purpose of the excise tax being to 
discourage plan terminations with reversions. Not surprisingly, no tax 
revenue is raised by this tax because no reversions are taken (Pang and 
Warshawsky 2009). 
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Pension Taxation versus Social Security Taxation 
An issue in judging the tax treatment of pensions is whether it ought 
to be, and is, equivalent to the tax treatment of Social Security benefits. 
The issue is complicated by the different tax treatment of defined bene-
fit plans and 401(k) plans, and by different treatment of low and high 
earners. U.S. Social Security benefits are tax free for people earning be-
low a fixed level of income, making the tax treatment of Social Security 
benefits more favorable for many people than the tax treatment of pen-
sions, where the benefits are taxed as regular income for most people. 
Lower-income retirees are not taxed on their Social Security benefits, 
while higher-income retirees must include 50 percent of their benefits in 
taxable income, a figure that rises to 85 percent at even higher income 
levels. The effective income tax rate on the employee’s share of Social 
Security contributions and the part of the benefits that the employee 
must include as taxable income depend on the employee’s income tax 
rate, which varies across people and in some cases is zero. 
Social Security receives equal contributions from workers and em-
ployers. Workers contribute from after-tax income (they cannot deduct 
the contributions from their taxable income), while employers’ contri-
butions are from before-tax income (they can deduct them from their 
taxable income, and the contributions are not treated as taxable income 
to workers). 
Implicit Taxes
An implicit tax may effectively reduce pension benefits received by 
some U.S. retirees by taxing them at a high marginal rate. As just men-
tioned, Social Security benefits are taxable under the personal income 
tax when a retiree’s income exceeds a certain level. For some workers, 
this causes double taxation of pension benefits in the sense that the mar-
ginal tax rate jumps because of the taxation of Social Security benefits. 
Double taxation occurs when pension benefits raise the retiree’s total 
income to a level where Social Security benefits are taxable. Each extra 
dollar of pension benefits raises the retiree’s tax payments by the tax on 
the pension benefit plus the tax on the Social Security benefit.
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In Canada, the income-tested component of the social security 
system discourages low-income workers from participating in pension 
plans. For each dollar of retirement income exceeding a certain amount, 
social security Guaranteed Income Supplement benefits are reduced by 
50 cents. The net result is that Canadian retirees with low lifetime earn-
ings face a 50 percent tax rate on private pension income on top of any 
personal income tax liability. A similar effect can occur in the United 
States if pension benefits cause a reduction in eligibility for food stamps 
for low-income recipients. 
Tax Expenditures
The federal government, as well as state and local governments, 
loses tax revenue because of the preferential tax treatment of pen-
sions. This revenue loss is called a tax expenditure. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress’s Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) define tax expenditures as losses in revenues re-
sulting from deviations from the “normal” individual and corporate 
income tax bases. The tax expenditure is the cost side of the tax prefer-
ences–provided pensions. It is measured relative to the tax treatment of 
standard, nontax-preferred savings vehicles. One study has measured it 
as 27 cents per dollar contributed to a pension plan in the United States, 
with a comparable figure of 13 cents for the Netherlands and 31 cents 
for Canada (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2  Net Tax Cost per Dollar Contributed to a Pension, Different 
Countries, 2006
Country
Net tax cost (%) per dollar 







NOTE: The net cost is the reduction in taxes per dollar contributed.
SOURCE: Yoo and de Serres (2005). 
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The measurement of tax expenditures is controversial. Policy 
analysts have no commonly agreed-upon tax baseline against which 
to measure departures. In spite of this, most economists believe 
that measuring tax expenditures is useful because tax benefits can 
have the same effect on beneficiaries as direct spending programs, 
and they impose similar opportunity costs in terms of higher taxes, 
reduced federal spending, and higher deficits (Burman, Toder, and 
Geissler 2008). 
Workers’ wages, their marginal tax rates, and their probability of 
participating in the pension system tend to rise with age, which would 
raise the annual tax expenditure per person as pension participants age. 
However, a factor that generally more than offsets this pattern is that for 
a given wage level, the tax expenditure is higher for younger workers 
because they have more years over which they benefit from the tax free 
buildup in their pension plans. 
Two assumptions used in the tax expenditure calculations can have 
a particularly important effect on the results. Those assumptions are 1) 
the choice of a discount rate in the present value discounting and 2) the 
assumed tax rates on future withdrawals, which depend on assumptions 
as to tax rates in the future.
Three approaches are commonly used in estimating tax expendi-
tures (Yoo and de Serres 2005). First, the revenue-foregone method 
measures the amount by which tax revenues are reduced by a particular 
tax concession, usually assuming unchanged behavior by workers and 
firms. Second, the outlay-equivalent method measures the cost of pro-
viding the same monetary benefit through direct spending, assuming 
also that behavior is unchanged as a result of the tax concession. Con-
trasting with those two approaches, the revenue-gain method considers 
potential behavioral responses and provides an ex ante measure of the 
expected increase in revenues if the concessions were repealed.
Within these methods, at least two approaches can be used—the 
present value approach and the cash flow approach. The present value 
approach, used in the United States, considers the future flows of 
revenues foregone on accrued income and of revenues collected on 
withdrawals corresponding to contributions made in a given year. In 
this respect, it is not influenced by the history of past contributions or 
by demographic changes. Given that the present-value method directly 
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incorporates the intertemporal shift in tax revenues, it may provide a 
more accurate picture of the underlying budgetary cost associated with 
participation in tax-favored schemes, in particular during the first few 
years after a plan has been introduced.
The more commonly used cash flow method differs from the pres-
ent value method in that it does not consider future offsetting flows. 
Its budgetary cost in a given year is measured as the net amount of 
revenues foregone on contributions, revenues foregone on accrued in-
vestment income, and revenues collected on withdrawals, which are all 
realized during that same year. In such a case, the revenues foregone 
on accrued investment and the revenues collected on withdrawals cor-
respond to contributions made in previous years. The latter approach 
is better suited to capture the influence of demographic changes on the 
profile of net fiscal revenues from tax-favored retirement plans at dif-
ferent points in time. The approach has been used in recent studies to 
estimate the current and future profile of tax costs and benefits related 
to tax-favored pension regimes in OECD countries (Boskin 2003; CBO 
2003).
CONCLUSION
In the private sector, employee contributions to 401(k) plans are 
tax deductible. In the public sector for state and local government em-
ployees, employee contributions to both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans are tax deductible. The only major group of partici-
pants in the U.S. pension system who are denied tax deductibility of 
contributions are participants in private sector defined benefit plans. 
Extending tax deductibility to those participants would level the playing 
field between defined benefit plans and 401(k) plans. Tax deductibility 
of employee contributions is provided in most countries with sizable 
pension systems.
Tax changes could be made to encourage annuitization through 
401(k) plans. Such changes could include providing less favorable tax 
treatment to lump sum payments through 401(k) plans.
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The tax system could be used to encourage broader coverage 
through defined benefit plans. For example, the allowable maximum in-
come considered for determining defined benefit plan benefits could be 
raised in plans that provided 100 percent coverage to all full-time work-
ers. Switching to a tax credit instead of a tax deduction would provide 
greater incentive for participation to low-income workers.
Note





Managing Pension Risk 
Risk is a fundamental aspect of pension systems. Because pension 
plans promise to pay benefits at a future date, risk is inherent.1 Some 
party must bear the economic and demographic risks associated with 
providing retirement benefits—employers, employees, insurance com-
panies, other financial service providers, or the government. The risks 
include the financial market risk associated with the investments of the 
plans, the portability risk experienced by job changers and workers who 
are laid off, the interest rate risk associated with converting investments 
into an annuity, the longevity risk associated with the length of life after 
retirement, and the inflation risk for the accrual of pension benefits and 
pension benefits in payment. 
The rules that determine benefit amounts and contributions deter-
mine who bears the risk. An employer’s first decision when considering 
the amount of pension risk to bear, and how much to shift onto workers, 
is whether to provide a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan, 
or a hybrid plan. The risks plan sponsors bear may affect their willing-
ness to offer pension plans and the types of plans they offer. 
In comparing the merits of defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans, we should bear in mind that the choice isn’t mutually exclusive. 
The positive features of both can be achieved simply by an employer 
providing both. In 2003, an estimated 14 percent of the U.S. private 
sector workforce participated in both an employer-provided defined 
benefit and an employer-provided defined contribution plan (Buessing 
and Soto 2006). Alternatively, hybrid plans, discussed more in Chapter 
7, combine features of both defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans.
This chapter investigates a broad range of risks facing pension par-
ticipants and plan sponsors. It considers policy options for dealing with 
those risks. The chapter first discusses risks arising for workers in both 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans. It then discusses the two 
types of plans separately. Finally, it discusses the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation, the federal government agency that insures private 
sector defined benefit plan benefits.
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RISK IN PENSION PLANS
Inflation Risk
Inflation can be a risk for workers, as it affects the real value of their 
benefit accruals in some types of plans. It also affects the portability 
loss of job changers and workers who are laid off. However, for work-
ers participating in defined benefit plans and for workers who annuitize 
their defined contribution plans, it is primarily a risk retirees face. Hav-
ing a fixed annuity increases a person’s exposure to inflation risk. Even 
a low rate of inflation considerably erodes the real value of benefits 
over the retirement period if benefits are not adjusted for inflation. It is 
unusual for U.S. defined benefit plans to provide automatic indexation 
for inflation, though a few do. The plans that do provide this generally 
provide indexation up to an annual cap, such as 3 percent per year. 
Pension policy could require defined benefit plans to provide 
inflation-indexed benefits to protect retirees against inflation erod-
ing the value of their benefits. While that would provide protection to 
long-lived retirees, particularly women, it would be expensive. In the 
UK, pension plans are required to do so. They were formerly required 
to provide indexation up to 5 percent per year; now that has been re-
duced to 2.5 percent per year. The reduction was made because of the 
costs imposed on defined benefit plans by this requirement. If this re-
quirement were placed on pension plans and they were not permitted 
to adjust the generosity of the initial benefits they provided, it would 
considerably increase their pension costs, which in a voluntary pension 
system could lead to erosion in the willingness of employers to provide 
defined benefit plans. In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that impos-
ing mandatory inflation indexation plus mandatory survivors’ benefits 
raised the liabilities of final-salary defined benefit plans by 40 percent 
(House of Lords 2003).
A major difference between social security programs and employer- 
provided pensions is the protection they provide against inflation. 
While the social security systems in most high-income countries pro-
vide inflation protection, pension systems generally do not provide 
inflation-indexed benefits. They do not do so because few countries 
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have well-developed markets for inflation-indexed securities that 
could be used to provide the financial backing for inflation-indexed an-
nuities. When inflation protection is provided on a cost-neutral basis, 
initial benefits are lower than they would be without such protection, 
while benefits received at older ages are higher because of the index-
ing of benefits. Chile is unusual in that it has a well-developed market 
for price-indexed bonds, allowing pensioners to receive benefits from 
price-indexed annuities. 
Inflation indexing of annuities is particularly valuable for people 
with long life expectancy. For this reason, inflation indexing is particu-
larly valuable for women.
Replacement Rate Risk
Replacement rate risk is the risk that workers will have a lower 
income replacement rate provided by their pension than expected. The 
income replacement rate can be measured in different ways, but in broad 
concept it is the percent of preretirement earnings that are replaced by 
retirement income. Replacement rate risk is influenced both by financial 
market risk, which affects the level of benefits in defined contribution 
plans, and by risk in the worker’s preretirement earnings, which is a 
factor for both defined contribution and defined benefit plans.  
Litigation Risk 
The United States is a litigious society. Increasingly, plan sponsors 
face litigation risk. Plan sponsors in both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans face the risk that they will be sued. In 401(k) plans, 
a number of lawsuits have been related to the fees that plans charge 
participants. Participants have also brought lawsuits regarding the 
investment options provided to participants and the participants’ invest-
ments in employer securities in companies that eventually have gone 
bankrupt. 
Litigation risk is tied to the fiduciary liability that employers incur 
based on the pension decisions they make. Litigation risk may be par-
ticularly large in the United States, given the litigious nature of U.S. 
society. A 2007 proposal of the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC 
2007) has signaled that employers are willing to give up control of the 
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investment decisions in defined benefit plans if they can also shield 
themselves from fiduciary risk relating to investment decisions.
RISK IN 401(k) PLANS
Workers with 401(k) plans face an array of risks, and those plans do 
little to protect workers from risks. Workers face capital market risks on 
their investments. When they do not annuitize, workers face risks as to 
their ability to monitor their consumption during retirement so as to not 
spend too quickly, and they face risks as to their own life expectancy. 
If they have the good fortune of living longer than they expected, they 
need to have annuitized income or to have saved adequate assets to 
cover their living expenses for the longer period. The opposite risk is 
that they will be overly conservative in avoiding this risk and spend less 
than they could. However, empirical studies indicate that few people 
fall in the latter category (Butrica and Mermin 2006).
Investment Risk
Workers bear investment or rate-of-return risk from their 401(k) in-
vestments in financial markets. This risk is particularly great for workers 
who are near retirement because they have relatively little time to wait 
for the stock market to recover following a downturn. This risk can be 
reduced at the expense of reducing expected rates of return by invest-
ing in low-risk assets such as government bonds or by purchasing an 
insurance company product. When workers with defined contribution 
plans seek to minimize this risk by investing overly conservatively, they 
increase their replacement rate risk that they will not have adequate as-
sets in retirement.
If workers were to maintain a constant portfolio mix over their work-
ing lives, the risk of a large loss would increase as retirement approached 
because the workers’ account balances would be larger. Workers can 
offset this risk by gradually moving into bonds, but because of inertia, 
it appears that many workers do not make that change. For this reason, 
life-cycle mutual funds have been developed that automatically make 
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that adjustment. With life-cycle funds, the fund is diversified with a mix 
of stocks and bonds that shifts toward bonds as the worker approaches 
his planned retirement date. 
The financial market meltdown of 2008 has highlighted the fi-
nancial market risk borne by older workers. Perhaps the best way of 
dealing with this type of risk prospectively is to invest in life-cycle 
funds, where the fund’s portfolio switches increasingly into bonds as 
the worker’s retirement date approaches. As with any good idea having 
to do with 401(k) plan investment management, recognizing the poor 
job that many participants do of managing their accounts, this approach 
could be voluntary, it could be the default, or it could be mandatory.
Investment risk is borne by the plan sponsor in defined benefit 
plans. The risk may be partially shifted to workers in some plans when 
the extent of price indexing of retirement benefits is affected by the 
investment rate of return received by the plan. 
Because of the long time horizon of pension plans, with their long-
dated liabilities, it can be argued that investment risk is different for 
them than for some other types of investments. For example, if a plan 
were to purchase long-dated bonds that it planned to hold to maturity, 
the fluctuations in the value of those bonds would be irrelevant to the 
plan. A mark to market approach, which would force a contemporane-
ous recognition of the fluctuation in their value, would impose a false 
element of volatility.
Investment risk is borne in different ways by participants in hybrid 
plans. In cash balance plans, the participants may bear some investment 
risk to the extent that the crediting rate varies with the rate of return in 
capital markets. In the collective defined contribution plans in the Neth-
erlands, employers contribute a fixed amount, and all investment and 
demographic risk is borne by workers collectively. However, because 
benefits are based on a benefit formula, the risk is not borne through 
changes in benefits but through changes in the contributions made by 
workers. Thus, workers nearing retirement and retirees receiving bene-
fits bear relatively little risk. This pattern of risk-bearing is superior to 
that in 401(k) plans, where workers nearing retirement and retirees are 
most affected by investment risk.
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Individual Management Risk
Individual management risk arises from individual errors in man-
aging pension investments. Evidence has accumulated that many 
individuals systematically make errors in managing pension invest-
ments, and that these errors affect their retirement income. Life-cycle 
funds have been developed to help individuals manage the investments 
of their 401(k) plans. Individual management risk is discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 8.
Individual management risk does not arise in traditional defined 
benefit plans, which generally are managed by financial professionals. 
However, financial professionals also may make investment manage-
ment mistakes, whether by following what other professionals are doing 
(“herding”), by trading too aggressively, or by engaging in short-term 
strategies. The risk associated with bad financial management is borne 
by the plan sponsor of defined benefit plans.
Agency Risk
Defined contribution pension participants are subject to risks arising 
from the improper or self-serving financial management of the agents 
they entrust to handle their investments. Agency risk arises because the 
pension participant’s investments are handled by agents rather than di-
rectly by the participant. These agents include mutual fund managers 
and the corporations in which the investments are made. The risk is lim-
ited to a small extent by workers’ being able to choose their investments. 
An example of agency risk is when the CEO of a company in which the 
worker has invested receives a high salary while mismanaging the com-
pany. This risk is borne by the plan sponsor in defined benefit plans but 
by the individual worker in defined contribution plans. 
Longevity Risk
Longevity risk for workers has two components. First, longevity 
risk arises because of changing mortality rates up to the point of re-
tirement. This aspect of longevity risk affects the annuity value if the 
individual decides to annuitize the account balance, or it affects the 
amount the individual can withdraw through phased withdrawals if he 
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chooses not to annuitize. Second, individuals who do not annuitize their 
account balances face the risk of living longer than expected and not 
having sufficient funds. Both aspects of longevity risk are borne by the 
plan sponsor in defined benefit plans but are borne by the worker in 
defined contribution plans.
Risks Associated with Annuities
While annuities provide insurance against outliving one’s income, 
they also pose risks to the purchaser. Annuity providers have developed 
options that deal with many of the risks workers face in an attempt to 
make annuities a more appealing financial and insurance product for 
pension participants. 
Prepurchase market risk. Workers face financial market risk 
concerning the value of an annuity. The value of the assets in their ac-
count may be relatively low because of a downturn in financial markets 
shortly before the date at which they plan to retire and purchase an an-
nuity. This risk to some extent can be dealt with by phased or delayed 
purchase of annuities.
Mortality risk. Retirees who annuitize face the risk of dying un-
expectedly early, in which case they would have been better off not 
annuitizing their account. This risk can be dealt with by purchasing an 
annuity that guarantees a death benefit to the purchaser’s beneficiary or 
that guarantees payment for a minimum number of years whether the 
purchaser is alive or not. Another way for workers to deal with this risk 
is simply to annuitize a smaller part of the account balance. 
Default. A further risk is that the annuity provider will default. In-
surance companies provide annuities. These companies face the risk of 
bankruptcy if, for example, they misprice their products or if people 
live substantially longer than the insurance company expected. This 
risk is addressed to some degree through state guarantee funds and can 
be further mitigated through reinsurance. Reinsurance is an agreement 
whereby an insurance company transfers risk of loss under insurance 
policies it writes by means of a separate contract with another insurance 
company. 
108   Turner
The Chilean government guarantees the annuities of retirees in 
its mandatory pension system. The government provides this guar-
antee without charge to the participants or the insurance companies. 
The guarantee is for 75 percent of the annuity, subject to a maximum 
amount. To prevent the need for this insurance being used, the Chilean 
government sets stringent regulations on insurance companies. Thus 
far, for the 25 years the Chilean system has operated, no claims have 
been made against the insurance (James, Martinez, and Iglesias 2006). 
Issues related to annuities are discussed further in Chapter 10.
Interest rate risk at purchase. When a worker purchases an an-
nuity, the worker’s account balance is converted to an annuity based on 
an interest rate, which varies with the long-term interest rates available 
in capital markets. When interest rates are relatively high, the annual 
value of the benefits provided by an annuity are higher than when inter-
est rates are low. Thus workers face the risk that interest rates will be 
relatively low when they convert their account balance to an annuity. 
Variations in interest rates used to convert account balances to an-
nuities can have a large effect on the level of annual pension benefits 
received. For a 65-year-old U.S. male, a 4 percent interest rate gen-
erates annual payments of $686 per $10,000 annuitized. This amount 
rises to $830 at 6 percent and $982 at 8 percent (Ameriks 2002). Higher 
interest rates produce higher annual payments because the interest in-
come produced by the account balance invested at those interest rates 
will be greater. The higher payments do not necessarily imply higher 
lifetime benefits because higher interest rates tend to be associated with 
higher inflation rates. This interest rate risk can be largely eliminated by 
investing individual accounts in the period leading up to annuitization 
in long-term bonds. 
Interest rate risk may be offset to some extent by offsetting changes 
in asset prices. That occurs if interest rates are low, producing a low 
annuitized benefit for a given account balance when stock prices are 
relatively high.
Under a guaranteed annuity conversion option, a pension plan guar-
antees to convert a worker’s account balance to a life annuity at a fixed 
interest rate. Alternatively, the interest rate can be guaranteed to be no 
lower than a fixed minimum. If the annuity rates provided under the 
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guarantee are more beneficial to the participant than the prevailing rates 
in the market, the plan, employer, or some other entity must make up 
the difference in the purchase price of the annuity. 
Fixed rate guarantees are vulnerable to prolonged falls in interest 
rates (Turner and Rajnes 2006). Alternative approaches can be used to 
limit the interest rate risk associated with annuity conversions. One ap-
proach is to allow workers to partially annuitize in steps, spread over 
time. This approach reduces the interest rate risk associated with com-
pletely annuitizing at a single point in time. Another approach is to 
allow workers to initially take phased withdrawals and later take an 
annuity, thus giving workers greater flexibility in picking the date at 
which they annuitize. 
Sweden provides an interest rate guarantee for annuity conversions. 
The government, as the provider of annuities in the Swedish manda-
tory Notional Defined Contribution system, limits interest rate risk for 
workers by providing the guarantee. The interest rate used to determine 
the annuity varies based on market interest rates but is guaranteed to be 
no lower than 3 percent (Engström and Westerberg 2003). 
RISK IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
For many workers, particularly those with long careers working 
for a single employer, defined benefit plans provide retirement benefits 
with substantially less risk than 401(k) plans. Defined benefit plans, 
however, can be risky for workers who change jobs or are laid off, par-
ticularly at older ages. They also pose greater risks for workers than do 
defined contribution plans in the case of the bankruptcy of the sponsor-
ing employer or plan termination for any reason. Because the earnings 
used to calculate defined benefit plan benefits are not indexed in the 
United States (but are in the United Kingdom), these events can cause 
a substantial loss of benefits, compared to what would have been ac-
crued for those years of work if the person had continued working at 
the job until normal retirement age. Portability risk to participants due 
to changing jobs or layoffs is discussed in Chapter 4.
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Risk That Benefits Will Be Cut
U.S. pension law prevents a cut in accrued vested benefits. How- 
ever, employers can modify their pension plans to reduce future accru-
als of benefits. Thus, a person who was hired with the expectation that 
the pension plan at hire would be the one providing benefits at retire-
ment may have his expectations disappointed. The benefits he expected 
to receive can be cut. 
In bankruptcy, workers may experience a cut in benefits because 
of limitations on the benefits that the PBGC insures. In addition, work-
ers generally will experience a cut in the benefits that they expected to 
receive, when those expectations were based on a long career and the 
continued existence of the plan.
Risk Sharing in Career Average Defined Benefit Plans
Career average defined benefit plans provide a form of risk shar-
ing between the plan sponsor and workers that does not occur in final 
average pay plans. Career average plans base benefits on the nominal 
average of wages over a career. Because of inflation, the nominal aver-
age of wages does not keep pace with the current standard of living. 
Thus, these plans periodically have benefit enhancements. However, 
risk sharing occurs in that the benefit enhancements typically depend 
on how well the plan is doing concerning its investments and its experi-
ence with increased worker life expectancy.
Risks to Plan Sponsors in Defined Benefit Plans
Investment risk. In the early 2000s, several changes occurred that 
may have made defined benefit plans appear to employers to be riskier 
than they previously had thought. These changes may have contributed 
to a declining support for defined benefit plans among employers. In 
what some commentators called a perfect storm, both the stock market 
and interest rates declined. The decline in the stock market lowered the 
value of assets, while the decline in interest rates raised the value of 
liabilities. In addition, the increase in worker life expectancy at older 
ages may have been greater than anticipated by plan sponsors. 
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These changes, however, also affected defined contribution plans. 
The decline in the stock market would make defined benefit plans 
relatively less desirable to employers, but it would also make defined 
contribution plans relatively less desirable to employees. Unexpectedly 
long life expectancy would similarly make defined benefit plans less 
desirable to employers but more desirable to employees, with the re-
verse pattern holding true for defined contribution plans. A reduction 
in interest rates increases the cost of annuitizing in both defined benefit 
plans and defined contribution plans. 
Investment mismatch risk. Plan sponsors bear the risk that their 
assets and liabilities are mismatched, so that their liabilities may grow 
faster than their assets. Their assets and liabilities may react differently 
to changes in interest rates.
The effects of uncertainty in improvements in life expectancy. 
Uncertainty as to future changes in life expectancy may affect em-
ployers’ pension decisions. For example, the increasing obesity in the 
population may cause life expectancy to increase less than projected, 
while a revolution in medical science may cause the improvements to be 
greater than projected. Experts disagree as to the likely future increases 
in life expectancy. The Social Security actuaries have projected an in-
crease of 6 years between 2000 and 2080 for life expectancy at birth; 
but the 2003 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003), 
which examined the basis for that projection, recommended projecting 
an even greater increase in life expectancy—about 7.5 years. Most of 
this increase will occur at older ages because mortality is already low 
at younger ages. 
Pension plan sponsors may have poorly anticipated improvements 
in life expectancy. Many defined benefit plans were established during 
the 1940s and 1950s, a time when life expectancy at older ages had 
increased relatively little during the preceding decades of the twentieth 
century. Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 11.7 years in 1900 to 21.2 
years in 2000, an 81 percent increase. However, 75 percent of this in-
crease occurred after 1950, and thus may not have been anticipated by 
the sponsors of defined benefit plans at the time that many plans were 
started. The improvements in life expectancy at older ages generally 
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accelerated over the century, thanks especially to an unprecedented re-
duction in mortality from cardiovascular disease beginning in the late 
1960s (Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods 2003). 
Markets can pool idiosyncratic longevity risk, which is the risk that 
a particular individual will live longer than expected. However, pension 
providers also take on systematic longevity risk, which is the risk that 
an entire cohort will live longer than expected. 
Longevity bonds are a financial instrument that would protect de-
fined benefit plan sponsors from the risk that an entire cohort lives 
longer on average than expected. Longevity bonds have a payout that 
is structured so that the larger the percentage of a particular age co-
hort that survives during the postretirement years, the larger the payout. 
These bonds have been offered, but a market has not been developed 
for them.
When an employer provides annuities through a defined benefit 
plan, the employer takes on idiosyncratic and systematic longevity risk. 
That risk can be reduced in larger plans by the diversification across 
plan participants. By the same token, the risk is larger in small plans 
than in large plans because small plans have a smaller pool of retirees 
across which they can diversify the risk.
Systematic longevity risk is expensive for a plan sponsor to bear 
because it is positively correlated across workers. However, it is rel-
atively inexpensive, compared to idiosyncratic risk, for individual 
workers to bear because for each worker the increase in life expectancy 
is relatively small, and the worker benefits from that increase through 
the associated longer life. It is efficient for plan sponsors, rather than 
individual workers, to bear the idiosyncratic risk because plan sponsors 
of large plans can diversify it away. It may be efficient for workers to 
bear the systematic risk because they are also the beneficiaries of the 
longer life expectancy.
Systematic risk can be transferred to workers by raising the plan’s 
normal retirement age in connection with improvements in life expec-
tancy. An increase in the normal retirement age means that benefits are 
reduced at all calendar ages younger than the new normal retirement 
age, including at the plan’s earliest retirement age. The reduction in 
benefits is designed to maintain a constant lifetime expected value of 
benefits in the face of increased life expectancy. U.S. plans are not per-
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mitted to have a normal retirement age higher than age 65, an aspect of 
pension law that has not been adjusted to reflect increasing longevity.
The increase in the plan’s normal retirement age can be done in 
several ways. Similar to the increase for Social Security benefits, the 
increase can be determined in advance according to a fixed schedule. 
This approach eliminates any risk as to the timing and amount of the 
changes. Alternatively, the increase can be linked to increases in life 
expectancy. That approach would entail some risk as to the timing and 
amount of reductions in annual benefits, but would assure that for the 
pension population as a whole the expected lifetime value of benefits 
would be maintained. The increase could occur for all workers, or it 
could be limited to new hires.
Pension participants as a group have longer life expectancies than 
the general population because they are healthy enough to work. Also, 
they have higher average income than the population average, which 
is associated with longer life expectancy. The life expectancy of pen-
sion participants may change at a different rate from that of the general 
population, which should be taken into account in indexing increases in 
a plan’s normal retirement age.
Regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is the risk that pension com-
mitments will be made more expensive for plan sponsors because of 
regulatory changes. For example, a change that required all plans to 
provide cost-of-living adjustments for retirees, or that required plans 
to index benefits during the preretirement period for workers the plan 
sponsors lay off, would raise plan costs.
Pension Insurance for Defined Benefit Plans: The PBGC
In a dynamic economy, new companies are being created at the 
same time that older companies are shutting down.2 The bankruptcy 
of firms, though distressing for owners and employees, is part of the 
normal functioning of a competitive, efficient economy. If government 
wants to further that competitive economy, it will avoid subsidizing 
firms in declining industries. 
The bankruptcy of firms generally hurts pension participants in de-
fined benefit plans. In an employer-provided defined benefit system, 
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workers may lose their retirement benefits if their employer declares 
bankruptcy at a time when its defined benefit pension is underfunded. 
When employers are under financial stress, contributing to a pension 
plan may take a low priority. In the absence of regulations prevent-
ing employers from forgoing contributions, typically such an employer 
seeks to place the minimum amount into the pension plan, leading to 
underfunding. 
The PBGC protects the pensions of U.S. workers in private defined 
benefit plans. The PBGC’s operations are financed by insurance pre-
miums set by Congress and paid by sponsors of defined benefit plans; 
they are also financed by investment income, assets from underfunded 
pension plans the PBGC has taken over, and recoveries from compa-
nies formerly responsible for the plans. The PBGC maintains separate 
insurance programs for single-employer defined benefit plans and for 
multiemployer defined benefit plans because of the difference in risk 
of termination between the two types of plans. The PBGC charges a 
premium that is based in part on the number of participants in the plan 
and in part on the extent of underfunding. However, the premium is 
not risk-related in that it is not larger for sponsors that are more likely 
to go bankrupt. Thus, weak companies having plans with a significant 
degree of underfunding are not charged the full premium that would be 
charged using insurance principles.
Table 6.1 indicates that the net assets of the PBGC single-employer 
trust fund declined by an astounding $33 billion between 2000 and 
2004. This experience demonstrates that the PBGC is somewhat like 
a casualty insurance company that insures catastrophic events. The fi-
nancial status of the pension benefit insurer can change dramatically in 
a short period of time. 
Causes of the deficits. These deficits reflect in part the effects of 
a three-year downturn in the stock market, starting in 2000, plus the 
decline in interest rates over the period. At the beginning of 2000, the 
PBGC had a surplus of $9.7 billion rather than a deficit.
Claims on the PBGC’s insurance are sensitive to changes in interest 
rates and stock returns, overall economic conditions, the development 
of underfunding in some large plans, the economic performance of par-
ticular industries, and the bankruptcy of a few large companies. 
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Defined benefit pensions face long-term challenges due to the ear-
lier retirements and increasing life expectancies of their participants. In 
2003, an average male worker would expect to spend 18.1 years in re-
tirement, compared to 11.5 years in 1950 (PBGC 2003). The additional 
seven years of retirement must be funded.
Since pension plans with unfunded benefits are more likely to 
be sponsored by weak companies, the variable premium the PBGC 
charges is a step toward a risk-related premium that a commercial in-
surer would assess. The next step would be to increase the 0.9 percent to 
reflect the probability of the employer becoming bankrupt.3 However, 
that gets difficult, for the following five reasons: 1) the correct premium 
could be huge for employers that are about to go bankrupt; 2) not all 
companies are rated; 3) ratings can be incorrect (e.g., Enron), so the 
PBGC might need to audit employers; 4) the large premium could be 
enough to bankrupt a weak employer; and 5) the premiums would go 
to the PBGC, whereas the best place for the money would be to put it 
into the plan. 
Since it could be difficult to get payment of this large risk-related 
premium from a bankrupt employer, the PBGC could put a cap on it. 
Another idea is to restrict benefits. For example, when a weak employer 
is funded at less than 60 percent, U.S. pension law restricts the employer 
from improving benefits. These rules could go further in four ways: by 1) 
setting a higher threshold than 60 percent; 2) restricting improvements 
targeted at employers with a below-investment-grade credit rating; 











SOURCE:  Annual Reports of the PBGC.
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3) further restricting benefits, such as by freezing all accruals4 and disal-
lowing lump sums and early retirement subsidies; and 4) avoiding the 
guarantee of poison pill provisions or shutdown benefits unless they 
were funded. It should be noted that advocates for workers oppose the 
60 percent rule, arguing that workers should not be penalized for the 
poor funding, which is the responsibility of employers. These bene-
fit restrictions have been discussed in response to plan funding ratios 
plummeting because of payments of subsidized lump sums to people 
who get all their money out before plan termination by lump sum. Be-
cause of the way that the PBGC guarantees benefits,5 the participants 
remaining in these plans will get less from the PBGC. 
Principles for Evaluating the PBGC
This section discusses basic principles for evaluating the PBGC. 
A fundamental issue in establishing a pension insurer is the extent 
to which it should act as a profit-making insurer would, providing 
market-based insurance, versus the extent to which it should provide 
social insurance, where social goals are met through the transfer of re-
sources across firms.  
Adequate pension funding. The PBGC would not be needed if 
government regulation could assure that pension plans were always 
adequately funded. However, with the volatility of equity and bond 
markets and the desire of employers to gradually pay for new or larger 
benefits, it is difficult to require that pension plans always be adequately 
funded. 
Because pension contributions are tax deductible under the cor-
porate income tax and the earnings on contributions are generally not 
taxed, profitable tax-paying firms have an incentive to prefund pension 
plans. For firms in financial distress that are not paying taxes, the incen-
tive is the opposite: these firms try to minimize contributions.
When a firm promises a defined benefit pension to its workers, eco-
nomic theory posits that those workers accept a lower amount in wages, 
depending on the risk associated with the promise of benefits and the 
value that workers place on future compensation versus current com-
pensation. As a matter of public policy, many people believe that the 
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trade-off of lower wages for future pension benefits should not be a 
gamble that depends on the fortunes of the employer.
Requiring adequate funding for pension plans, rather than placing 
too much burden on using risk-based premiums, limits the premium costs 
for employers. Ensuring adequate funding through funding regulations 
is the best way to keep down the level of the required levy and to assure 
employers that the cost of the levy will not become burdensome.
Funding issues can be divided into two groups: those that occur 
during periods of economic strength and those that occur during periods 
of economic weakness. During periods of economic strength, funding 
rules need to assure that an adequate cushion of extra assets is built 
up in pension funds to cover the difficult economic periods. The fund-
ing during periods of strength is important, since funding during those 
times is less burdensome on firms because they tend to have adequate 
resources in those times. 
During periods of economic weakness, the PBGC is more at risk 
of claims. Adequate safeguards in funding rules can be used to avoid 
underfunding. Funding rules need to assure that employers are required 
to contribute to underfunded plans. 
Because of concerns about lost tax revenue due to pension fund-
ing, the amount of overfunding allowed in pension plans during periods 
of strong capital markets generally is restricted. During periods of 
strong financial markets, plans need to develop an adequate cushion of 
overfunding.  
Concern may be raised about excess pension funding making a firm 
an attractive target for a corporate takeover.  That issue was dealt with 
in the United States by a steep tax on asset reversions when a corpora-
tion terminates an overfunded plan and reverts assets to the corporation 
(or to a corporation that has taken over the original corporation).  The 
reversion tax is 50 percent, on top of a federal corporate income tax of 
35 percent. With state income taxes, the total tax can exceed 90 percent 
of the reversion. If the employer uses surplus assets to improve benefits 
or start a replacement plan, the excise tax is lowered to 20 percent. Even 
with this lower excise tax, the total tax would exceed 50 percent. Thus, 
U.S. employers rarely terminate pensions to get a reversion. The funds 
are more valuable in the plan. However, the reversion tax may reduce 
funding levels. In good years, when an employer could contribute more 
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to a pension plan, they don’t, because if the pension assets do well they 
may exceed the value of all future benefits, and the employer won’t be 
able to access them without paying the steep excise tax. Thus, the em-
ployer may never get the advantages of the good returns.  
The funding situation in pension plans, however, can change dra-
matically over a short time period, due to falling equity values and rising 
liabilities. In addition, if an employer goes bankrupt it needs to replace 
its pension promises with annuities, which generally are determined 
using bond rates of return. These annuities are more expensive than the 
present value of the pension promises, using expected long-term rates 
of return.
A major source of funding problems has been flat benefit plans. 
Periodically unions renegotiate the pension benefit formula, which 
leaves these plans perpetually underfunded.  This problem could be 
dealt with by prohibiting increases in benefit generosity in plans that are 
underfunded and prohibiting increases in benefit generosity that cause 
underfunding beyond set limits. 
 Moral hazard. Moral hazard arises because people may take less 
care to avoid an undesirable outcome if they are covered by insurance 
and thus compensated if that event occurs. This problem is considerably 
more significant for pension benefit insurance than for life insurance or 
fire insurance because with moral hazard, financially weak firms have 
an incentive to take actions that increase the liabilities of the PBGC. 
Another factor making moral hazard particularly a problem for 
government-provided pension benefit insurance is that weak firms, 
through the political process, may seek to influence the pension benefit 
insurance legislation to subsidize them. This is particularly likely to 
happen when an industry is struggling, such as the airline industry is, 
and when various firms are able to work together to mobilize political 
support.
For financially stable firms, pension benefit insurance may suffer 
less from adverse incentives due to moral hazard, because these firms 
have countervailing motivations. A firm that expects to continue to be in 
existence will want to maintain its reputation as a trustworthy employer 
and as a responsible institution in society. 
Managing Pension Risk   119
These countervailing motivations do not limit the incentives of 
moral hazard for financially stressed firms with little in the way of fu-
ture prospects. Because of the likelihood of their eventual bankruptcy, 
those firms may attempt to increase their claim on the PBGC so that 
their limited resources can be used for providing compensation for 
their senior management. Also, a firm in financial trouble may engage 
in measures to preserve the firm that would be described as desper-
ate. It is presumably more likely to engage in financial activities that a 
financially sound firm would not do, including skipping required pen-
sion contributions to pay wages, or increasing future pension benefits 
instead of current wages. 
The existence of the PBGC diminishes the influence of concern 
for reputation as a restraining force on the problem of moral hazard 
for weak firms. This occurs because firms that are concerned about 
the welfare of their employees, and for that reason would take steps 
to fund their pension benefits, now can rely on the PBGC to provide 
those benefits. For example, immediately after PBGC was created in 
1974, unless a large employer was in very bad financial condition, it 
generally did not enter bankruptcy (and all the difficulties that entailed) 
just to get help with its pension plan. However, that has changed. Em-
ployers realized that bankruptcy could help them in other areas (such 
as allowing them to break labor agreements). A few large employers 
used Chapter 11 bankruptcy rules (reorganization, not liquidation) in 
the 1980s to eliminate debts and reorganize, relying on the PBGC to 
pay their pension debts (with their competitor’s premiums). These com-
panies set a precedent, and an increasing number of large employers 
are using Chapter 11 bankruptcy rules for just these purposes. For this 
reason, Congress amended U.S. pension laws to make it more difficult 
in Chapter 11 reorganization for the employer to dump the pension plan 
on the PBGC. The bankruptcy judge must find that the company cannot 
continue unless the pension plan is terminated.
Without pension benefit insurance, employees have a strong finan-
cial interest in the extent to which their pension plans are funded. They 
express these concerns explicitly in labor negotiations and implicitly 
in the labor markets, where workers choose among various employers 
with competing offers (CBO 1993). Even with this incentive, however, 
workers may be able to do little to influence the funding of an under-
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funded pension plan. Nonetheless, pension benefit insurance means that 
employees have weaker incentives to assure that their pension plans are 
adequately funded.
Policy to Deal with Moral Hazard 
Monitoring. Monitoring the status of firms at risk can allow the 
PBGC to take steps to limit its exposure. Monitoring can occur through 
mandatory advance reporting of activities of firms, such as change in 
corporate ownership, or it can occur through indicators, such as a de-
cline in bond rating. When the PBGC learns that a strong company is 
selling a subsidiary to a weak buyer, it may require that the pension plan 
be well funded, or that the strong seller back its funding requirements 
for five years.
Coinsurance. Coinsurance, in which employees are not fully in-
sured against pension benefit losses, is one way to preserve incentives 
for employees to pressure their firms for better pension funding. With 
top executives, coinsurance may have some influence on their decisions 
because they would lose pension benefits if the plan terminated with 
insufficient funding. This idea has not been as successful in the United 
States as originally hoped, however, because employees, except those 
at the very top, have little effect on an employer’s funding of the pen-
sion plan, especially if the firm is weak. In addition, the employees at 
the very top may be insulated from this concern by having their separate 
(and much larger) contractual pension benefits vest when the company 
is in difficulty. Congress is considering ways to prohibit this vesting and 
tie the interests of the top employees to the prospects of the company’s 
pension plan.
Coinsurance can also occur with other creditors of firms in finan-
cial distress. The PBGC is a creditor of the bankrupt defined benefit 
plan sponsor. The more money the PBGC receives from the bankrupt 
firm, the less the other creditors receive. Consequently, other unsecured 
creditors are also coinsurers of pension insurance. They would want the 
pension plan funded better (and wages not increased as much). Through 
the decisions to provide loans (and loan covenants that can call in the 
loan) they may be able to affect the plan sponsor’s behavior.
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Policy concerning top executives. In some U.S. firms making 
claims on the PBGC, high executives have retired shortly before the 
firm filed a claim, taking their entire pension benefits as a lump sum or 
in accelerated payments. This strategy has enabled them to receive their 
full pension benefit amount, rather than the reduced amount they would 
receive if they had taken an annuity, which would have been subject to 
the maximum insurable benefit. It also in some cases has considerably 
reduced the assets in the plan and decreased the plan’s funding ratio. 
This type of practice has since been prevented by not allowing lump 
sum benefit payments when a pension is underfunded below a certain 
level.
Top executives in failing firms may have an incentive to pay them-
selves high compensation rather than funding their pension plans. This 
incentive may be a reason for the PBGC to monitor executive com-
pensation in firms with low funding ratios and even to limit maximum 
compensation in that situation.
Protections Against Political Risk
The political forces affecting the PBGC may result in it being struc-
tured in a way that leads to it having insufficient financing. Political risk 
has two major aspects. First, financially weak firms will exert pressure 
so that they will be subsidized by financially strong firms through the 
PBGC. Second, the government, in order to reduce the loss of tax reve-
nue occurring due to the tax deductibility of pension contributions, will 
set too low a ceiling on the allowable level of pension overfunding. 
Special interest group politics work against the financial sound-
ness of pension benefit insurance. The companies most likely to make 
a claim on the pension benefit insurer tend to be in the same industry, 
which facilitates their efforts to influence the government in ways op-
posed to the interests of other taxpayers. 
Economic downturns are a difficult time in which to require greater 
pension funding. In the past, bills have been introduced in the U.S. Con-
gress that would permit underfunded plans to reduce their contributions 
because of hard economic times.  Thus, political pressure could worsen 
the PBGC’s financial situation, unless it helps some companies stay 
afloat long enough to maintain their plan and fund it better in the long 
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run. Unfortunately, the PBGC has experience with companies that got 
funding breaks only to eventually come back later and dump their plan 
on the PBGC, but this time with larger underfunding. 
CONCLUSION
Life expectancy risk can be divided into the idiosyncratic risk that 
a particular individual will live longer than expected and the cohort risk 
that an entire cohort on average will live longer than expected. Annuity 
providers are able to deal with idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across 
large numbers of people, effectively diversifying it away. However, 
no pooling mechanism exists for dealing with cohort risk. Longevity 
bonds would provide a hedge, but a market for them has not developed. 
Longevity bonds have a higher payout when the percentage of a cohort 
that is surviving is higher. Life expectancy indexing of benefits is one 
way of dealing with this risk. The idiosyncratic risk is borne by the an-
nuity provider, who can diversify it away. The cohort risk is borne by 
workers, who are the beneficiaries of the improved life expectancy.
The PBGC insures pension benefits but itself is subject to risks aris-
ing from political pressures. The financial problems of the PBGC have 
not been resolved, even though it has been in existence for some 35 
years. 
Inflation risk remains a problem in the U.S. pension system. Few 
workers have benefits that are protected against inflation. While annui-
ties protect workers against outliving their resources and are particularly 
valuable for women because of their longer life expectancies, the real 
value of annuity benefits can be greatly eroded in old age for long-lived 
retirees. An issue in dealing with this problem is that the trade-off of 
reduced benefits at retirement in exchange for higher benefits a decade 
or two later does not seem to be appealing to most retirees.
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Notes
1. The reader is reminded that the term “pension plans” refers in this book to both 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans, and that 401(k) plans, because of 
their dominance, are generally discussed when discussing defined contribution 
plans.
2. This section draws heavily on Gebhardtsbauer and Turner (2004).
3. In addition, the risk premium could reflect two things—1) the risk levels of the 
pension plan’s assets and 2) whether the plan is too large for the employer to 
afford—by comparing the plan’s cost and liabilities to items on an employer’s 
balance sheet and the balance sheet’s earnings or cash flow. However, not only 
would this be complex, but it could entail the PBGC involving itself in the 
employer’s business in an unprecedented way.
4. Not just disallowing benefit improvements, which really only hurts hourly plans 
that don’t base benefits on final pay averages.





The Best of Both Worlds?
Hybrid pension plans combine features of both defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans. A factor motivating their development ap-
pears to be the desire by employers to shift the risk they bear in defined 
benefit plans to plan participants. In traditional defined benefit plans, the 
employer bears the investment risk and the risk relating to the longevity 
of participants. In hybrids, one or both of these risks is shifted to partici-
pants. Hybrid defined benefit plans preserve aspects of defined benefit 
plans for workers, such as collective management of investments, while 
reducing the risks that employers face, such as mortality risk. 
This chapter discusses risk-sharing approaches through the use of 
hybrid pension plans. It first discusses the types of hybrid plans in ex-
istence. It then discusses possible types of hybrid plans that have been 
proposed. 
TYPES OF HYBRID PLANS
The four main types of hybrid plans in the U.S. private sector are 
1) cash balance plans, 2) pension equity plans, 3) floor offset plans, and 
4) multiemployer plans. This section also discusses sequential hybrids, 
which are offered in the United Kingdom, and the huge ABP plan in the 
Netherlands. Features of the types of hybrid plans are summarized in 
Table 7.1. 
The plans are described and their handling of risks analyzed based 
on the actual functioning of each type of plan. For example, while cash 
balance plans offer annuities, the usual practice is that workers take 
their benefits as lump sums. Thus, the analysis of the distribution of risk 
concerns the distribution of risk as the plans actually function, not as 
they possibly or ideally could function. 
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Table 7.1  Types of Hybrid Pension Plans
Plan name
Employee (EE) 



















Cash balance plan ER DC A ER and EE EE EE EE
Pension equity plan ER DB A ER EE EE EE
ABP plan 
(Netherlands)
ER and EE DB B ER and EE ER ER EE
DB(k) ER and EE DC A ER EE EE EE
Plain Old Pension 
Plan




ER DB B ER ER EE and ER EE
Combination of defined benefit plan and defined contribution plan
Floor offset plan ER, with EE in 
some plans




ER and EE ER ER EE
Sequential hybrid 
(UK)
ER and EE DB and DC A and B ER and EE ER and EE ER and EE EE
NOTE: A = account balance, B = benefit formula, DB = defined benefit plan, DC = defined contribution plan, EE = employee, 
ER = employer.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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Cash balance plans. Cash balance plans appear to workers to be a 
defined contribution plan. About a quarter of active participants in U.S. 
defined benefit plans are in cash balance plans (USDOL 2008). These 
plans provide each worker with an account to which contributions and 
interest are credited. Cash balance plans are communicated to workers 
in terms of a balance in an individual account, they are readily portable 
at job change, and their benefits are based on earnings over the worker’s 
entire period of participation in the plan. In a cash balance plan, each 
participant’s account is periodically credited with a dollar amount by 
the sponsoring employer, usually based on a percentage of the individu-
al’s salary. Unlike a traditional defined benefit plan, a cash balance plan 
provides workers with hypothetical or notional individual accounts. 
Cash balance plans are required to offer annuities because the De-
partment of Labor regulates them as defined benefit plans. Typically, 
however, workers withdraw their benefits in the form of a lump sum 
payment, which, in the United States, is a defined contribution plan 
characteristic. Workers may bear some investment risk because the 
interest rate used to credit accounts may vary with rates of return in 
capital markets. Like traditional defined benefit plans, workers are au-
tomatically enrolled in cash balance plans.
Although a cash balance plan portrays benefits to employees in the 
form of an individual account, the account balance does not depend 
on the performance of plan assets. Contributions and investment earn-
ings are not allocated to individual accounts; instead, contributions are 
made to a common trust fund for all participants, and benefits are paid 
directly from the fund. 
From the perspective of employers, cash balance plans have many 
features of defined benefit plans (Turner 2003a). Pension law treats 
them as defined benefit plans because they specify a monthly benefit at 
retirement. They are funded by employers as defined benefit plans, with 
a single, collectively managed fund. Also like traditional defined bene-
fit plans, cash balance plan benefits are insured by the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 
The cash balance pension formula determines benefits as a func-
tion of wages, pay credit rates, and interest credit rates. Contributions 
credited to the employee’s account by the employer (pay credit) are 
generally quoted as a given percentage of the employee’s pay. Interest 
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credits equal to the product of the employee’s credited account balance 
times an interest credit rate are also accrued in the account. An interest 
credit rate is either a fixed rate or a variable rate tied to an index, such 
as the 30-year Treasury bond rate, or the rate on one-year Treasury bills 
reset every six months. 
In a cash balance plan, the employer bears the investment risk of 
the underlying assets in which the plan is invested. Employees, how-
ever, may bear some investment risk because of fluctuations in the rate 
of return on the asset that determines the crediting rate. Employees bear 
interest rate risk if they choose to convert their account balances to 
annuities. They bear longevity risk if they do not convert to annuities, 
which is the usual practice. Reasons why employees do not choose an-
nuities are discussed in Chapter 10.
Pension equity plan (PEP). A pension equity plan (PEP), called by 
the more descriptive name of final salary lump sum plan in the United 
Kingdom, allows for the accrual each year of a certain percentage of 
final average pay. That percentage can rise with tenure so as to reward 
long-tenure workers. At retirement, the total percentages accrued over 
the employee’s entire career are summed, and then that percentage is 
applied to the final average pay to determine the final account balance. 
The benefit payable is then determined from that balance (McGill et al. 
1996). PEPs are classified under pension law as defined benefit plans 
and are insured by the PBGC.
In a PEP, the employer bears the investment risk on the assets in 
which the plan is invested. The employee bears no investment risk. As 
in cash balance plans, employees bear interest rate risk if they choose to 
convert their account balances to annuities, and they bear longevity risk 
up to the point of retirement if they annuitize, and beyond retirement if 
they do not annuitize.
This type of plan is similar to a cash balance plan in that workers 
have individual accounts that are credited each year. While cash bal-
ance plans have accrual patterns similar to defined contribution plans, 
PEPs have accrual patterns similar to defined benefit plans. 
Floor offset plans. Floor offset plans, also called floor plans, and 
called underpin plans in the United Kingdom, combine two separate 
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plans: a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan. The de-
fined benefit plan provides a guaranteed minimum benefit and is insured 
in the United States by the PBGC. Thus, employees do not bear the 
downside risk of financial market investment, but to the extent that the 
defined contribution plan accumulations produce a larger benefit than 
that payable from a defined benefit plan, employees can gain from that 
upside potential. To limit the financial market risk to the employer, the 
plan may limit the investment options from which the employee may 
choose in the defined contribution plan. The defined contribution plan 
must be converted into an annuity, but the participant generally must 
bear the longevity and interest rate risk of the conversion. 
Multiemployer plans. Multiemployer plans are collectively bar-
gained plans that cover more than one employer, and in most cases 
they cover a number of employers. Multiemployer plans are defined 
benefit plans from the perspective of workers, with benefit formulas 
that determine the value of benefits. From the perspective of employ-
ers, they operate like defined contribution plans, at least for the period 
of a bargaining cycle. Over a bargaining cycle, which is typically two 
or three years, the contributions of the sponsoring employers are fixed. 
In these plans, however, the future benefit accruals of workers are more 
likely to be affected by the level of plan funding than is the case in 
single employer plans.
Sequential hybrids. A sequential hybrid is two distinct plans, 
rather than a single plan with hybrid features. With a sequential hybrid, 
provided by some employers in the United Kingdom, typically the em-
ployer offers a new employee membership in a defined contribution 
plan at hire. After a fixed period that the employee remains with the 
employer, such as five years, the employer enrolls the employee in a 
defined benefit plan. This type of arrangement provides the positive 
features of defined contribution plans for short-tenure employees and 
the positive features of defined benefit plans for long-tenure employees 
(Wesbroom and Reay 2005). 
The ABP plan. In the Netherlands, the ABP plan, which is the larg-
est pension plan in Europe in terms of assets, is for Dutch government 
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employees (de Jong and Turner 2001). This plan bases benefits on a 
benefit formula, as is done in defined benefit plans. However, the plan is 
financed by contributions by employees and employers, and the contri-
bution rate varies annually based on the investment performance of the 
pension fund. The calculation of the contribution rates uses a procedure 
that smoothes the fluctuations in the rates so that the annual variation 
is small. 
Dutch collective defined contribution plans. In the early 2000s, 
Dutch employers started using a new hybrid plan called a collective 
defined contribution plan. This type of plan shifts both investment risk 
and longevity risk to plan participants. A collective defined contribution 
plan has a benefit formula similar to a defined benefit plan. However, 
in these plans all the investment risk is shifted to employees as a group. 
In a traditional defined contribution plan, by contrast, the investment 
risks are borne by employees individually, and for that reason can be 
particularly problematic for older workers. 
In a collective defined contribution plan, employees accrue benefits 
based on a career average benefit formula. The level of benefits ac-
crued in a year depends on the salary the worker earns that year. These 
plans provide benefits in the form of a price-indexed annuity. Employ-
ers contribute a fixed percentage of wages to these plans and have no 
additional liability if the investments of the plans perform poorly.
If a collective defined contribution plan suffers investment losses 
and becomes underfunded, the plan’s governing body, which includes 
representatives of both employers and employees, decides how the ad-
justment is to be made. It can be made by an increase in contributions 
of employees (but not employers) or a reduction in benefit indexing and 
in the accrual of benefits. If the plan’s investments perform well and the 
plan becomes overfunded, the workers rather than the employer benefit. 
Some Dutch companies have added the feature that if the plan becomes 
overfunded, they can reduce their contribution, but such plans do not 
qualify as a collective defined contribution plan.
These plans appeal to employers because the employer bears less 
risk than with a traditional defined benefit plan. They can be appealing 
to employees because the employee bears less risk than with a tradi-
tional defined contribution plan. 
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Hybrid Plan Proposals
Several types of hybrid plans have been proposed by pension 
analysts. 
DB(k). DB(k) plans are defined benefit plans with 401(k) features 
(American Academy of Actuaries 2001). This type of plan was enabled 
by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, but the effective date for its 
implementation is 2010. This plan option will be available to employers 
with 500 or fewer participants. This type of pension plan would look 
like a combined defined benefit plan and 401(k) plan to workers. The 
defined benefit component is either a benefit formula of 1 percent 
of final average pay for up to 20 years of service, or a cash balance 
formula that increases with the participant’s age. The 401(k) compo-
nent would include an automatic enrollment feature (using 4 percent 
as the automatic enrollment contribution rate), and would provide 
for a fully vested employer matching contribution of 50 percent on 
the first 4 percent contributed by workers. Each worker would have 
an account, to which would be credited the worker’s contributions and 
the matching contributions of employers. The account would be cred-
ited with a rate of return that would be determined in advance, or it 
would pay investment returns based on bond rates. 
DB(k) plans differ from cash balance plans in that the contributions 
credited to the worker’s account are not determined in advance by a 
formula in the plan document but are determined by the amount that the 
employee decides to contribute. Also, employees would have a choice 
among accounts in which to place their contributions. 
Employees would bear interest rate risk if they chose to convert 
their account balances to annuities. They bear longevity risk if they do 
not convert to annuities.
Plain Old Pension Plan. The Plain Old Pension Plan (POPP) is a 
variation on the traditional defined benefit plan (Conversation on Cov-
erage 2007). It would provide a modest guaranteed benefit accrual that 
employers could boost for a year and then reduce back to the basic 
benefit in future years. In these plans, the employer bears the financial 
market risk, but that risk is shifted back to the employee to the extent 
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that employers reduce the level of benefit accrual when financial mar-
kets are performing poorly. The employer bears the interest rate and 
longevity risk.
Life-indexed DB plan. Life expectancy risk can be divided into 
two parts: the idiosyncratic risk that workers face concerning the un-
certainty of their individual life expectancy, and the systematic risk that 
annuity providers face concerning the life expectancy of a birth cohort. 
Workers are concerned about the idiosyncratic risk, while pension pro-
viders are concerned about the systematic risk. With large numbers of 
participants, the idiosyncratic risks of workers are diminished in aggre-
gate for the plan provider through the pooling of risks. 
A hybrid plan option that would shift the systematic life expectancy 
risk to workers but would protect them from the idiosyncratic risk is the 
life-indexed DB (LI-DB) plan (Muir and Turner 2007). With this type 
of plan, the benefit formula in a traditional defined benefit plan would 
be modified so that for each new retirement cohort, the generosity of the 
plan would be slightly reduced to offset the effect of the long-term trend 
of increased life expectancy on the present value of future benefits. This 
plan has the advantage for employers that they do not have to deal with 
the uncertainty of future improvements in life expectancy. 
ANALYSIS OF RISK-BEARING IN HYBRID PLANS
This section groups the hybrid plans considered according to how 
they deal with financial market risk, longevity risk, and interest rate 
risk.
Financial Market Risk
Financial market risk is shifted to workers in a number of the hybrid 
plans. Workers can bear financial market risk either through variations 
in their future benefit levels or variations in their contributions in de-
fined benefit plans that require worker contributions. Plans in which the 
risk is borne through variation in future benefit levels can affect benefit 
levels at least three ways: 1) through the effect on the worker’s no-
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tional account balance in plans that mimic defined contribution plans, 
2) through benefit level in plans that retain the traditional defined ben-
efit formula as the method for determining future benefits, or 3) through 
actual defined contribution account balances in plans that combine a 
defined contribution plan with a defined benefit plan.
Effect on a notional account balance. In cash balance plans, 
workers bear financial market risk through variations in future benefits 
to the extent that the crediting rate on their accounts varies with finan-
cial markets. In DB(k) plans, workers would bear financial market risk 
through variability in future benefits due to variations in the crediting 
rate on their account balance. 
Effect on an actual defined contribution plan account balance. 
In floor offset plans, workers bear financial market risk through future 
benefit variability to the extent that they receive their benefits from the 
defined contribution part of the plan. In sequential plans, workers also 
bear financial market risk on the defined contribution part of their pen-
sion arrangement. 
Effect on the value of traditionally calculated defined benefit 
plan benefits. In the Plain Old Pension Plan, the accrual of benefits 
varies depending on the investment performance of the plan. 
Effect on contributions to a defined benefit plan. In the ABP 
plan, workers bear financial market risk through the level of their 
contributions. 
Life Expectancy Risk
Life expectancy risk that relates to the life expectancy of the indi-
vidual can be transferred to workers by paying benefits as a lump sum, 
rather than as an annuity. Life expectancy risk that relates to changes 
in the life expectancy of an age cohort can be transferred to workers by 
life expectancy indexing of benefits at retirement.
Individual life expectancy risk. Individual life expectancy risk is 
transferred to workers by paying lump sum benefits in cash balance 
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plans, in DB(k) plans, and in the defined contribution part of floor offset 
and sequential plans.
Cohort life expectancy risk. Cohort life expectancy risk is trans-
ferred to workers in life-expectancy-indexed defined benefit plans. 
Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk arises when workers desiring annuitized benefits 
must convert lump sum benefits. This risk occurs in the same plans 
that shift individual life expectancy risk to workers by generally paying 
lump sum benefits: cash balance plans, DB(k) plans, and the defined 
contribution part of floor offset and sequential plans.
CONCLUSION
Pension risks can be shared by workers, employers, and insurance 
companies in many ways. In a traditional defined benefit plan, the in-
vestment risk, the interest rate risk associated with annuitization, and the 
risk related to workers’ longevity are all borne by employers. In a tra-
ditional defined contribution plan, these risks are all borne by workers. 
This chapter discusses hybrid defined benefit plans where the invest-
ment risk, interest rate risk, or longevity risk is shifted to workers. 
Defined benefit plans have declined considerably in terms of the 
percentage of the workforce covered by them in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, and less dramatically in Canada. Hybrid plans are 
of particular interest because they may provide an option that is more 
attractive to employers than traditional defined benefit plans, while pre-
serving for workers some of the risk protections of traditional defined 
benefit plans.
This chapter analyzes hybrid employer-provided defined benefit 
plans currently in existence: cash balance plans, pension equity plans, 
floor offset plans, the Dutch ABP plan, and sequential plans in the 
United Kingdom. It also analyzes types of hybrid plans that have been 
proposed. 
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One of the proposals for hybrid plans is the life-indexed defined 
benefit plan. This plan, similar to notional defined contribution plans, 
would adjust the benefit received at the point of retirement for im-
provements in life expectancy. That adjustment would result in a small 
downward correction in benefits for each successive birth cohort. This 
plan shifts cohort life expectancy risk to workers through the downward 
adjustment of benefits. However, it shields them from individual life 





Financing Pensions for 
Adequacy and Security 
This chapter begins by considering some fundamental issues in 
pension financing: who ultimately bears the cost, and how to deal with 
inherent conflicts of interest. It considers issues common to both defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans, as well as issues affecting them 
separately. It addresses a central issue in pension policy—the choice 
between defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.
FINANCING ISSUES COMMON TO DEFINED  
CONTRIBUTION AND DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
Who Bears the Costs of Pensions?
Economic theory holds that it does not matter whether pension con-
tributions are made by the employer or the employee. In either case, 
competition in labor markets causes wages to adjust so that the net com-
pensation of the employee, including the accrual of future benefits, is 
the same regardless of whether the employer provides a pension, and 
this net compensation is tied to the employee’s productivity. Thus, if the 
employee receives a pension, the employee’s wage is reduced by the 
value of the pension. Noneconomists tend to view this theory’s stated 
result with skepticism, and behavioral economics may eventually decide 
that who makes the contribution matters because of an effect resulting 
from the visibility of the contribution to workers. It may be also that the 
theory holds true in some circumstances and not others.
The argument that employees bear the costs of pensions is particu-
larly strong, however, in the case of collective bargaining. It is clear 
that employees trade off higher benefits in return for higher wages when 
negotiating agreements.
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On the other hand, the argument that employees bear the costs of pen-
sions is particularly weak when considering the defined benefit pension 
costs of unanticipated improvements in life expectancy. Unanticipated 
improvements in life expectancy raise the pension accruals associated 
with past service. The economic theory of compensating differentials 
arguably only applies to the effect of current nonwage compensation 
costs on current wages. Thus, while improvements in life expectancy 
raise the costs of providing benefits equally through a defined benefit 
plan, and workers may bear the costs to the extent that the improve-
ments are anticipated at the time the worker is accruing benefits, the 
costs associated with unexpected improvements in life expectancy may 
be borne by employers. Consequently, unexpected increases in life ex-
pectancy may be a reason why employers want to switch to defined 
contribution plans. 
Conflicts of Interest
U.S. pension law requires plan sponsors to act solely in the interest 
of plan participants. However, plan sponsors face a conflict of interest 
because they also have a duty to act in the interest of their corporate 
shareholders. For example, this conflict of interest may occur in defined 
contribution plans, where, because of the need for diversification, it is 
generally not in the interest of participants to be heavily invested in the 
stock of their employer. However, it may be in the employer’s inter-
est in the case of takeover attempts to have employees holding a large 
block of company stock. Also, employees may more closely ally their 
interests with those of the company when they own company stock.
Conflicts of interest are inherent in economic relations. They occur 
when one party is acting as an agent for another party; this is called the 
agency problem. The conflict of interest concerning the plan sponsor’s 
duty to its shareholders could be resolved by requiring plans to be man-
aged by independent third parties, as is done in Japan. However, this 
arrangement simply substitutes another conflict of interest for the exist-
ing one: a for-profit entity managing a pension fund has a duty to its 
shareholders that conflicts with the interest of the pension participants. 
In this case, the conflict can be dealt with by requiring clear disclosure 
of fees paid so that participants, or the plan sponsor, can make an in-
formed choice between competing pension fund managers.
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Joint Trustees for Plan Management
Joint trustees are one way of dealing with conflicts of interest and 
the agency problem for pension plan management. With joint trustees, 
the board of trustees is composed of both employer and employee rep-
resentatives. The United States is one of the few countries that have 
single-employer defined benefit plans where those plans are managed 
entirely by the employer. U.S. multiemployer plans are jointly trust-
eed. In the United Kingdom, Australia, and elsewhere, single-employer 
defined benefit plans are managed by a joint board of workers and em-
ployer representatives. In Australia, the trustee boards are made up of 
equal numbers of employee and employer representatives. The trustees 
must meet minimum standards of fitness established by regulation, and 
are licensed by the Australian government.
In theory, joint trusteeship better protects the interests of the em-
ployees than does relying on the good intentions of employers. Which 
approach yields better outcomes for pension participants is an empirical 
question that has not been investigated.
The Choice of Defined Benefit Plans versus Defined 
Contribution Plans
Perhaps the most significant aspect of pension financing, with ma-
jor consequences for participants, is whether pensions are provided 
through defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans. Both types 
of plans provide employees with the opportunity to earn tax-favored 
returns on their retirement savings, to benefit from economies of scale 
in investment transactions, and to have a commitment mechanism for 
saving, which is beneficial to people who lack the self-control to save 
independently (Aaronson and Coronado 2005).
Employers have shifted pension coverage dramatically from defined 
benefit to defined contribution plans, not only in the United States but 
also in the United Kingdom. The shift has been less dramatic in Canada 
and Ireland, and little shift has occurred in Japan (Turner and Hughes 
2008). The shift in the United States has been primarily to 401(k) plans, 
and a shift among other types of defined contribution plans to 401(k) 
plans has also occurred. Possible causes of this shift can broadly be fit 
into two categories: 1) changes in the economy that affect the demand 
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for defined benefit pensions, and 2) changes in regulation that affect the 
supply or cost of providing defined benefit pensions. 
A third, noneconomic factor that affects the demand for defined 
benefit pensions is changes in ideology. Conservative ideology tends to 
favor individually managed defined contribution plans. Defined contri-
bution plans are preferred for ideological reasons by some people. It is 
felt that they are superior in terms of enhancing individual choice and 
individual responsibility for retirement. In addition, financial service 
providers may prefer defined contribution plans as providing greater fee 
income than defined benefit plans.
Changes in the economy include the decline in unionism and the de-
cline in manufacturing. Unions favor defined benefit plans, and defined 
benefit plans tend to be offered in manufacturing industries. Changes in 
the economy also include a workforce that is increasingly mobile, and 
defined contribution plans are more favorable to a mobile workforce 
than defined benefit plans. Changes in government regulation include 
regulations favoring 401(k) plans, such as allowing tax deductibility of 
employee contributions; this deduction is not allowed for private sector 
defined benefit plans. 
Defined contribution plans face less restrictive regulations than 
defined benefit plans in the United States. Defined benefit plans are 
required to offer annuities as an option, and require mandatory spou-
sal consent if other options are chosen, while 401(k) plans do not face 
that requirement. Defined benefit plans allow workers to receive bene-
fits while still working for the sponsoring employer starting at age 62, 
while the corresponding age for 401(k) plans is 59 ½. Employers spon-
soring defined benefit plans are required to provide benefits for a larger 
fraction of their workforce than is the case for 401(k) plans. Employee 
contributions to 401(k) plans are tax deductible, but employer contribu-
tions are not tax deductible when made to defined benefit plans. 
The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans has 
spurred a policy reaction: the attempt to “DB-ify” defined contribu-
tion plans. Examples of such proposals include automatic enrollment in 
defined contribution plans, having professional management of defined 
contribution plan investments, having phased purchase of annuities in 
defined contribution plans, and making annuities the default form of 
benefit receipt.
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DEFINED CONTRIBUTION FINANCING ISSUES
While pension financing decisions for single-employer defined 
benefit plans are made by employers in the United States, such deci-
sions for defined contribution plans are made primarily by employees.
Financial Literacy
A major weakness of the U.S. pension system’s being largely based 
on 401(k) plans is that for it to function well it requires everyone to 
be an expert on financial market issues. With the move from defined 
benefit plans to 401(k) plans, increasingly workers must make financial 
decisions that affect the amount of resources they will have during re-
tirement. Because few workers annuitize their 401(k) account balances 
at retirement, financial decisions must be made during retirement con-
cerning the management of their accounts. 
Many participants do not understand the basic mathematics of fi-
nance, do not know basic facts about different financial instruments 
and their levels of risk, and do not understand basic financial principles, 
such as risk diversification. For example, few Americans understand the 
relationship between a change in interest rates and the resulting change 
in the value of bonds (which is an inverse relationship). Surveys from 
other countries indicate that financial illiteracy is also a problem there 
(Lusardi 2007). 
Financial literacy cannot be achieved by having a worker attend a 
couple of seminars. Some financial issues are complex. The economic 
literature on the effects of financial education indicates mixed success 
in affecting participant behavior by providing pension participants with 
more information about their investments. Clark et al. (2004) examine 
the effect of worker participation in financial education seminars on their 
retirement savings decisions. Individuals reported that they planned to 
change their retirement saving behavior based on knowledge gained at 
the seminar. Women were much more likely to alter their retirement 
goals and saving behavior than men. Lusardi (2004) also finds a posi-
tive effect of financial seminars on participants’ decision-making, with 
the effect being particularly large for participants with less education. 
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Employee Contributions 
Employee contributions to defined contribution plans exceed em-
ployer contributions by about 50 percent (USDOL 2008). Employee 
contributions are generally voluntary in 401(k) plans, but if the em-
ployee does not contribute, the employer also does not contribute. Some 
plans have established automatic enrollment, generally only for new 
employees, as a way of encouraging greater participation and greater 
employee contributions. However, some evidence suggests that when 
automatic enrollment is used, the default employee contribution rate is 
lower than if automatic enrollment had not been used. 
Employee contributions to private sector defined benefit plans 
are rare because they are not tax deductible. Employee contributions 
to 401(k) plans, however, are tax deductible, and are a key source of 
financing. Once a worker has decided to participate in a 401(k) plan, 
the factor that has the largest effect on the amount of assets accumu-
lated at retirement is how much has been contributed to the plan (Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian 2004). 
Workers and their families may have a difficult time determin-
ing their retirement income needs and how those needs translate into 
required pension contributions. Workers who underestimate their life 
expectancy will save insufficiently even if they are saving adequately 
for their perceived life expectancy. Even for workers with accurate esti-
mates of their life expectancy, there is no simple answer to the question, 
“How much do I need to save for retirement?” Further, some workers 
may not contribute to 401(k) plans because they distrust financial insti-
tutions (Agnew et al. 2007).
Persistence of Contributions
Many employees do not consistently contribute to their defined 
contribution plans. While a number of studies have examined determi-
nants of pension contributions in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom, far fewer have examined the persistency of workers’ con-
tributions. One study found that contributors generally persisted in 
making contributions, but that the contribution rate tended to vary over 
time. Smith, Johnson, and Muller (2004) use the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) to look at the persistency of employee 
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contributions to 401(k) plans for up to 12 years. Nineteen percent of 
contributors were intermittent (i.e., had breaks in their contributions), 
24 percent were rising contributors (increasing their contribution rate 
over time), 8 percent were falling contributors, and 23 percent were 
fluctuating contributors. Only 27 percent of individuals were steady 
contributors (i.e., made persistent contributions at a stable contribution 
rate). While the study finds that workers raise their contribution rates 
after reaching significant life course milestones, such as the birth of a 
child, it did not find changes in contributions associated with negative 
income shocks or changing consumption needs. 
Paul Smith (2001), using a sample of tax returns from 1987 to 
1996, finds a high rate of initial drop-off in pension contributions to 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Of those contributing in 1987, 
only 45 percent were still contributing in 1992, and 40 percent con-
tributed through 1996. Sarah Smith (2006) uses the British Household 
Panel Survey to examine the persistency of contributions to individual 
account defined contribution plans. Her results suggest a link between 
pension contributions and changes in an individual’s income needs, as 
measured by financial circumstances, health, having a baby, and mov-
ing to a new house. Data from Canada indicate that between 1991 and 
1993, about half of participants in Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
(RRSPs, similar in some respects to IRAs) contributed in only one or 
two of the three years (Maser 1995). 
Policy Options 
Several strategies may help in encouraging workers to contribute to 
their 401(k) plans.
 Match. Offering an employer match for employee contributions 
increases participant contributions. One study finds that a 1 percent 
increase in the employer match rate led to a 0.25 percent increase in 
employee contributions (Engelhardt and Kumar 2003).
The “reverse match” is a policy innovation that places less respon-
sibility on workers and more on employers. With a reverse match, the 
employer automatically contributes for all covered workers, assuring 
that all workers covered by the plan receive at least a minimum contri-
bution to their plan. The employee then has the opportunity to contribute 
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to the plan in proportion to the contribution of the employer, which 
could be on a dollar-for-dollar basis or at a higher employee contribu-
tion ratio of two-to-one. This type of option could be encouraged by 
companies’ receiving regulatory relief from nondiscrimination testing. 
Nondiscrimination testing is required to assure that highly compensated 
employees do not benefit disproportionately from the pension plan.
Loans. Certain defined contribution plan features besides the match 
rate may affect the amounts participants contribute. One study found 
that the ability of plan participants to borrow from the plan increased 
their contributions by about 1 percentage point (Munnell, Sundén, and 
Taylor 2000). Another study found that participants in plans that allow 
borrowing contribute, on average, 35 percent more to their pension ac-
counts than participants in plans that do not allow borrowing (GAO 
1997).
Active enrollment. A study of one firm found that active enroll-
ment with no default option, which is enrollment where employees are 
required to make a decision, improved participation but led to lower 
average contribution rates (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006). Ac-
tive enrollment participants had lower contribution rates than standard 
enrollment participants until the fourth year of participation. The expla-
nation for the lower average contribution rates among active enrollment 
participants may be that active decisions bring employees with weaker 
saving motives into participation earlier in their tenure. 
Autoescalation. One approach to encourage workers to increase 
their contributions automatically over time has been given the acronym 
SMarT—Save More Tomorrow (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). The Save 
More Tomorrow plan is designed to make it easier for workers to com-
mit to participating in a 401(k) plan, to keep the commitment, and to 
increase their contributions over time. Under this plan, workers volun-
tarily agree to save part of their future wage increases—the first payroll 
deduction occurs a year following the date on which the commitment is 
made. In the future, today’s workers generally will have higher wages 
than they do currently as they gain more experience, as productivity 
increases in the economy, and as the price level rises. Therefore, work-
ers will face no absolute reduction in their nominal take-home pay in 
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order to save more, as long as they receive wage increases that exceed 
the payroll deduction. 
Wages increase in both nominal and real terms over time. This 
plan, however, is not dependent on real wage increases. It assumes that 
workers are subject to “wage illusion,” meaning that they are fooled 
by inflation and misperceive nominal wage increases as real wage in-
creases that raise their wages above the amount necessary to keep pace 
with inflation. Workers commit to save part of their nominal wage in-
crease through their pension. Alternatively, autoescalation can occur 
as an increase in the percentage of wages contributed, regardless of 
whether future wages increase.  
The SMarT approach has five essential aspects: 1) the increased 
contribution occurs one year following the decision to participate, 2) the 
increased contribution is taken out of increased income, 3) the increased 
income of the worker is measured in nominal terms, 4) participation is 
voluntary, and 5) participation is open to all workers who are eligible to 
participate in the pension plan.
In the firms that have implemented it, the SMarT approach has suc-
ceeded in encouraging workers to participate in 401(k) plans and to 
increase their contribution rate over time. In its first implementation, 78 
percent of the people who were offered the option chose it, 98 percent 
of the people who took the option remained in it through two annual 
pay raises, and 80 percent remained in it through three annual pay raises 
(Thaler and Benartzi 2004).
Investment Choices
With the growth of 401(k) plans, workers’ investment decisions 
play an increasingly important role in determining their retirement in-
come. While traditional defined benefit plans are generally managed 
professionally, workers have responsibility for managing the invest-
ments in their 401(k) plans. 
Traditional economic theory assumes that investors are rational 
wealth maximizers who do not make systematic errors. More recent 
economic theory and empirical studies, however, increasingly sug-
gest otherwise. Many workers are uninformed about financial markets 
and lack interest in learning about them. Consequently, they may have 
biased or otherwise inaccurate information and make predictable mis-
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takes. Not only are they poorly informed, they make irrational decisions 
when confronted with risk and uncertainty.
These information problems can be addressed by participant educa-
tion (McCarthy and Turner 2000). However, information provided by 
financial service providers may be affected by the self-interest of the 
provider—for example, it may come with little or no discussion of the 
amount of fees the provider charges and the magnitude of the effect of 
fees on reducing account balances.
A different information problem is that economists do not agree 
on what workers should do concerning the management of their pen-
sion portfolios. A leading scholar in the field writes, “There is currently 
no consensus on the optimal asset allocation strategy for investors” 
(Poterba 2001). For example, most financial planners encourage work-
ers to hold less risky portfolios as they approach retirement, but Bodie 
(1995) challenges that view.
Financial information may be so complex that, even if it is supplied, 
pension investors are unable to make rational choices (Barr 2001). This 
failure may occur in part because the long time horizon for young work-
ers makes it difficult for them to understand the consequences of their 
choices. 
Having a larger number of choices may seem to be desirable. It 
would better allow workers to find the options that fit their tastes or 
needs. However, the paradox of choice is that too many choices may 
immobilize some workers, because the increased number of choices 
make it difficult for them to decide. One possible explanation is informa-
tion overload (Agnew and Szykman 2004). With information overload, 
workers find the problem too complex: there is too much information 
to understand, and so they take no action. Studies in psychology have 
shown that having more choices may render people worse off by ham-
pering their ability to identify the option that best suits them (Iyengar 
and Lepper 2000). 
The question arises as to how many options workers should be given 
in deciding how to invest their pension assets. An example of many 
choices leading workers to take the default is provided by the experi-
ence of the mandatory account system in Sweden. Workers there have 
a choice of more than 600 mutual funds. Yet only 18 percent of new 
entrants into the system in 2001 made an active choice; the rest allowed 
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their contributions to be placed in the default fund, which is primarily 
invested in equities (Turner 2004).
Types of Investment Errors Pension Participants Make 
The preceding section discussed reasons why participants in 401(k) 
plans make errors; this section discusses the types of investment errors 
they make. Pension investor errors include insufficient diversification 
and inappropriate portfolio adjustments (Turner 2003b). 
Insufficient diversification. Failure to understand the basic princi-
ples of diversification may lead to investor errors. Specifically, this lack 
of understanding leads to insufficient diversification between stocks 
and other instruments such as bonds, and also to lack of diversification 
within the stock portion of the portfolio. Lucas (2000), examining the 
portfolios of 250,000 401(k) participants, found that, typically, partici-
pants hold poorly diversified portfolios, focusing mainly on stable value 
funds, large capitalization stock, and stock in their own company. 
Naïve diversification occurs when participants attempt to diversify 
by dividing their investment portfolios equally among all available in-
vestment options offered by a pension provider. Thus, if a pension plan 
offers three options, participants would split their contributions in thirds. 
This results in an asset allocation to stocks and bonds that depends on 
the number and composition of stock and bond funds offered by the 
sponsoring employer (Benartzi and Thaler 2001). One study explored 
this pattern and found that only a small percentage of workers appear 
to manage their pension portfolios this way (Holden and VanDerhei 
2001).
Overinvestment in the sponsoring employer’s stock is another form 
of insufficient diversification. When workers invest their pension plans 
in company stock, if the company goes bankrupt they lose both their 
jobs and their pensions. In plans that allow employer stock as an invest-
ment option, 46 percent of participants (about 11 million employees) 
hold more than 20 percent of their account balance in employer stock 
(VanDerhei 2002). This sometimes occurs because the company pro-
vides the contribution match in company stock. Providing the match 
in company stock encourages workers to overweight their portfolios in 
company stock. 
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Men and lower-paid employees tend to invest a higher percent-
age of their portfolios in company stock than women and higher-paid 
employees (Holden and VanDerhei 2001; Lucas 2000). One study re-
ports that when the employer match is in company stock, employees 
invest 29 percent of their own contributions in company stock. When 
the match is in cash, employees invest 18 percent of their own contri-
butions in company stock (Benartzi 2001). This pattern is the reverse 
of what diversification would indicate employees should do. When 
employees overinvest in company stock, they take on risk that they other- 
wise could have diversified away, and that is thus not compensated by 
a higher expected return. 
Some lawsuits have involved pension investment in employer 
stock. Employees have alleged that employers continued to require or 
permit investment in company stock, even after they realized that the 
company was having financial difficulties and its stock was no longer a 
good investment. Lawsuits have also alleged that employers provided 
incomplete or misleading information about the future prospects of the 
company. In some infamous instances, top executives have extolled 
company stock to their employees while dumping the stock they them-
selves held.
Inappropriate portfolio adjustments. Overconfidence in one’s 
own abilities as an investor may lead to inappropriate portfolio ad-
justments. For example, overconfidence may cause some investors 
to trade aggressively. Barber and Odean (2001) define overconfident 
investors as those who ultimately lower their returns because of exces-
sive trading. Males, and in particular young adult males, tend to suffer 
from overconfidence in their ability as investors. This may arise from 
a feeling by some of superior knowledge concerning the mathematics 
and concepts of finance (ibid.). Overconfidence tends to increase the 
amount of trading by individual investors, raising their transaction costs 
(Odean 1998). A study of trading at a discount brokerage firm (Barber 
and Odean 2001) found that single men traded 67 percent more than 
single women, lowering their returns net of trading costs by 1.4 percent-
age points per year compared to single women.
Inertia causes the opposite problem. It results in some investors not 
revising their initial investment allocation when their pension plan of-
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fers further options or changing to a more conservative portfolio as their 
expected retirement date approaches. 
Inertia may result from workers not being willing to invest the 
time to learn how to make portfolio allocation changes. The perception 
that it is a time-consuming process to make changes may be a factor. 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) find that most pension participants 
in TIAA-CREF never make any adjustments to their asset allocation 
over their entire careers. Ameriks and Zeldes (2000) find that nearly half 
of TIAA-CREF participants made no changes over a ten-year period. 
Failing to adjust one’s portfolio can be a manifestation of inertia. 
Lucas (2000) finds that pension participants typically do not adjust their 
portfolios as their time horizon shortens. Portfolios are clustered at 
similar risk levels across age groups from ages 25 to 50. Equity expo-
sure only decreases materially for the portfolio of the typical participant 
at age 60 and older. 
Agnew (2004) examines the question of how pension participants 
adjust their asset allocation in response to changes in stock market 
prices. She finds that participants react to changes in the stock market 
when rates of return are low by moving out of stocks, which is the 
opposite of the strategy recommended—that of dollar cost averaging, 
where workers pick an investment allocation for their contributions and 
stick with it during the ups and downs of the market. 
Policy Options
Several possible alternatives exist to having employees managing 
their own 401(k) plans.
 1) The employer could manage the investments of the 401(k) 
plan. One convenience store chain provides a 401(k) plan for 
its employees with a trustee-investment structure, where all 
participants’ accounts are aggregated and invested as one pool, 
and investment earnings are distributed to participants’ accounts 
proportionate to their account balances (Demby 2002). This 
approach may be desirable in firms with lower-paid employ-
ees who may have less experience with and knowledge about 
investing. However, almost 70 percent of 401(k) participants 
direct the investment of their entire account balances, and an 
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additional 17 percent are able to direct the investment of a por-
tion of the assets in their account (USDOL 2004). 
 2) Some plan sponsors have offered managed 401(k) plans, where 
employees can pay a fee based on their assets to have profes-
sional management of their investments (Maas 2005).
 3) Employers can offer a default option, so that workers do not 
need to make an investment choice. 
 4) Because of an innovation in mutual funds, some mutual funds 
adjust their portfolios so that they become more conservative 
as the worker’s expected retirement date approaches. These 
funds are called life-cycle funds, target-date funds, or age-
based funds. These funds have been established to assist work-
ers in managing their retirement funds in a manner that makes 
appropriate adjustments as retirement approaches. Funds dif-
fer in the “glide path” that they take in portfolio adjustments 
as retirement nears, with some funds being somewhat more 
conservative than others.
An approach to improving asset allocation in 401(k) plans would be 
to grant plan sponsors relief from some fiduciary liability if they offered 
participants alternatives to self-direction of investment choices. This 
could be done by offering diversified funds that would meet certain 
standards or by having professionally managed accounts (Gale et al. 
2004). 
Many workers end up in the default fund in a situation of automatic 
enrollment. Because of inertia, they then stay with that fund. Thus, the 
risk and expected return of the default fund warrant careful consider-
ation. Some employers have chosen a low-risk money market portfolio 
as the default fund because they were afraid of lawsuits if participants 
lost money. That portfolio, however, would be too conservative for par-
ticipants over the long run. 
The United Methodist church pension fund has a complex default 
option. It is managed by a computer algorithm, where the default varies 
depending on the worker’s age (single years of age demarcating each 
group), expected retirement date, and degree of risk aversion (three 
categories).
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This discussion of common errors that individual pension investors 
make suggests a number of possible pension policy options. These op-
tions would restrict the range of investment choices, but such restriction 
in choice could reduce investor errors. The options are as follows:  
1) Limit investment in individual stocks, including employer 
stocks.
2) Limit investment in mutual funds with narrow market focus.
3) Limit investment in highly risky assets such as high-tech 
stocks.
4) Offer professional management of pension investments as an 
option.
5) Educate workers on common investment mistakes.
6) Limit the frequency of investment changes.
7) Provide well-chosen default options that participants can use if 
they do not want to make an active choice.
8) Provide as an option a low-cost fund that tracks a major index, 
such as the S&P 500. 
Investment and Administrative Fees
Fees in defined contribution plans pay for managing and investing 
the accounts. Employers typically hire service providers to operate the 
plans. Participants can be charged fees for establishing an account, con-
tributing to an account, management of assets in an account, switching 
between funds provided by a single mutual fund provider, assistance 
from a financial adviser, withdrawals from an account, and termination 
of an account. 
Generally, the largest fees arise from the costs of managing the 
investments. These fees include fees for active management, fees for 
transactions, and fees for the administration of the accounts. Fees for 
establishing and terminating an account are typically flat fees. A plan 
may be charged a fee for terminating its arrangement with a particular 
management company. 
152   Turner
Because fees are often hidden, many people do not consider the 
management of a pension account as having a price. While proponents 
of defined contribution plans sometimes claim that those plans are more 
transparent to participants than defined benefit plans, the fees charged to 
participants in defined contribution plans are often far from transparent, 
and sometimes disclosures are blatantly misleading. An example of bla-
tantly misleading disclosure is the practice of indicating that a number 
of services are “free,” when in reality they are paid for by the partici-
pant out of general fees charged. Markets do not perform the function 
of assuring a competitive price when consumers do not understand the 
costs and have difficulty comparing across products.
One prominent mutual fund company reports on the account state-
ments of the 401(k) funds it manages that it charges zero fees. Nowhere 
on the statement is it disclosed that the company is not reporting the fees 
charged through the expense ratio for the management of mutual funds. 
When questioned about this misleading reporting, company personnel 
stated that they did not report the fees charged through the expense ratio 
because that is disclosed in mutual fund prospectuses.
Pension participants pay billions of dollars in fees annually. The 
issue of fees would be of no consequence, however, if all mutual funds 
in which pension participants invested charged the same competitive 
price. In fact, mutual fund fees vary by an order of magnitude. There 
is also a wide range of fees charged when comparing across countries 
(Table 8.1). The wide variability in the level of fees charged for mutual 
funds, combined with little evidence that high-cost funds outperform 
low-cost funds net of fees (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006), make 
adequate disclosure important for pension participants. As retirement 
income systems worldwide move toward defined contribution plans, 
the topic of fees becomes increasingly important in terms of its impact 
on national and individual retirement savings.
Because workers typically do not know how much they are paying 
in fees (Turner and Korczyk 2004), they are unable to make informed 
choices in managing their retirement income, resulting in a lack of 
competitive pressure on fees. With better disclosure of fees, pension 
participants would be better able to decide whether those fees were 
justified or whether they would prefer to use lower-fee providers. The 
excess fees paid, compared to what would be charged in a more com-
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petitive market with better informed participants, amount to money that 
is subtracted from retirement savings and is permanently lost from the 
retirement income system. 
A principle of fee disclosure is that the nature of the disclosure 
should depend on the level of financial sophistication of the target 
audience. Behavioral economics has shown that the level of financial 
sophistication and interest in financial issues among pension partici-
pants with defined contribution pensions is fairly low. Fee disclosure 
for pension participants thus needs to be different from the disclosure 
that would be appropriate for professional investors. 
Because the fees are paid primarily by participants in defined con-
tribution plans rather than by plan sponsors, plan sponsors have less 
incentive than they do for defined benefit plans to provide tough over-
sight of fees. Furthermore, the usual conflict of interest arises between 
a for-profit service provider and a client. The for-profit service provider 
is interested in charging fees as high as possible, as is consistent with 
maximizing its profit. 
Investments and Politics
In Chile and elsewhere, an argument has been made concerning 
individuals investing through defined contribution plans that when indi-
viduals invest in the stock market, and in that way invest in companies, 
it turns workers into capitalists. As capitalists, they are more likely to 








Australia 1.09 1.17 1.41
Canada 1.96 2.56 3.00
Sweden 1.32 1.37 1.51
United Kingdom 1.07 1.18 2.28
United States 0.62 1.11 1.53
NOTE: Management expenses include charges levied each year for management ser-
vices. The total expense ratio includes all annual expenses charged against account 
balances, including investment expenses. Total shareholder costs include all annual 
expenses plus an annuitized form of loads assuming a five-year holding period.
SOURCE: Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2007). 
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be pro-business, to be unsympathetic to labor unions, and to vote con-
servatively. This argument provides an ideological reason to favor or 
oppose plans such as 401(k) plans. 
DEFINED BENEFIT FINANCING ISSUES
With the decline in defined benefit plans, a major issue in defined 
benefit plan financing is whether the employer decides to stop financing 
the DB plan.
Plan Freezes
Plan freezes are the most recent aspect of the decline in defined 
benefit plans. In the 2000s, a number of plan sponsors froze their de-
fined benefit plans. With a hard freeze, which is the most common type 
(Munnell and Soto 2007), no new benefits are accrued in the plan. A 
freeze differs from a termination in that the plan is not shut down. A 
freeze provides the plan sponsor time to continue contributing to the 
plan to raise its funding, if it is underfunded. A plan freeze is a good 
alternative for a plan sponsor wishing to stop accrual of benefits but 
facing a plan that is underfunded. It is expected that frozen plans will 
be terminated when they have adequate funding. Plan freezes are occur-
ring as a way for plan sponsors to end the financial commitments they 
have in defined benefit plans.
Sponsors of ongoing plans are required to report the projected 
benefit obligation (PBO) on their balance sheet. However, if they freeze 
the plan, they report the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) on the 
balance sheet. The accumulated benefit obligation does not take into ac-
count pension liabilities arising from future benefit growth, and can be 
considerably lower than the projected benefit obligation. Thus, freezing 
a plan can give the impression of considerably improving the financial 
status of a firm.
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Plan Buyouts
A new development in defined benefit plan financing is plan buyouts. 
Plan buyouts are targeted at frozen plans. A large financial institution, 
such as a bank, offers to buy the pension assets and liabilities of a frozen 
pension plan from the sponsoring employer. The financial institution 
then takes over responsibility for managing the plan. 
Accounting Policy
Employers have expressed concern over two aspects of volatility 
in defined benefit pension financing: volatility in accounting values and 
volatility in contributions. Accounting policy is much more an issue for 
defined benefit plans than for defined contribution plans, which are by 
definition always fully funded. Accounting rule changes have no effect 
on the underlying economics concerning the costs and the volatility of 
costs of providing pensions, because accounting rules are just rules for 
measurement. Nonetheless, they are frequently mentioned as a cause 
of the recent decline in defined benefit plans. It is argued that investors 
have not understood the underlying economics of pensions, given the 
accounting information that has been available. The new accounting 
requirements apparently have real effects, however, because with the 
provision of information under the new rules, investors now view pen-
sion costs differently from before. 
However, just as information in the old accounting rules could be 
misinterpreted, the same applies for the new rules. Volatility in plan 
liabilities does not reflect the underlying profitability of a firm. An ar-
gument can be made that pension plan volatility should be noted in 
accounting statements as an extraordinary event that does not affect the 
long-run profitability of the firm. With this approach, pensions would 
be listed in accounting statements separately from the accounting for 
the firm’s business activities. This approach would make it easier for 
investors to evaluate the business performance of the firm without hav-
ing to take into account the financial performance of the firm’s pension 
fund.
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Employer Contributions
Defined benefit pension financing in the United States depends 
largely on employer contributions. A reason frequently given for why 
employers have stopped providing defined benefit plans for their work-
ers is the unpredictability and volatility in employer contributions. The 
unpredictability and volatility are partly the result of investing in risky 
financial markets, which causes the value of plan assets to vary. But 
they are also partly the result of government regulations that limit plan 
sponsors’ ability to control the timing of their contributions. 
Government regulations prohibit employers from making tax de-
ductible contributions to a pension plan when the plan exceeds a certain 
level of overfunding. These rules are designed to limit the tax loss to 
the U.S. Treasury arising from the tax deduction taken for these con-
tributions. Another effect, however, is that firms are prohibited from 
making contributions when the economy is booming and they have sur-
plus funds to contribute. When the economy is slumping, and the value 
of the assets in the pension funds has fallen, companies are required 
to make contributions, even though the contributions come at a time 
when the companies themselves may be struggling and do not have sur-
plus funds. Thus, the funding rules cause a temporal mismatch between 
when funding is required and when firms are best able to provide it. By 
preventing firms from contributing regularly, the rules make it impos-
sible for firms to benefit from dollar cost averaging in funding pension 
plans.
The volatility of employer contributions could be reduced by allow-
ing employers to contribute, at a minimum, 50 percent of normal cost, 
no matter what the plan funding level was. This would prevent large 
swings in contributions, because the floor on allowable contributions 
would be 50 percent of normal cost rather than zero. The need for this 
option depends on the extent of overfunding allowed. With the changes 
in maximum funding rules in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the 
need for this option has been considerably reduced.
Employee Contributions
A distinctive feature of the financing of state and local government 
defined benefit plans is that employee contributions are used for financ-
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ing, and in fact play a major role. Data from the BLS indicate that in 
1998, some 78 percent of state and local government employees in de-
fined benefit plans were in plans that required an employee contribution 
(BLS 2000). 
In contrast, it is rare for employee contributions to be used for fi-
nancing private sector defined benefit plans. In 2007, it was required for 
3 percent of employees participating in private sector defined benefit 
plans in private industry (BLS 2007). Mandatory employee contribu-
tions were more common in the past, but for reasons that are unclear. 
A survey of the 50 largest pension sponsors in 1979 indicated that 
seven had defined benefit plans with mandatory employee contribu-
tions (Aaronson and Coronado 2005; Wyatt Company 1980).
The explanation for the difference between employee contributions 
in the private and public sectors is that employee contributions to state 
and local government plans are tax deductible, while they are not tax 
deductible for contributions to private sector plans. Thus, employee 
contributions are tax deductible both for 401(k) plans and for defined 
benefit plans for state and local government employees, but they are not 
tax deductible for employees’ contributions to defined benefit plans in 
the private sector.
Employee tax deductible contributions could be allowed on a vol-
untary basis, so that employees could buy extra years of service to raise 
their benefit on a tax deductible basis. Alternatively, employers, in de-
signing defined benefit plans, could be permitted to make employee 
contributions mandatory. Tax deductible employee contributions are 
permitted in Canada, the United Kingdom, and nearly all other coun-
tries with well-developed pension systems. In Canada, employee 
contributions cannot exceed half of the employee’s annual benefit ac-
crual (International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors 
and International Social Security Association 2003).
Mechanisms for Dealing with Imbalances in Pension Financing 
In Japan, if a company is facing financial difficulties it can reduce 
the generosity of its defined benefit plan so long as employees agree to 
the reduction. This element of flexibility has been credited as being one 
reason why defined benefit plans have not declined in Japan, where they 
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account for all but a small percentage of pension assets (Webman 2007). 
In the United States, employers cannot reduce the value of already ac-
crued benefits in defined benefit plans. In reality, however, employers 
are able to do so when they lay off workers who have not reached the 
age of eligibility for retirement benefits.
Improving life expectancy among workers causes the increasing 
pension costs that so many nations face in their social security systems, 
but it also causes increasing costs for employers sponsoring defined 
benefit plans. For a defined benefit plan, increasing life expectancy after 
age 65 raises the costs of providing benefits because retired workers 
receive benefits for more years. The effect of this change over long 
periods of time can be large. Employers bear the risk of unexpected 
increases in life expectancy. 
Changes in life expectancy generally occur slowly; perhaps this ex-
plains why pension researchers and policy analysts have tended to focus 
on other issues affecting pension liabilities, where short-term change is 
more dramatic. In most years, changes in interest rates have a larger 
effect on pension liabilities than do changes in life expectancy. Over a 
period of decades, however, the effect on pension costs of the increase 
in longevity can be considerable, while changes in interest rates gener-
ally have little effect because the increases and decreases offset each 
other. The short-run and long-run importance of the effects on pension 
cost of changes in life expectancy are thus quite different. 
The Effect of Increases in Life Expectancy on Pension Costs
To estimate the effect of increased life expectancy on defined bene-
fit pension costs, a simple calculation can be done. A 40-year-old man in 
1980 was expected to live to 73 in the population life table for that year, 
but was expected to live to 78 in 2002 (Oster 2003). This difference in 
life expectancy would increase the expected length of retirement from 
11 years to 16 years, assuming retirement at age 62an increase in 
retirement years of 45 percent.   
Making a few assumptions, we can estimate the effect of increased 
life expectancy on defined benefit pension costs. To calculate for a rep-
resentative worker, assume a retirement age of 62 in both 1980 and 
2002, a 4 percent interest rate for discounting the value of future bene-
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fits, and no inflation indexing of benefits past retirement. With these 
assumptions, the growth in life expectancy since 1980 has increased 
the nominal cost (measured as the present value of benefits) of provid-
ing a defined benefit plan per male participant by roughly 30 percent. 
A higher interest rate would yield a lower figure, while partial inflation 
indexing would yield a higher figure. This number is less than the 45 
percent increase in years in retirement because of the effect of interest 
discounting, which reduces the present value of distant future benefits. 
Thus, these calculations suggest that defined benefit costs have 
grown more than 1 percent a year per male participant because of the 
increase in life expectancy. While this figure is a rough approximation, 
it indicates the possible magnitude of the effect for a typical defined 
benefit plan. The “feminization” of some pension plans due to more 
women in the labor force would further increase cost, since that would 
further raise the average life expectancy of all participants in the plan. 
Life expectancy increases in other countries provide further evidence 
as to the possible effects on pension plans. In the United Kingdom, the 
effect of increasing longevity on defined benefit plan costs is thought to 
be one of the reasons why employers are ending those plans in favor of 
defined contribution plans (Pensions Policy Institute 2007). According 
to a British survey, the primary reasons for large numbers of employers 
terminating defined benefit plans are increased costs due to lower real 
investment returns and greater longevity (White 2003).  
The effect of increases in life expectancy on pension costs is greater 
in the United Kingdom than in the United States. It is greater because 
the United Kingdom mandates that pension benefits be price-indexed, 
which raises the cost of benefits provided to retirees at older ages. How-
ever, a similar, though smaller, effect of life expectancy on pension costs 
also occurs in the United States. 
Demographers and actuaries foresee improvements in longevity 
continuing into the future. Pension policy for the long term needs to 
consider how defined benefit plans will deal with this increased cost. If 
nothing is done, increased longevity will result in continued increases 
in costs for employers. 
Employers have a number of options to deal with this problem, 
though some good options are prevented by pension law (Muir and 
Turner 2007). Some employers cut future benefit accruals. Some em-
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ployers are freezing or terminating their defined benefit plans and 
switching to defined contribution plans, where employer costs are im-
mune to the glacial inevitability of increased longevity. 
If pension law were changed so that accrued benefits could be ex-
pressed in terms of accrued present value, which is the way employers’ 
liabilities are expressed, rather than as annual benefits, firms would be 
more encouraged to maintain defined benefit plans. Thus, a possible 
response to increasing life expectancy—which would require a change 
in ERISA—would be to index initial benefits received at retirement 
to increases in life expectancy. With this indexation, workers’ lifetime 
expected present value of benefits would not be affected by increases 
in life expectancy, but annual benefits at the point of retirement would 
be cut to take into account life expectancy increases. To shield workers 
from demographic risk after retirement, no further benefit cuts would 
occur for improvements in life expectancy occurring during retirement. 
This approach is used in Sweden for its social security program.
With this proposal, the pension financing risk that, on average, 
people will live longer is largely shifted from employers to workers. 
Workers are arguably better able to bear this risk than employers be-
cause they are the beneficiaries of the increased life expectancy. They 
can adjust to the benefit cuts by working longer, which is facilitated 
by their increased life expectancy. Employers still bear the risk of im-
provements in life expectancy at older ages that occur after the cohort 
has reached the early retirement age.
Employers also would still bear idiosyncratic life expectancy risk, 
which is the risk that a particular worker will live longer than expected. 
While it is not possible for employers to reduce the cohort life expec-
tancy risk by diversifying across cohorts because all cohorts share in 
the improvement, plan sponsors can reduce the idiosyncratic risk by 
diversifying across workers. 
A similar approach for dealing with cohort life expectancy risk, 
which has the questionable advantage of being less transparent to work-
ers, would be to index the plan’s normal retirement age to increases 
in life expectancy. Doing so could also result in a reduction in annual 
benefits, while maintaining the lifetime expected value of benefits. This 
change is less transparent because it is presented to workers as an in-
crease in the normal retirement age rather than a benefit cut. 
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Employer-Provided Plans with Automatic 
Adjustment Mechanisms
Countries generally have minimum funding requirements for de-
fined benefit plans that require plan sponsors to contribute when the 
funding ratio falls below a fixed level. The use of other automatic ad-
justment mechanisms by employer-provided plans is rare but has been 
done, and may provide useful policy insights. 
Iceland. Iceland has mandatory employer-provided hybrid pension 
plans that cover nearly all workers. Benefits are calculated based on a 
formula, but the level of benefits is reduced if the plans become under-
funded. These plans have been funded by a contribution of 4 percent of 
wages by employees and 6 percent of wages by employers. In January 
2007, the employer contribution was increased to 8 percent. In the past, 
these plans fixed the contribution rate and occasionally would adjust the 
generosity of benefits, depending on their funding level. Pension plans 
that were adequately funded could choose to put part of the contribu-
tions into a defined contribution plan. A law passed in January 2007 has 
made the reduction of benefits automatic when a plan is underfunded. If 
a plan is underfunded by 10 percent or more in a year or by 5 percent for 
five years in a row, it must reduce the generosity of its benefits (Social 
Security Administration 2007). 
Netherlands. The ABP plan is the Dutch civil servants’ pension 
fund. It is one of the largest pension plans in the world in terms of as-
sets. It is a privatized plan for civil servants (de Jong and Turner 2001). 
This plan bases benefits on a benefit formula, as is done in defined bene-
fit plans, but it is a hybrid plan. The plan is financed by contributions 
from employees and employers. Automatic adjustment occurs through 
changes in the contribution rate of workers and the indexation rate of 
benefits in payment for pensioners. 
The Board of Governors, which runs the system, changes contribu-
tion and indexation rates annually based on the investment performance 
of the pension fund, using a formula called the contribution/indexation 
matrix. The calculation of the contribution rates and indexation uses a 
procedure that smoothes the fluctuations in the rates so that the annual 
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variation is generally small. The formula determines by how much ben-
efit indexation must decline and contribution rates must increase during 
periods of weak financial performance, and conversely, by how much 
indexation can increase and contribution rates can decrease during good 
times. The ABP’s Board of Governors is able to take other factors into 
account besides the matrix, such as general economic conditions and 
forecast pay trends, so the adjustment is not fully automatic.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has a type of plan called a 
With-Profits Pension Annuity. With this type of annuity, the individual 
participant chooses an anticipated bonus rate (ABR). If the participant 
chooses an ABR of zero percent, the participant is guaranteed that each 
year’s benefit in retirement will be no lower in nominal terms than 
the starting benefit—this, in other words, is the guaranteed minimum 
benefit. If the underlying investments perform sufficiently well, the 
participant will receive higher benefits. If the participant chooses an 
ABR higher than zero percent, the starting benefit will be higher, but 
the participant risks that future benefits will be reduced at some point, 
although to no lower than the initial benefit had an ABR of zero percent 
been chosen. Rather than the plan’s payments varying with the rate of 
return received each year, however, the plan smoothes the benefit pay-
ments over time. 
The main factor affecting bonuses is the rates of return earned on the 
fund’s assets. The bonuses paid also depend on the longevity experience 
of the plan’s participants relative to assumed longevity experience. The 
bonuses received are divided into regular bonuses, which change once 
a year, and additional bonuses, which change more frequently and may 
change by greater amounts than the regular bonuses. However, both the 
regular and additional bonuses are affected by the policy of smoothing 
payments over time. Insurance companies that provide these annuities 
take an annual charge related specifically to providing the guarantee. 
One company takes a yearly charge of 75 basis points for the guarantee, 
with the charge being reviewed annually. Participants are permitted at 
any time to convert to a fixed income annuity (Aviva 2009). 
A different form of self-adjustment plan has been developed re-
cently. In the United Kingdom, employee contributions to DB plans are 
tax deductible. The new arrangement adopted by some plans ties the 
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level of employee contributions to the improvement in life expectancy 
at retirement age for participants in the plan (Pension Protection Fund 
and Pensions Regulator 2006).
CONCLUSION
While coverage in defined benefit plans has declined dramatically in 
the United States and even more so in the United Kingdom, the decline 
has been modest in Canada and Ireland. Thus, international experience 
casts doubt on the view held by many that defined benefit plans are 
dinosaurs and their decline and extinction is inevitable. In both Canada 
and Ireland, and indeed in most countries with defined benefit plans, 
employees make tax deductible contributions to those plans. 
A factor that appears to have played a role in the decline in de-
fined benefit plans has been the increase in life expectancy, since the 
defined benefit plans don’t have the flexibility to deal readily with this 
continued increase in cost. In the United States, some plans have re-
duced their generosity, but generally they make this change only for 
new hires, which can make date of hire an important issue for some 
workers. A possible policy innovation, following the notional defined 
contribution plan in Sweden, would be to permit life expectancy in-
dexing of benefits at retirement. Thus, each year, the generosity of the 
plan would be adjusted downward slightly to reflect the trend toward 
greater life expectancy. Under U.S. law, this innovation would not be 
allowed because it would violate the anticutback rule. The anticutback 
rule is defined in terms of annual benefits. If it were redefined to take 
an economist’s perspective and use lifetime benefits as the measure, life 
expectancy indexing would not constitute a cutback in lifetime benefits.
One of the problems with defined contribution plans that has 
received little notice in the United States is the persistency of contri-
butions. Many workers do not consistently contribute to their plans, 
resulting in reduced account balances at retirement. Part of the lack of 
persistency results from job change, but it occurs even among workers 
who remain with the same employer.
164   Turner
To reduce the volatility and timing problem of employer contribu-
tions for defined benefit plan funding, both the maximum and minimum 
contribution requirements could be eased. First, plans could be allowed 
to contribute 25 percent of normal cost in any year, regardless of the 
level of funding. This proposal would set the floor on contributions 
allowed at 25 percent of normal costs rather than zero. Thus, plan spon-
sors would be allowed to contribute every year—the pattern desired for 
pension plans, which are ongoing entities.
To ease the requirements on the minimum required contributions, 
plan sponsors could be allowed a longer period over which to amortize 
unfunded liabilities. For example, they could be allowed a period of 15 





The Search for Lost Pensions and Other Issues
The ultimate goal of pension policy is that workers receive adequate 
and secure pension benefits. This chapter first considers the payment 
of benefits from defined contribution plans, then from defined benefit 
plans. Issues affecting both types of plans, including lost pensions, are 
discussed last. While defined benefit plans traditionally have provided 
benefits as annuities, most 401(k) plans do not provide that option. Why 
they do not, and other issues related to annuitization of defined contri-
bution plans, are considered separately in the next chapter. 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
The retirement financing problems facing retirees relying solely 
on defined contribution plans as their employer-provided pension plan 
differ considerably from the ones they faced as workers. As retirees, 
they need to figure out how to manage the spend-down of their assets. 
During retirement, they are faced with complex issues concerning how 
to manage various risks. One strategy policy analysts have taken in re-
forming defined contribution plans is to attempt to make them more like 
defined benefit plans.
When Congress passed ERISA in 1974, the situation was different. 
People who were covered by pensions had defined benefit pensions that 
provided them with annuities. Because their pension was annuitized, 
they did not face issues about how to manage the spend-down of their 
pension assets. 
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Forms of Benefit Payment
Defined contribution plans can pay old-age benefits in any of five 
basic ways, or in a combination of the five ways: 1) a lump sum, 2) 
a life annuity, 3) a phased withdrawal (based on annual recalculation 
of life expectancy), 4) installment (term certain) payments, and 5) ad 
hoc (unscheduled) withdrawals. A lump sum provides no insurance 
against the risk of outliving one’s resources. An annuity is a financial 
instrument that converts an account balance into a stream of periodic 
payments. With life annuities, workers receive periodic payments that 
continue until death. Life annuities, referred to here simply as annuities, 
insure workers against running out of money if they live longer than 
they expect. 
With phased withdrawal, workers receive benefits each year that 
are based on their remaining life expectancy and the amount in their 
individual accounts. With phased withdrawals, a retiree may wish to re-
ceive a fixed real amount each month in order to ensure a steady stream 
of resources to finance retirement expenditures. A problem with this 
approach is that when the same amount is withdrawn each month from 
an equity mutual fund, more shares are sold when the price is low than 
when it is high. Thus, with periodic withdrawals there is a trade-off be-
tween having a steady flow of withdrawals and maximizing the lifetime 
value of the withdrawals.
With installment or term certain payments, payments are made at 
a fixed rate (a specified dollar amount) until the account balance is re-
duced to zero. Alternatively, payments are made for a fixed number of 
years in an amount that varies with investment performance.
Income Redistribution
A negative aspect of the move toward defined contribution plans 
that has received little attention is its effect on the inequality of re-
sources for older persons. The growth of defined contribution plans and 
the decline of defined benefit plans has resulted in a large increase in 
the inequality of pension wealth holdings among workers (Wolff 2007). 
This change has occurred in part because lower-income workers who 
would automatically be included as participants in defined benefit plans 
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are not opting to participate in 401(k) plans. This change has left many 
older workers unprepared for retirement. 
Defined benefit plans that are based on the final three or five years 
of earnings reward high achievers who rise to the top of their organiza-
tions. By comparison, defined contribution plans and career average 
defined benefit plans are relatively more favorable to low achievers 
who have less of an increase in earnings over their careers.
Loans
In the United States, plans wishing to do so may provide the option 
for participants to take loans from the plan. For example, a 401(k) par-
ticipant could take a loan from his plan, repaying the loan with interest 
over time. Thus, one of the assets of the plan becomes the interest- 
bearing loan to the participant. The appeal to the participant is that the 
loan is generally at a lower rate than he could otherwise obtain. The 
disadvantage is that the participant’s 401(k) account is invested in an 
asset (the loan) that is paying a low rate of return.
Because of the low rate of return received, and the propensity for 
participants not to repay the loans, policy analysts often oppose the 
idea. However, some participants possibly would not have participated 
without that feature, and a loan from a pension plan may be preferable 
to carrying an account balance on a credit card.
In other countries, loans generally are not allowed. For example, 
in Germany the tax subsidy for the pension plan is viewed as being for 
the purpose of encouraging retirement savings, and not to be used for 
other purposes. Similarly, loans to participants from their plans are not 
allowed in Australia or the United Kingdom. 
Women’s Issues
The pension problems of particular concern to married women are 
largely benefits issues. These issues arise concerning the spousal bene-
fit rights of divorced women and widows. The assets in 401(k) plans 
are not automatically split at divorce. The disposition of those assets 
is the subject of negotiation. Spouses typically are less well protected 
as survivors by 401(k) plans than by defined benefit plans. Whereas in 
defined benefit plans the spouse has a right to a joint and survivor annu-
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ity unless the spouse waives that right by signing a notarized statement, 
401(k) plans provide little protection of survivors. Most 401(k) plans 
pay benefits as a lump sum, with no benefit rights for spouses. The 
exception is that they provide survivors’ protection for spouses if the 
participant dies before retirement. In addition, spouses may inherit the 
remaining account balance or the remaining assets from the lump sum.
Retirement income policy in the United States has not caught up 
with the growing role of 401(k) plans. It continues to regulate 401(k) 
plans as though they were supplementary to defined benefit plans, 
which is how they began in the early 1980s. It treats 401(k) plans as 
savings plans rather than as pension plans. An example of this policy 
lag concerns the provision of benefits to women as spouses, including 
as current spouses, as divorced spouses, and as widows. 
The U.S. pension system no longer provides women as spouses 
the protection it once accorded them when defined benefit plans were 
prevalent. A worker generally can take the benefit from a 401(k) plan as 
a lump sum, without the consent of his spouse. A husband anticipating 
a divorce can shelter his 401(k) assets from division in a divorce settle-
ment by taking a lump sum and spending the money. A widow may 
receive no benefit from her husband’s 401(k) plan because he has taken 
the money as a lump sum and spent it. This aspect of 401(k) plans may 
lead to increasing poverty among older women in the future.
A policy issue to be considered is whether all 401(k) plans should 
be regulated as if they were the primary plan, or whether 401(k) plans 
should be regulated differently when they are the only plan provided by 
an employer, as compared to when they are a supplementary plan with a 
defined benefit plan being the primary plan. Currently, 401(k) plans are 
regulated more like savings plans than like pension plans. 
While husbands and wives in healthy marriages presumably treat 
their income and assets generally as held in common, pension plans are 
designed to be held in the name of one person. That could be changed 
to potentially benefit women through a couple of ways: 1) by allow-
ing spouses to designate their IRA and 401(k) contributions to go into 
the account of the other person, and 2) by allowing spousal IRAs that 
would be owned jointly.
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DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
The Progressivity of Benefits
Many lower-income workers participating in defined benefit plans 
receive reduced benefits because their plan is integrated with Social 
Security. In 2005, 28 percent of workers in private industry that were 
participating in a defined benefit plan were in plans that were integrated 
with Social Security. Integration means that benefits were reduced for 
lower-wage workers to take into account that their replacement rate 
from Social Security is higher than it is for higher-income workers 
(BLS 2007). Integration with Social Security reduces the pension bene-
fits of lower-wage workers and offsets the progressivity built into the 
Social Security benefit formula. 
The private pension system is often viewed as favoring middle- and 
higher-income workers. Those workers have higher participation rates 
than lower-income workers, perhaps in part because the tax subsidy 
they receive per pension dollar is greater because of their higher mar-
ginal income tax rates. They are also less affected by integration with 
Social Security. Viewed this way, the private pension system appears to 
unduly favor the upper-income segments of society.
However, when viewed within the context of the retirement income 
system, the picture is different. When Social Security old-age benefits 
and disability benefits are also considered, the system is considerably 
more balanced in the way it treats different income segments of U.S. 
society.
Life Expectancy Indexing of Benefits
A factor that appears to have played a role in the decline in defined 
benefit plans has been the increase in life expectancy: the defined bene-
fit plans do not have the flexibility to deal readily with this continued 
increase in cost. In the United States, some plans have adjusted down-
ward their generosity, but generally this change is only done for new 
hires. 
A possible policy innovation, following the notional defined contri-
bution plan in Sweden, would be to permit life expectancy indexing of 
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benefits at retirement. Each year, as another cohort reaches retirement 
age, the generosity of benefits is reduced slightly to take into account 
the continued improvement in life expectancy. The adjustment does not 
reduce expected lifetime benefits.
Life expectancy risk can be divided into the idiosyncratic risk that 
a particular individual will live longer than expected and the cohort 
risk that an entire cohort on average will live longer than expected. 
Annuity providers are able to deal with idiosyncratic risk by pooling it 
across large numbers of people, effectively diversifying it away. How-
ever, cohort risk cannot be pooled. Longevity bonds would provide a 
hedge, but a market for them has not developed. Longevity bonds have 
a higher payout when the percentage of a cohort that is surviving is 
higher. Life expectancy indexing of benefits is one way of dealing with 
this risk. The idiosyncratic risk is borne by the annuity provider, who 
can diversify it away. The cohort risk is borne by workers, who are the 
beneficiaries of the improved life expectancy.1
Life expectancy indexing of benefits would shift onto workers the 
systematic life expectancy risk, which is the risk that an entire birth 
cohort will live longer on average. The plan sponsor bears the idiosyn-
cratic life expectancy risk, which is the risk that a particular individual 
will live longer than expected.
An issue arises for plan sponsors as to who would generate the life 
expectancy index to be used. Department of Labor regulations may need 
to resolve that issue, setting a required index or a minimum standard.
Under U.S. law, this innovation would not be allowed because it 
would violate the anticutback rule. The anticutback rule is defined in 
terms of annual benefits. If it were redefined to take an economist’s 
perspective and use lifetime benefits as the measure, life expectancy 
indexing would not constitute a cutback in lifetime benefits.
Other Aspects of Benefits 
The defined benefit system would have greater flexibility in meet-
ing the needs of workers if they had greater choice in setting the level 
of their benefits. If tax deductible employee contributions were allowed 
for U.S. private sector defined benefit plans, that would facilitate an-
other feature whereby employees would be allowed to make voluntary 
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tax deductible contributions, subject to limits, to purchase additional 
benefits. This arrangement is permitted in Canada. This feature, how-
ever, may disproportionately benefit high-income workers.
Without price indexing, inflation erodes the real value of benefits. 
Few U.S. private sector defined benefit pensions provide price indexing, 
and those that do generally set a cap, such as no more than a 3 percent 
increase in benefits per year. An alternative to price indexing benefits 
is to choose an annuity that provides automatic annual increases in 
benefits—for example, one that has benefits rising by 3 percent a year 
regardless of the rate of inflation. 
ISSUES AFFECTING BOTH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION AND 
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
The Adequacy of Benefits for the Old-Old
Both defined benefit and defined contribution plans have shortcom-
ings in providing benefits for people who survive to their 80s and older. 
Pensions that were adequate at retirement often are inadequate at older 
ages.
Defined benefit plans tend to be inadequate for persons in their 80s 
and older because they rarely provide cost-of-living adjustments. Thus, 
their real value is eroded over time by inflation. Even a relatively low 
inflation rate of 3 percent can have a substantial effect on the real value 
of benefits over a period of two decades. 
Defined contribution plans tend to provide inadequate benefits for 
people in their 80s and older for two reasons. First, they are rarely an-
nuitized. People who live longer than they expected are particularly at 
risk of running out of money in their pension accounts. Second, for the 
relatively few who do annuitize, just as for defined benefit plans, rarely 
are the annuities adjusted for inflation.
A policy option could be to require that both defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans provide at least a minimum amount of price 
indexation. That requirement exists in the United Kingdom. However, 
it is expensive and may be a reason for employers ceasing to provide 
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plans. When benefit adjustments are flexible, the cost of providing price 
indexation can be borne by retirees through a reduction in their initial 
benefits.
Life Expectancy Indexing of Ages in Benefits Law
A number of fixed ages appear in pension law governing the receipt 
of benefits by workers and retirees. With continued increases in life ex-
pectancy, a possible policy option would be to index these ages so that 
they would increase with increases in life expectancy at older ages. 
Workers must begin receiving benefits from Individual Retire-
ment Accounts (IRAs) by April 1 of the year following the year they 
reach age 70 ½. The 70 ½ rule also applies to other pensions, unless the 
worker is still working for the employer providing the pension. Workers 
pay a 10 percent penalty if they begin receiving 401(k) benefits before 
age 59 ½ while they are still working for the employer providing the 
pension. Workers cannot receive benefits from a defined benefit plan 
while still working for the sponsoring employer until age 62. 
Recognizing that continued improvements in life expectancy mean 
that fixed ages occur relatively earlier in the life span, these ages could 
be indexed to improvements in life expectancy. Such indexing could 
be a year-for-year increase, but recognizing that retirement is roughly 
a third of adult life, the indexing could be a two-year increase in pen-
sion ages for every three-year increase in life expectancy. That type 
of partial indexing would keep retirement periods the same length, on 
average, relative to preretirement periods.
Preretirement Withdrawals for Medical Expenses, Educational 
Expenses, or Purchasing a Home
Sweden, Chile, Canada, and the United Kingdom prohibit preretire-
ment withdrawals from pension plans. Retirement benefits are locked in 
until retirement. In the United States, 401(k) plans permit preretirement 
withdrawals for educational expenses, purchase of a first home, and 
for high medical expenses. Other things being equal, such withdrawals 
reduce the amount of retirement savings that workers have. However, it 
is argued that workers would be less likely to participate in 401(k) plans 
were such options not available. 
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Lump Sum Benefits
Lump sum benefits are popular with many retirees. Retirees like 
the liquidity and financial control that these benefits provide. However, 
these benefits are not popular with policy experts. Policy experts tend to 
favor annuities because of the insurance protection they provide against 
outliving one’s resources because of poor planning or from living 
longer than expected. The two types of benefits, however, are not mutu-
ally exclusive. Lump sum benefits can be paid using a part of the funds 
in an individual account, with the remainder paid as an annuity or a 
phased withdrawal. Some plans do not provide the option of partial 
payment, but public policy could be changed, requiring that option to 
be provided.
Sweden does not permit lump sum benefits to be paid from its man-
datory individual account pensions. Chile permits lump sum benefits 
as an option for taking a part of the account balance. Chilean workers 
may withdraw a lump sum benefit from their individual account if the 
remaining amount is sufficient so that the participants can meet one of 
two conditions: they purchase an annuity at least equal to 120 percent 
of the minimum guaranteed pension, or they take scheduled withdraw-
als that are at least 70 percent of the participant’s price-indexed covered 
wages. Few Chilean workers have met these requirements. In Chile, 
insurance company sales agents in firms charging high sales commis-
sions have provided unofficial lump sum payments of part of the sales 
commissions, permitting workers to convert part of their individual ac-
counts to a lump sum payment (James, Martinez, and Iglesias 2006). 
In the United Kingdom, until 2006 workers had to take the entire 
account balance of a contracted-out personal pension as an annuity. 
Since 2006, it has been possible to take up to 25 percent of the account 
balance as a lump sum, which is consistent with the treatment of other 
personal pensions. 
Lost Pensions
Lost pensions are an issue that affects both defined benefit and de-
fined contribution plans but tends to be more of a problem for defined 
benefit plans. Over the past two decades, changes in pension law have 
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lowered years of employment required for pension vesting. A worker 
with a pension plan can be entitled to a benefit after five years or less of 
full-time covered work. Workers immediately vest in their own contri-
butions. Worker contributions have become increasingly common with 
the growth of 401(k) plans, and occur in some defined benefit plans, 
though that is unusual in the United States. Thus, workers who change 
jobs several times over their careers may be eligible for pensions from 
several former employers. 
In a dynamic economy, each year many firms dissolve, file for 
bankruptcy, are bought, merge, or change their names. The employer 
that a former employee had worked for 20 years ago may have moved, 
may no longer be in business, or may be doing business under a differ-
ent name. If the company was sold or merged, the pension plan may 
have been taken over by the new company or may have been termi-
nated. Consequently, when a worker who has worked for more than one 
employer approaches retirement, he may not know where to apply for 
the pensions to which he is entitled.
In 1992, in part because of this problem, Congress directed the 
Administration on Aging to start several pension counseling projects 
around the country. Established in 1993, the Massachusetts Pension 
Assistance Project was one of the pilot projects. In 1998, this project 
expanded its scope to cover all six states in the New England region and 
became the New England Pension Assistance Project (NEPAP). 
Lost pensions are a potentially serious problem for millions of pen-
sion participants. As of 1998, 16 million people, even though they had 
left private sector defined benefit and defined contribution plans that 
included deferred vested benefits, were not receiving benefits (USDOL 
2002). That figure would be higher now because of the growth of the 
labor market over time. This situation of a person having a deferred 
future claim on a pension plan from a former employer arises both in 
defined contribution and defined benefit plans but occurs more com-
monly in defined benefit plans. In 1998, even though fewer than half 
as many workers were active participants in defined benefit plans (23.0 
million) as in defined contribution plans (50.3 million), more partici-
pants who had separated from employers had vested rights in defined 
benefit plans (9.3 million) than in defined contribution plans (6.9 mil-
lion) [USDOL 2002]. In addition, for workers changing jobs between 
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1993 and 1998 the Form 5500 data indicate that 25 percent of the plans 
in existence in 1993 had terminated by 1998, while another 10 percent 
of plans had been created and terminated within that period (Perun and 
Valenti 2008).
No accurate statistics exist concerning the total amount of unclaimed 
pension benefits in U.S. pension funds. However, evidence suggests that 
in the United Kingdom it lies within a wide range—from £10 billion to 
£77 billion, or roughly $18–$140 billion (Maunsell 1998). It is difficult to 
apply this evidence to the United States because of differences in number 
of workers, pension coverage rate, and income level, and because of fluc-
tuations in the exchange rate. Nonetheless, this evidence for the United 
Kingdom, which has a labor force about 20 percent as large as that of 
the United States, suggests that the amount of lost pension money in the 
United States could be substantial. Because formal assistance by the gov-
ernment to people seeking lost pensions is greater in the United Kingdom 
than in the United States (Blake and Turner 2002), we would expect the 
lost pension problem in the United States to be proportionally larger. As 
a rough estimate based on the British data, a minimum figure would be 
about $50 billion in lost pension money in the United States. While it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a precise estimate, the total amount 
lost clearly is in the billions of dollars. Thus, this problem is a serious 
problem among pension participants who change jobs.
Lost Pensions Policy in the United States
In the United States, it is up to the individual workers who have 
changed jobs to find their former pension plans. To receive a benefit, the 
worker needs to contact the former employer to apply for the benefit, 
but this task may involve tracing the connection back through a compli-
cated series of corporate mergers and bankruptcies. 
Employees can start by contacting the Social Security Administra-
tion to get a copy of their Social Security earnings record. This record 
will provide their former employer’s federal ID number, which may 
help in tracking down the plan.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PGBC), which insures 
most private sector defined benefit plans in the United States, can assist 
in finding pension plans that are ongoing defined benefit plans paying 
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pension benefit insurance premiums. It also maintains a Pension Search 
database that will assist workers whose lost defined benefit plans have 
terminated because of insufficient funding and have been taken over by 
the PBGC. 
Lost Pensions in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has established a national pension plan registry 
so that workers need only contact a single source to trace a lost pension. 
Workers can make a request by telephone, mail, or the Internet. The Oc-
cupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA) was established to 
help make sure occupational pension plans were secure for workers. The 
Pension Schemes Registry (PSR) is now part of OPRA. (“Scheme” is 
the British pension terminology for “plan.”) The PSR is designed to help 
workers track down their pensions with former employers. Workers in the 
United Kingdom filing a tracing request form with the PSR are asked 
information such as the full name and last known address of the former 
employer. The tracing service then tries to find a current address for the 
pension fund. It provides this service without fee to persons requesting 
it. While the British government maintains the PSR on the grounds that 
it provides an important social service, the cost of the PSR is covered by 
a levy collected from each of the registered pension plans in the UK.
At regular intervals, the Savings, Pensions, and Share Schemes Of-
fice (SPSS) sends the PSR details about new plans that have been granted 
“exempt approved” status.2 Active plans are required to provide updated 
information to the registry at the same time that they pay their annual levy. 
The two functions are interrelated, in that at the time of collection of the 
levy, plans are reminded that they should provide updated information to 
the registry.
The success rate for people contacting the registry varies from year 
to year but has been uniformly high. Between fiscal years 1991–1992 
and 1997–1998, the registry had a total of 74,605 requests, an annual 
average of almost 11,000. A survey conducted by the PSR indicated that 
34 percent of those who used its tracing service received some financial 
benefit, and the PSR has an 85 percent success rate in tracing contact 
details (Maunsell 1998, 1999). In fiscal year 1999–2000, the service re-
ceived 18,000 requests and had a 95 percent success rate in tracing lost 
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pensions. The number of requests increased to 21,000 in 2000–2001, 
and the success rate was 92 percent. 
Lost Pensions in Australia
Australia has taken a different approach. To deal with the lost 
pension problem, the Australian Tax Office (ATO) maintains a Lost 
Members Register. Instead of registering plans, it registers members 
that plans are unable to locate. All regulated pension funds are required 
to provide details of members with whom they have lost contact. Pro-
viders of individual retirement savings accounts (such as IRAs) are also 
required to register the names of account holders whom they are un-
able to contact. If a worker is unable to contact a former pension plan, 
the worker can contact the Australian Tax Office (2001). That worker’s 
plan will presumably have contacted the ATO because of the inability of 
the plan to contact the worker. Thus, through the Lost Members Regis-
ter a connection can be made between the worker and the plan. The Lost 
Members Register database is searched by government bureaucrats on 
behalf of persons making an inquiry. Plans that are able to contact all 
members are not required to contact the registry. If a person’s pension 
money has not been claimed by the time he or she reaches age 65, the 
money is transferred to the Unclaimed Money Register, where it can 
still be claimed.
Characteristics of People with Lost Pensions
Because little is known empirically about the characteristics of par-
ticipants with lost pensions, or the relative importance of various causes 
of the problem, we created a data set to study lost pensions (Bruce, 
Turner, and Lee 2005). The data set uses three years of pension counsel-
ing cases from the New England Pension Assistance Project (NEPAP). 
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the lost pension 
problem in the United States. 
Characteristics of Clients and Plans  
Lost pensions constitute a problem that is more likely to occur 
for participants in small plans than those in large plans. Changes that 
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caused the employing company to cease to exist under its original name 
are also an important factor resulting in lost pensions. In 24 percent of 
lost pension cases, the company had gone out of business. Of the cases 
in the data set where the company had gone out of business, almost all 
(32 out of 33) involved a lost pension. In 47 percent of the lost pension 
cases, the company had been sold or had merged with another company. 
Lost pension cases are more likely to involve defined benefit plans than 
defined contribution plans.
How Effective Is Existing Government Policy?
The PBGC seeks people who are eligible for pension benefits 
due them under plans it has taken over because of the inability of the 
sponsoring employer to adequately fund the plan. In most of the cases 
involving lost pensions in the survey data, the PBGC was not involved. 
The PBGC had taken over the plan, because of the underfunding or 
termination of the plan, in only 11 percent of the lost pension cases. If 
the PBGC’s efforts to locate plan participants of the plans it administers 
were effective, then individuals would not seek out pension counseling 
projects to assist in locating the plans. Since the vast majority of lost 
pension cases did not involve plans taken over by the PBGC, the data 
indicate that the limited scope of the PBGC’s program to find lost pen-
sioners does not address the full extent of the problem.
People who are eligible for deferred vested pension benefits and 
who have applied for Social Security benefits should have received two 
notices that could help them locate their pension. First, when they left 
their employer they should have received from the employer a notice 
that they were eligible for a deferred vested pension benefit. Second, 
they should have received from the Social Security Administration a 
notice triggered by their application for Social Security benefits that 
indicated they might be eligible for a deferred vested pension benefit. 
That notice would contain information about the pension plan’s loca-
tion when they left it. 
These notices of entitlement to a pension do not appear to be a 
significant reason for clients to come to the project for help in finding 
a pension. The most common reason clients give for looking for a pen-
sion is that the client has reached retirement age. While in principle, 
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100 percent of participants with a lost pension would have received a 
deferred vested pension notice from their employer, only 16 percent of 
the lost pension cases report having such a notice in the file. The data do 
not permit an evaluation of the extent to which people received the no-
tice, nor, among those people, how useful the information was, so it is 
not possible to judge definitively how useful the notices are. Nonethe-
less, this percentage indicates the extent to which NEPAP could use the 
notice to find a lost pension. The delay between the time when this no-
tice is given (when the participant leaves the company’s employment) 
and the point in time when the participant is looking for the pension 
(retirement age) may account for the apparent lack of usefulness of this 
notice for people using the pension assistance program.
The data also suggest that government-mandated notice policies in 
this area have been ineffective in helping the people who use pension 
assistance programs. In contrast, the pension counseling project was 
successful in locating pension plans in over 80 percent of the lost pen-
sion cases and was able to obtain a benefit in 40 percent of the lost 
pension cases. The data suggest that individuals can use assistance in 
locating their pension plans when their former employers have moved 
or gone out of business. 
CONCLUSION
Retirement income policy in the United States has not caught up 
with the growing role of 401(k) plans. It continues to regulate 401(k) 
plans as though they were supplementary to defined benefit plans, 
which is how they began in the early 1980s. It treats 401(k) plans as 
savings plans rather than as pension plans. An example of this policy 
lag concerns the provision of benefits to women as spouses, including 
as current spouses, as divorced spouses, and as widows. 
Both defined benefit and defined contribution plans do not provide 
indexed annuities to deal with inflation. Workers often have the choice 
of escalating annuities but rarely choose them. The United Kingdom 
has mandated inflation protection of benefits, up to a minimum level 
of inflation. These types of mandates protect workers from the eroding 
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effects of inflation, but they are expensive for employers to provide or 
for workers to choose. When they are an option in defined contribution 
plans, the worker must accept a substantially lower initial benefit. 
The lost pension problem is a problem for workers who are laid off 
or who change jobs. It can be difficult to track down a pension from a 
former employer, particularly if that employer has gone out of business. 
Both the United Kingdom and Australia have gone further than has the 
United States in assisting people facing this problem. A national regis-
try, perhaps as an expansion of the registry maintained by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, would be a major improvement in this 
area. 
Notes
1. A study has attempted to quantify the aggregate mortality risk, which is the risk 
that an entire cohort will live longer than predicted (Friedberg and Webb 2005). 
The study estimates that a markup of the annuity premium by 4.3 percent would 
reduce the probability of insolvency from cohort mortality risk to 5 percent, and a 
markup of 6.1 percent would reduce the probability of insolvency to 1 percent.
2. The role of the SPSS is to grant “exempt approved” status to pension schemes; i.e., 
it approves pension schemes for the purpose of enjoying tax relief on contributions 
into the schemes and also approves income and capital gains tax exemption on the 




The Decline in Annuitization  
and How to Reverse It
Annuities are generally not provided to participants in 401(k) 
plans.1 This is a key shortcoming of 401(k) plans. Annuities are not 
required in 401(k) plans, making those plans practically indistinguish-
able from tax-favored retirement savings accounts, rather than making 
them seem like pension plans. With the decline in defined benefit plans, 
one of the goals of some policy analysts has been the “DB-ification” 
of 401(k) plans, meaning that 401(k) plans would be structured so that 
they have some of the desirable features of defined benefit plans, in-
cluding providing annuities. Because annuities are a complex subject, 
they are treated here, in a separate chapter from other benefits issues, 
which were discussed in the previous chapter. 
The goal of pension policymakers is to enable retirees to achieve 
financial security. With continued increases in life expectancy and poor 
planning by some, retirees risk outliving their assets. Retirement bene-
fits generally are intended to protect against this risk. This risk can be 
managed through a life annuity, which provides a guaranteed stream 
of income that the recipient cannot outlive. While Social Security pro-
vides lifetime, inflation-indexed benefits, those benefits do not provide 
enough income for most retirees to maintain their preretirement stan-
dard of living. Defined benefit plans traditionally have provided their 
benefits as an annuity, but those plans are declining in importance. 
This chapter surveys the variety of annuity payout options available 
in defined contribution systems. It provides examples of payout options 
from Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Chile and compares those to 
options in the United States. These countries are chosen because to-
gether they provide a wide variety of payout options under different 
institutional arrangements. The Swedish system, the newest of the 
three, has been designed with an attempt to learn from the experience 
of other defined contribution systems. The British and Chilean systems 
have substantial experience in paying benefits, and those systems have 
evolved over time. 
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Defined contribution plans accrue benefits in the form of an ac-
count balance and typically in the United States pay benefits as a lump 
sum or as a series of withdrawals. Thus, with the growth of defined 
contribution plans and the decline in defined benefit plans, the extent 
to which workers annuitize retirement income is expected to decline 
over time, unless workers start obtaining annuities from 401(k) plans. 
While economists and others have predicted that the growth of 401(k) 
plans would lead to the growth of the use of annuities (Brown et al. 
2001), only 10 percent of individuals with defined contribution plans 
annuitized their account balances when terminating employment, both 
at ages 60 to 64 and at ages 65 to 69 (Gale and Dworsky 2006). How-
ever, Holden (2007) finds that 23 percent of those having the option to 
take an annuity do so, while 47 percent take a lump sum, 26 percent 
defer taking a distribution, and 10 percent take installment payments. 
Selectivity may affect these statistics, however, as annuities may be 
offered in workplaces where workers have greater demand for them. A 
different study (Medill 2008) finds that 11 percent of people in one plan 
take an annuity when given the option.  
ANNUITY BASICS
An annuity is a financial instrument that converts an account bal-
ance into a stream of periodic payments. Life annuities provide retirees 
periodic payments that continue until death. They insure workers against 
the monetary costs of living longer than expected. 
A basic life annuity pays fixed nominal benefits until the annui-
tant’s death. This product combines two features, whose importance 
varies depending on the age at which the participant takes the annuity. 
First, annuities provide retirement income, and in this respect they are 
comparable to other financial instruments, particularly bonds. Second, 
annuities have an insurance component. They insure against the risk 
that retirees will outlive their resources. Because retirees tend to spend 
down their savings, that risk increases with age. Thus, the relative im-
portance of the insurance aspect of an annuity is greater the older the 
age at which the participant first receives benefits.
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Annuities provide insurance against outliving one’s resources by 
pooling mortality risks across individuals. Other risks workers face 
also can be mitigated by purchasing an annuity. An annuity provides 
a mechanism for controlling one’s level of consumption over time, 
thus providing a valuable device for self-control and self-discipline 
(MacKenzie 2007). With an annuity, capital market risks are shifted 
to the financial institution providing the annuity, usually an insurance 
company. 
Workers purchasing annuities benefit from the “mortality credit,” 
meaning that workers who survive to older ages benefit from the assets 
of those workers who die earlier. For this reason, annuities typically 
provide a higher expected return than bonds for workers who live rela-
tively long. However, annuities generally provide a lower expected rate 
of return than equities, though also with lower risk. Annuities are par-
ticularly valuable for women because women tend to outlive the men 
in their lives, and their risk of poverty at the end of life is greater than 
for men.
ANNUITIZING 401(k) PLANS
While 401(k) plans generally do not provide annuities, when an an-
nuity is offered by a 401(k) plan, workers generally do not take it. This 
section investigates why most 401(k) plans do not provide annuities 
and why most 401(k) plan participants do not take them when offered. 
It considers changes in policy and in features of annuities to increase 
the extent to which annuities are offered and to which participants take 
them. 
The Effects of Unisex Pensions
Annuities offered through employer-provided pension plans in 
the United States must calculate benefits using unisex mortality rates. 
That requirement is the result of a Supreme Court ruling that using 
gender-based mortality tables would constitute sex discrimination in 
compensation. The case Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 463 
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U.S. 1073 (1983) held that employer-provided pension plans were re-
quired to provide men and women the same level of benefits from an 
annuity if they were the same age and had the same account balance. 
This means that benefits are determined using the same mortality rates 
for men and women, not recognizing that women at retirement ages on 
average live about three years longer than men. Privately purchased an-
nuities do not have this requirement, and are sold on a gender basis in 
every state except Montana. 
Unisex single life annuities are favorable to women but adverse to 
men, compared to gender-based annuities. The disadvantages to men 
of purchasing annuities through a 401(k) plan could be offset to some 
extent because group annuities are priced more cheaply than single an-
nuities in the private market. The disadvantages to men are also offset 
to the extent that they choose joint and survivor annuities.
Adverse selection occurs when people selecting annuities have in-
formation about their life expectancy that the annuity provider does not 
have. For example, people who choose voluntary annuities on aver-
age have lower mortality rates for their gender than the population as 
a whole. The selection caused by a unisex requirement is not adverse 
selection because gender and gender differences in life expectancy are 
common knowledge to both the participant and the insurance company. 
However, this type of selection has the same effects as adverse selec-
tion: it is information about life expectancy that insurance companies 
are not able to use. Selection increases with the range of mortality rates 
in the population under consideration, and thus it increases when men 
and women are pooled together in a single risk pool. Adverse selection 
either results in insurers raising their premiums or not offering the prod-
uct at all. Adverse selection concentrates risk, rather than spreading it, 
and thus hinders the functioning of an insurance market.
The Thrift Savings Plan for government workers allows workers 
to calculate online how much in benefits they will receive from their 
account balance. This calculation is done on a unisex basis, and thus is 
relatively unfavorable to men taking single life annuities. The unisex 
annuity payable from the Thrift Savings Plan in March 2007 for an ac-
count balance of $100,000 with the annuity taken at age 62 was $8,280 
annually.
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The amount the Thrift Savings Plan provides can be compared to 
the amount indicated by online annuity calculators that would be avail-
able to men in the individual annuity market. An informal survey of 
online calculators indicates that men participating in the Thrift Savings 
Plan could receive higher benefits if they purchased an annuity through 
the individual annuity market, while women would receive lower bene-
fits (Table 10.1). 
The level of benefits women receive from the Thrift Savings Plan 
is higher than what they would receive in the individual market. How-
ever, the difference is only a little more than $200 a year, suggesting 
that most single life annuitants in the Thrift Savings Plan are women, 
and that the annuity is priced accordingly (Table 10.2). While the Inter-
net survey was not exhaustive, it appears that women could not find a 
higher annuity in the individual purchase market than the Thrift Sav-
ings Plan annuity, while men could. 
The Thrift Savings Plan annuity may not be representative of an-
nuities offered by other employers. Because the federal government 
negotiates for the annuity, it may be that the annuity provides benefits 
at favorable rates. If that is the case, it further strengthens the point con-
cerning the effect of the unisex requirement on men being able to get 
better annuities outside the Thrift Savings Plan. 
An earlier survey found similar results. The survey of payments 
from annuities in qualified pension plans (where the unisex requirement 
holds) and other annuities found that on average the payments from 
qualified plans were less than other annuities for men, but more for 
women (Brown et al. 2001, p. 157). However, annuity payments vary 
considerably, and not every qualified annuity for men paid less than ev-
ery nonqualified annuity. Payout differences across pension plans may 
be due to different assumptions for different groups of workers as to 
mortality experience. 
That study found that the annuity benefit payable to men in the 
Thrift Savings Plan was slightly larger than the average of that payable 
to men on individually purchased annuities. However, it was somewhat 
lower than the average for the 10 best nonqualified annuities. It found 
that the Thrift Savings Plan annuity payable to women was higher than 
the average of the ten best qualified or nonqualified annuities in the 




Sweden Chile United Kingdom
Entitlement conditions
Entitlement age 61 60 women, 65 men 60
Early benefit receipt before 
entitlement age with more 
stringent requirements
No Yes, based on account 
balance
No
Benefit receipt while working Yes Yes Yes
Maximum age by which 
benefit receipt must begin
No No 75
Annuity acquisition
Mandatory vs. voluntary 
annuitization
Mandatory Voluntary Until 2006, mandatory starting 
at age 75; starting in 2006, 
mandatory at age 75 except 
for those claiming a religious 
exemption 
Annuity provider Government Life insurance companies Life insurance companies
Factors used in determining 
annuity value
Age, year of birth No restrictions Age, gender, impaired health, 
year of birth
Fees
Level and structure of fees 
for annuitization
Uniform percentage of 
account balance
Determined by life 
insurance company
Determined by life insurance 
company
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Disclosure of fees Not separately disclosed, 
bundled with individual 
account fee
Not separately disclosed, 
incorporated in net annuity 
payments
Not separately disclosed, 
incorporated in net annuity 
payments
Benefit forms
Phased or partial annuitization Yes No Yes
Fixed or variable annuity Either fixed annuity with 
some upside variability 
or phased withdrawal
Fixed but price-indexed Price-indexed, up to 5% a year
Lump sum benefit allowable No Yes, for part of account No
Disability benefits Provided separately Provided separately Provided separately
Preretirement withdrawals 
for medical expenses, 
educational expenses, or 
for purchasing a home
No No No
Minimum period payment 
guarantees
No No No
Minimum benefit guarantee No Yes, for workers with 20 
years of contributions
No
Benefits for other persons
Spousal benefit Worker can contribute 
to account of spouse
No No
Benefit for divorced spouses No No Can be negotiated as part of 
divorce settlement 
Survivors’ benefits Optional Required for men who 
annuitize their account





Sweden Chile United Kingdom
Bequeathable benefits No Yes, if taking phased 
withdrawals 
Yes, if taking phased 
withdrawal before age 75
Risk reduction









Annuities price-indexed up to 
5% a year
Interest rate guarantee for 
annuitization
Guarantee at minimum 
of 3%
No guarantee No guarantee
Taxation and income redistribution
Taxation Same as wage earnings Same as wage earnings Same as wage earnings




Minimum benefit guarantee 
provides some redistribution, 
unrestricted annuity pricing 
limits redistribution through 
annuitization
No explicit redistribution, 
implicit redistribution through 
mandatory annuitization
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
Table 10.1  (continued)
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individual market. Thus, this earlier study is consistent with the results 
of our informal Internet survey.
Table 10.3 compares an annuity for a man obtained through the 
Thrift Savings Plan to an annuity for a man obtained individually 
through MetLife. MetLife is the annuity provider for the Thrift Savings 
Plan, so this comparison holds constant the company providing the an-
nuity. The MetLife annuity quote was obtained from a MetLife agent, 
rather than from the Internet. The interest rate used for calculating both 
annuities is slightly higher for the MetLife than for the Thrift Savings 
Plan. The Thrift Savings Plan annuity is calculated using unisex mor-
tality rates, while the MetLife annuity is calculated using gender-based 
mortality rates. 
The MetLife annuity provides benefits about 9 percent lower than 
the Thrift Savings Plan annuity, even though the interest rate used is 
slightly more favorable and the mortality table used is more favorable. 
The difference presumably is accounted for in part by the commission 
received by the MetLife agent in the case of the individually purchased 
annuity.
Adverse selection has the potential for destroying an annuity mar-
ket. An unintended consequence of the unisex rulings may be that 
Table 10.2  Comparison of Monthly Annuity Benefits for a $100,000 
Account Balance with Unisex and Gender-Based Pricing, 
Benefits Taken at Age 62, 2007 ($)
Plan type Men Women
Unisex—Thrift Savings Plan (MetLife) 690 690
Gender-based—Annuitybid.com 754 670
SOURCE: Thrift Savings Plan (2009).
Table 10.3  Comparison of a Unisex Annuity Provided through the Thrift 
Savings Plan and a Gender-Based Annuity Provided to Indi-
viduals by the Same Insurance Company, 2007 
Annuity source Monthly benefit ($) Interest rate (%)
Thrift Savings Plan (MetLife) 888 5.25
Individual purchase (MetLife) 806 5.30
NOTE: This assumes an account balance of $140,000 for a male age 57. The quotations 
are for March 19, 2007.
SOURCE: Thrift Savings Plan (2009); MetLife agent.
190   Turner
401(k) plans rarely provide annuities because men can obtain better 
annuities in the individual annuities market. Selection problems pre-
sumably are a more serious problem for 401(k) plans than for private 
sector annuity providers because of the unisex requirement. Private 
providers can reduce selection problems by offering different rates to 
men and to women.
Two Kinds of 401(k) Plans
Recognizing that 401(k) plans generally are no longer mainly sup-
plementary plans, they should be regulated as primary plans. However, 
an argument can be made that there should be two types of 401(k) plans 
as far as regulation is concerned. For 401(k) plans that are the primary 
or sole plan, they would be classified as 401(k) retirement plans. They 
would be required to provide an annuity as the default option, and to 
provide spousal protection in the form of a joint and survivor benefit 
that can be waived only by the spouse signing and notarizing a docu-
ment. Other 401(k) plans that are supplementary plans, where a defined 
benefit plan provides the primary benefits, would continue to be regu-
lated as savings plans.
 This approach favors extending the requirements applied to de-
fined benefit plans to 401(k) plans. This would mean that 401(k) plans 
provide annuities as the default option, requiring a spousal waiver if not 
chosen. That requirement would apply at least for those plans that are 
the primary or sole pension plan the employer provides. Arguments in 
favor of this approach include that 401(k) plans now play the role that 
once was played by defined benefit plans. Also, as a matter of leveling 
the playing field between 401(k) plans and defined benefit plans, the 
same requirements should apply uniformly to both. Both the United 
Kingdom and Ireland require that defined contribution plans provide 
annuitized benefits.
A different approach would be to require that 401(k) retirement 
plans offer annuities as an option but that the annuities not be required 
to be the default option. However, these plans would also be required 
to provide standard “advice” recommending that an annuity be chosen 
for at least part of the account balance because that is the only form of 
benefit that would assure that participants would not outlive their pen-
sion savings.
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Mandatory versus voluntary annuitization. Some degree of man-
datory annuitization may be desirable to assure that workers will not 
outlive their retirement savings. Mandatory annuity purchases reduce 
annuity prices by expanding the market to cover individuals regardless 
of health and life expectancy. Also, mandatory annuities would be less 
expensive to administer, with greater economies of scale and reduced 
enrollment costs. However, mandating annuities forces some people to 
buy them who would be better off not doing so.
Full mandatory annuitization may not be desirable. Full mandatory 
annuitization restricts the access of participants to their accumulated 
funds, and for this reason may weaken the argument that defined contri-
bution plans foster an “ownership society.” Full annuitization reduces 
flexibility in meeting unplanned expenses. Instead, a mandate could 
require that only part of the account balance be annuitized. An alterna-
tive policy innovation would be to charge an exit fee when lump sum 
benefits are taken, and use that fee to subsidize annuities.
Annuitization is a prerequisite to providing survivors’ benefits. 
Thus, the requirement for annuitization is related to providing survivors’ 
protection for widows. Annuitization could be required to be jointly de-
cided by husbands and wives. For example, annuitization could be the 
default, with other forms of benefit receipt only being allowed if the 
spouse signs an agreement permitting that. 
Perhaps in part because of the interest rate risk associated with 
converting an account balance to an annuity, many countries with man-
datory defined contribution plans do not require that workers annuitize 
account balances. Seven countries with mandatory defined contribu-
tion systems in Latin America allow their workers to choose between 
an annuity and phased withdrawals throughout retirement, while two 
countries mandate annuity purchases (Kritzer 2000). Countries that do 
not mandate annuitization generally mandate that benefits be withdrawn 
periodically through phased withdrawals.
In Sweden, where the mandatory defined contribution plan is a rela-
tively small part of the mandatory benefits (financed by a 2.5 percent 
tax rate, out of a total social security tax rate of 18.5 percent), workers 
must either fully annuitize their account balances or take the benefits as 
a phased withdrawal. Chile does not require workers to annuitize their 
account balances, but workers not annuitizing must take their benefits 
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as a phased withdrawal. British workers until 2006 were required to 
annuitize their account balances by age 75. That requirement has been 
dropped for those claiming a religious exemption. 
Default options. Behavioral finance has suggested that making 
automatic enrollment the default option can greatly increase the per-
centage of workers who participate in pensions. However, because of 
the financial importance of the decision and its irreversibility, if an-
nuities were the default, considerably more people might opt out of the 
default than has been the case with automatic enrollment. Experience 
with cash balance plans has indicated that making an annuity the default 
for receiving a benefit defined as an account balance may have little 
effect. 
Participant education. Participant education is one method for en-
couraging participants to annuitize. Employees may need to be educated 
as to the advantages of guaranteed lifetime income, which annuities 
provide. The U.S. Department of Labor (2005b) has commented that 
plan communications tend to focus on the accumulation phase rather 
than on the payout phase. It recommended that the Department of La-
bor provide guidance as to what constitutes education, as opposed to 
advice, in providing information concerning benefit options. Such guid-
ance would alleviate concerns that employers have over their fiduciary 
liability in providing such information to their participants.
Participant education may need to include information about life 
expectancy. Information concerning life expectancy is the most com-
mon way that information about mortality risk is provided. However, 
approximately half the population will outlive its life expectancy, so 
information about life expectancy sets a low standard in terms of the 
number of years that a person should be prepared to finance. It may be 
more useful in helping participants understand the risks they face to 
provide information on the probability they will live to age 90, and the 
higher probability that at least one member of a couple will live to age 
90.
Participants are accustomed to thinking of 401(k) plans in terms of 
their account balance. More participants might annuitize if they think 
of their 401(k) plans in terms of the amount of annuitized income the 
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account could provide. Thus, it might be desirable for account state-
ments to provide information as to the amount of annuitized income the 
account would provide if it were annuitized at a fixed age, such as 62. 
Also providing that information for age 65 would help educate people 
as to the advantages of postponing retirement.
Participant education is often provided by the institution managing 
the investments of the participants’ accounts. Those institutions gener-
ally have a conflict of interest with respect to providing information 
about annuities. Because they typically do not sell annuities, their in-
come will be greater if participants continue to maintain an account 
balance rather than purchase an annuity.
Tax incentives. Tax incentives can be used to encourage the choice 
of annuities by workers. That can occur either by providing more fa-
vorable tax treatment to annuities or a less favorable tax treatment to 
other forms of payment. In 2006, Spain reduced the generosity of the 
tax treatment of lump sum benefits to encourage workers to purchase 
annuities (Social Security Administration 2007). To encourage annui-
tization, the first $10,000 of annual income from an annuity could be 
exempt from taxation. This proposal, however, would disadvantage de-
fined benefit plans, unless the exemption was also extended to the first 
$10,000 of benefits received from a defined benefit plan. In that case, 
the loss of tax revenue would become more of an issue. 
Chile, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all do not encourage 
annuitization. Annuitization could be encouraged by favorable tax 
treatment, but none of those countries have adopted such a policy. An-
nuitization could be encouraged by providing preferential tax treatment 
for annuities, with maximum limits on the level of benefits that would 
receive preferential treatment to assure some targeting of the tax bene-
fit to lower- and middle-income recipients. However, tax incentives 
may have relatively little effect on the choices that pension participants 
make, given what appears to be a fairly strong preference to take lump 
sum payments. 
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ANNUITY OPTIONS
A number of options have been developed for annuities in an at-
tempt to make them more appealing by providing pension participants 
greater range of choice.
Phased or Partial Annuitization or Deferred Annuitization
Phased annuitization offers workers the option of annuitizing their 
account balance in stages over time. This option facilitates phased re-
tirement by allowing for receipt of partial benefits. Phased or partial 
annuitization facilitates part-time work with a part-time pension and 
thus may be a favorable option, particularly for women, because it 
provides greater flexibility for mixing paid work and family responsi-
bilities. It also is a way of attempting to deal with the interest rate and 
financial market risk associated with the timing of annuitization. 
Sweden and the United Kingdom allow phased or partial annuitiza-
tion in their individual account systems, while Chile does not. Swedish 
workers can phase in their annuitization over time, initially annuitiz-
ing only a quarter, then a half, and then three-quarters of their account 
balance, if they wish. Once they have claimed benefits, they can sus-
pend payment or change the percentage of a full payment they receive. 
Chilean workers may defer annuitization by first receiving benefits as 
a phased withdrawal and then later annuitize the remainder of their ac-
count balance. 
Fixed or Variable Annuities 
Annuities can provide fixed nominal or fixed real payments, or the 
payments can vary over time. Among annuities that vary over time, 
annuities that vary depending on the investment performance of the 
underlying assets are called variable annuities. Variable annuities offer 
both the advantages of annuities and the advantages of investments in 
equities, as well as the risks of investments in equities. Also, frequently 
insurance companies provide escalating annuities, where the payment 
increases by a fixed percentage amount each year. With this type of an-
nuity, retirees can attempt to obtain an annuity that mimics an indexed 
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annuity in that it increases over time, though it is not tied to increases 
in the price level.
Equity-indexed annuities have characteristics of both fixed and 
variable annuities. Their return varies more than a fixed annuity but not 
as much as a variable annuity. They combine a minimum guaranteed 
interest rate with a variable rate that is tied to a market index. The guar-
antee is backed by the insurance company marketing the product, and is 
thus only as secure as the insurance company.
When a Swedish participant chooses a fixed annuity, Sweden guar-
antees a fixed monthly payment for life. The monthly amount may be 
increased by a bonus, however, depending on the investment experi-
ence. When a worker chooses a phased withdrawal, the benefit may vary 
since the worker’s benefit will be affected by the value of the under- 
lying funds. When a worker chooses a phased withdrawal, the funds 
remain invested with the mutual funds the worker has chosen. 
Chilean workers may take their benefit as a price-indexed annuity 
or as a phased withdrawal, or as a combination of the two. British work-
ers choosing annuities must take price-indexed annuities, but they have 
the option of a phased withdrawal. Phased withdrawal does not provide 
longevity insurance, and for this reason it may not be a good option for 
many workers, especially women.
Benefits for Other Persons
As well as providing benefits to the retired workers who earned 
them, annuities may pay benefits to other related persons, notably 
spouses. Doing so, however, generally reduces the benefits received by 
the retired worker because the extra benefits must be financed out of the 
account balance.
Providing survivors’ benefits for a spouse or domestic partner gen-
erally would reduce the benefits paid while both persons were alive by 
8 to 20 percent, depending on the ages of the two people (American 
Academy of Actuaries 2001). Spousal benefits, benefits for divorced 
spouses, survivors’ benefits, and bequeathable benefits are of particular 
value to women because women are more likely to be economically 
dependent on their spouses than are men. 
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Spousal benefits. Spousal benefits are received by the spouse while 
the retired worker who earned them is still alive. In Sweden, workers 
can advance-fund retirement income for their spouse by having their 
contributions deposited into their spouse’s account instead of their 
own. The Chilean and British defined contribution plans do not provide 
spousal benefits. Dependent spouses must rely on the benefits of their 
working spouse while that person is alive.
Benefits for divorced spouses. Providing benefits for a divorced 
spouse from a defined contribution plan is particularly difficult if the 
worker has remarried and has a current spouse. Any benefits provided 
to the divorced spouse would reduce the benefits received by the worker 
and current spouse.
British workers can negotiate rights to pension benefits in divorce 
settlements. In Chile and Sweden, divorced spouses have no rights to 
pension benefits of their former spouses. While current spouses, same-
sex partners, and dependent children are eligible for survivors’ benefits 
if the participant elects to provide them, divorced spouses are not eli-
gible for survivors’ benefits. If a spouse is named as a beneficiary and a 
divorce subsequently occurs, the divorced spouse loses the right to the 
future survivors’ benefits.
Survivors’ benefits. Because workers are not required to annuitize 
their 401(k) accounts, women whose spouses participate in 401(k) plans 
are generally denied the form of insurance that an annuity received as 
a survivor provides. 
Survivors’ benefits can be a mandated part of a defined contribution 
system, or they can be provided as an option. In defined contribution 
systems, providing survivors’ benefits results in lower benefits to the 
couple while both are alive. In voluntary defined contribution systems, 
participants generally have a choice of level of survivors’ benefits—100 
percent, 75 percent, 66.7 percent, or 50 percent are common options, 
though participants generally would not have all those options. An issue 
when providing survivors’ benefits is what happens to the benefit of the 
participant if the dependent spouse dies first. The participant’s benefit 
could be left unchanged, it could be decreased because there would be 
only one person for it to support, or it could be increased because there 
is no longer the need to provide survivors’ benefits.
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The United Kingdom is the only country of the four (United States, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Chile) that requires all married participants 
in defined contribution plans to provide survivors’ benefits. It requires a 
married participant to provide survivors’ benefits equal to 50 percent of 
the benefits received by the participant. 
Bequeathable benefits. Bequeathable benefits take the form of 
a lump sum payment made to a surviving spouse or other surviving 
family member or unrelated person at the death of a pension partici-
pant. Defined contribution systems may distinguish between deaths that 
occur before the worker has started receiving retirement benefits and 
deaths that occur while the worker is receiving benefits. 
In the United States, the possibility of accumulating bequeath-
able wealth through defined contribution systems is considered to be 
a desirable feature by some people. This possibility allows workers 
to accumulate wealth that they might bequeath to their heirs, but the 
trade-off is that annuitized benefits are reduced below what they other-
wise would be. Bequeathable benefits generally result when a defined 
contribution has not been annuitized, and they are eliminated when an 
account has been annuitized. 
If workers die before having annuitized their account balances, the 
Swedish pension system does not allow the bequest of their account 
balances. That amount is redistributed among all the participants in the 
system. When Chilean or British workers die, their account balances 
are bequeathable to their survivors. If they die during retirement and 
they have not annuitized their account balances, the remaining account 
balances are also bequeathable. 
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
When defined contribution plans annuitize benefits without taking 
into account the longer life expectancy associated with higher income, 
they redistribute income toward upper-income workers. The use of 
unisex life tables also causes income redistribution within the system, 
though the pattern of redistribution is also affected by whether partici-
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pants choose survivors’ benefits for their spouses. Since women and 
higher-wage workers have on average longer life expectancies than men 
and lower-wage workers, the system redistributes money in a complex 
way from men to women and from lower-wage to higher-wage work-
ers. Thus, the criticism by some policy analysts that traditional defined 
benefit social security programs redistribute income in complex ways 
(World Bank 1994) also applies—and to some extent for the same rea-
sons—to defined contribution plans that mandate annuitization. 
Most of the mandatory defined contribution systems allow work-
ers to avoid the regressive effects of annuitization by taking a phased 
withdrawal of benefits. Providing this option, however, increases the 
problem of adverse selection in the annuity market. Adverse selection 
occurs when long-lived people are more likely to choose an annuity 
than short-lived people but both receive the same annual benefits for a 
given account balance. 
Because people who expect to be long-lived are more likely to pur-
chase annuities than people who expect to be short-lived, insurers price 
annuities on the assumption that their purchasers are long-lived. While 
these prices may be actuarially fair for upper-income workers with long 
life expectancies, the high price keeps low-income workers out of the 
annuity market and deprives them of the insurance protection tradi-
tional social insurance plans provide against the risk of outliving one’s 
resources. Not requiring annuitization, however, allows low-income 
workers who die relatively young to bequeath some of their retirement 
income to their survivors.
An option that has received little consideration for dealing with 
adverse selection that arises with voluntary annuitization is to levy a 
charge on persons not annuitizing that offsets the effects of adverse 
selection. The charge amount would be contributed to the financing of 
annuities, allowing annuities to be priced as if there were no adverse 
selection.
Insurance companies in Chile, but not in most countries with 
mandatory defined contribution plans, use individual characteristics, 
including income and gender, in determining the level of annuity bene-
fits an account balance provides. Calculating annuities this way limits 
the regressive income transfers due to annuitization, but at the cost of 
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lower retirement benefits for women than would be the case if unisex 
life tables were used to calculate annuitized benefits. 
Income redistribution can also occur through the way the annuity 
provider charges fees. The transaction costs to the annuity provider as-
sociated with an individual worker purchasing an annuity are largely 
fixed costs. These costs do not depend on the size of the account bal-
ance being annuitized. Thus, these costs have a regressive effect when 
charged to the individual. They form a larger percentage of small ac-
count balances than of big ones, and small account balances tend to be 
held by people with lower incomes. Vittas and Iglesias (1992) find that 
annuity charges in Chile are a source of inequality in benefits, as larger 
commissions relative to annuity payments are often charged to lower-
income workers.
MARKET INNOVATIONS: LONGEVITY INSURANCE, 
LADDERING, AND FRAMING
Longevity Insurance
Much of the utility value of annuitization comes from insuring 
against the possibility of running out of money if one lives to be older 
than expected (Brown 2001). An annuity can be used to purchase lon-
gevity insurance, while allowing workers control over part of their 
money. If a worker purchases an annuity with an adequate benefit and 
a start date that is deferred to age 85, the worker—if he or she lives 
that long—only needs to manage the spend-down of assets over a fixed 
period, from retirement to age 85. This strategy greatly reduces mortal-
ity risk, while also facilitating the management of the spend-down of 
assets. The person no longer needs to manage the spend-down of assets 
over an uncertain period.
Pension-plan tax qualification rules may make it difficult for work-
ers to purchase longevity insurance with start dates at advanced ages. 
The problem arises with the requirement that minimum distributions 
from a 401(k) plan start by April 1 of the year following the year the 
person turns age 70 ½. Changes in these minimum required distribu-
200   Turner
tion rules might be considered to encourage the purchase of longevity 
insurance. Even with such changes, however, it is likely that few people 
would purchase longevity insurance. People are reluctant to purchase 
annuities that begin payment immediately. They presumably would be 
even more reluctant to purchase an annuity that began payment at age 
85. With longevity insurance, people have better protection against out-
living their resources and ending life in poverty, but the trade-off is that 
they have less money to spend earlier in life. 
Laddering
Another innovation is laddering the purchase of annuities. This pro-
cess occurs when annuities are purchased in small amounts over time. 
Doing so reduces the risk related to interest rates. Participants may be 
more willing to purchase annuities if they do so in small amounts. The 
purchasing of annuities could be done in the context of a target date 
retirement plan, where the individual’s portfolio becomes more conser-
vative as the individual’s retirement target date approaches. Usually this 
change is done by increasing the share of the portfolio held in bonds. 
An alternative approach would be to gradually purchase annuities. Par-
ticipants may be more willing to have annuities in their portfolio if they 
are purchased by the employer with the employer’s contribution. This 
process could start later in life, for example at age 50.
Framing
An alternative approach to encouraging annuitization would be to 
require that 401(k) plans report at least once a year to participants the 
amount of the annuity they would receive at current interest rates if 
taken at age 62. That approach would encourage employees to think in 
terms of taking their benefit as an annuity.
CONCLUSION
Several aspects of government policy that were designed to 
strengthen the protection of workers may have had the unintended ef-
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fect of discouraging employers from providing annuities. First, the 
unisex rulings of the Supreme Court that require 401(k) plans to pro-
vide unisex annuities may have discouraged employers from providing 
annuities because often men are able to obtain annuities on more favor-
able terms by purchasing them individually outside the 401(k) plan. 
Second, the requirement of a joint and survivor option may have in-
creased the complexity of administering annuities. 
A basic policy decision is the extent to which participants will be 
free to choose from a wide range of options. A wide range of options 
allows participants the opportunity to structure the receipt of benefits in 
the way that they prefer. However, in some cases, public policy goals 
may take overriding importance. For example, should husbands be 
free to decide whether to provide survivors’ benefits for their wives, or 
should public policy require that those benefits be provided? 
Note





The goals of the pension system are to provide secure and ade-
quate retirement income. In both respects, the U.S. system needs better 
solutions. With the decline in defined benefit plans and the increasing 
reliance on 401(k) plans, future retirees will have less secure and less 
adequate retirement income than current retirees. Some analysts sug-
gest the contrary—that 401(k) plans will provide adequate retirement 
income for most participants—but their studies do not take into account 
the developments in behavioral economics indicating all the problems 
that workers encounter in accumulating retirement savings through 
401(k) plans.
This chapter summarizes the main policy implications from the 
book. It concludes by presenting a proposal for a new type of hybrid 
pension plan. 
PUBLIC POLICY FOR 401(k) PLANS
Since the early 1980s, 401(k) plans have grown from being supple-
mentary plans offered by plan sponsors who also offer a defined benefit 
plan to being the only plan that most workers have. However, the regu-
lation of 401(k) plans has lagged in recognizing their important role. 
One option would be to regulate all 401(k) plans as if they were 
primary plans, providing equivalent regulatory protection as that pro-
vided for defined benefit plans. A less burdensome, but more complex, 
approach would be to change the regulation of 401(k) plans so that two 
types of 401(k) plans would be recognized. 
First, 401(k) retirement plans would be plans that are the primary 
or sole plan provided by an employer. These plans would be regulated 
as retirement plans rather than as saving plans.1 The policy goal of lev-
eling the playing field between defined benefit plans and 401(k) plans 
would apply to these plans. For example, these plans would be required 
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to offer annuities, perhaps having as the default that 50 or 75 percent of 
the account balance would be annuitized as a joint and survivor annuity, 
or having the option that the annuity would begin at an older age, such 
as at age 80. These plans would also be required to frame the benefits 
as an annuity, providing the annuitized value of the account balance for 
retirement at different ages each time the account balance was reported 
to the participant. Tax changes could be made to encourage annuitiza-
tion through 401(k) plans. Such changes could include providing less 
favorable tax treatment to lump sum payments through 401(k) plans. 
Alternatively, people choosing a lump sum could be charged a penalty 
that would be returned to the plan to subsidize the annuities of those 
taking them. This would be done to offset adverse selection.
The second type of 401(k) plan would be 401(k) savings plans. 
These would be 401(k) plans offered by employers that also offered de-
fined benefit plans meeting minimum standards as to generosity. These 
plans would continue to be regulated as they currently are, reflecting 
their historical roots as secondary plans that are offered to supple-
ment defined benefit plans. Having this two-tier regulation of 401(k) 
plans could encourage employers to offer defined benefit plans, since 
that would permit them to offer 401(k) plans meeting less rigorous 
standards.
A retirement income system based on workers making investment 
decisions clearly has problems. The U.S. educational system does not 
prepare most people for making investment decisions. Participants in 
401(k) plans tend to make financial mistakes. Many participants lack 
both knowledge and interest. They fail to contribute, and those who do 
contribute do not take full advantage of employer matching contribu-
tions. They frequently make what appear to be inappropriate investment 
choices. While defaults relating to workers’ choices to participate, con-
tribute, and invest in 401(k) plans may not be optimal for all workers, 
such as short-tenure workers, they help assure that more workers will 
accumulate assets in a 401(k) plan, which are then available to finance 
retirement consumption. The effects of the defaults on women, minori-
ties, and low-wage workers, in particular, deserve further attention.
Some investment experts believe that low-cost index funds are the 
best choice for many pension participants and other individual inves-
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tors. According to one proposal, 401(k) plans would be required to offer 
as an investment option a low-cost index fund.
Participants in 401(k) plans bear the investment costs and typically 
also the administrative costs of their 401(k) plans. Yet many partici-
pants are unaware they are bearing these costs, and most do not know 
how much they are paying in fees. Fee disclosure to participants would 
be greatly improved if the fees they paid in dollars for administrative 
expenses and investment expenses, as well as the expense ratio for 
investment expenses, were disclosed on their annual and quarterly ac-
count statements. This type of disclosure is done in Australia for plan 
administrative fees and is done by the Janus mutual fund for investment 
costs.
A problem with defined contribution plans that has received rela-
tively little notice is the persistency of contributions by workers. Many 
workers do not consistently contribute to their plans, resulting in re-
duced account balances at retirement. The lack of persistency accounts 
at least in part for the surprisingly low account balances that many 
401(k) participants have at retirement. 
A widely recognized problem with 401(k) plans is that few plans 
provide annuities, and when annuities are offered few participants take 
them. People may be reluctant to annuitize because a relatively large 
amount of money is involved in an irreversible decision. Addressing the 
first concern, one approach that might encourage greater annuitization 
is the laddered purchase of annuities, meaning that it would occur in 
small quantities over time. Doing it this way would reduce the interest 
rate risk, and it might reduce the reluctance of workers to annuitize, 
because the amounts involved in each transaction would be small. Lad-
dering could be done within the context of a target retirement date plan, 
where typically the percentage of the worker’s portfolio held in bonds is 
increased as the target retirement date approaches. An alternative would 
be to gradually purchase annuities as the retirement date approaches. 
Workers’ reluctance to annuitize might be further reduced if that were 
the default option for the employer’s contribution, starting at a fixed 
age, such as age 50.2
An alternative approach to encouraging annuitization would be to 
require that 401(k) plans report at least once a year to participants the 
amount of the annuity they would receive at current interest rates if 
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taken at age 62. That approach would encourage employees to think in 
terms of taking their benefit as an annuity. An additional policy innova-
tion would be to charge an exit fee when lump sum benefits are taken, 
and use that fee to subsidize annuities, offsetting the effect of adverse 
selection that occurs when people choose to take a lump sum.
To assure greater participation in 401(k) plans, those plans could 
be required to provide a reverse match. With a reverse match, the em-
ployer would be required to contribute a certain percentage of pay for 
each worker. Workers could then have the option to contribute to the 
plan up to a certain matching amount. With this policy, the coverage 
provided by 401(k) plans would be more similar to that provided by 
defined benefit plans.
Defaults can be used to improve the outcomes provided by 401(k) 
plans. They offer the promise of improving participation and having 
better investment outcomes for workers.
The current approach of tax deductions for pensions favors upper-
income workers. An approach that would provide the same amount of 
incentive per pension dollar would be to provide tax credits.
PUBLIC POLICY FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
The decline in defined benefit plans is an issue of serious concern. A 
number of policies should be considered to address that issue. 
Private sector defined benefit plans are the only major type of 
pension plan in the United States that does not permit employee tax-
deductible contributions. Employee tax-deductible contributions are 
permitted for 401(k) plans, and for defined benefit plans for state and 
local government employees. Extending tax deductibility to private 
sector defined benefit plan participants would help level the playing 
field between defined benefit plans and 401(k) plans. 
Transition issues arise concerning permitting employee tax- 
deductible contributions. Employers who instituted employee tax-
deductible contributions would effectively be reducing employee 
compensation if they did not make compensating increases in wages. 
Nonetheless, employers already have the ability to reduce compensa-
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tion by failing to provide annual pay increases while inflation erodes the 
real value of compensation.
While coverage in defined benefit plans has declined dramatically in 
the United States and even more so in the United Kingdom, the decline 
has been relatively modest in Canada and Ireland. Thus, international 
experience casts doubt on the view that defined benefit plans are di-
nosaurs and their decline and extinction is inevitable. In both Canada 
and Ireland, and indeed in most countries with defined benefit plans, 
employees make tax deductible contributions to those plans. 
A factor that appears to have played a role in the decline of de-
fined benefit plans has been the increase in life expectancy, as defined 
benefit plans do not have the flexibility to deal readily with this con-
tinued increase in cost. In the United States, some plans have adjusted 
downward their generosity, but generally this change is only done for 
new hires. A possible policy innovation, following the notional defined 
contribution plan in Sweden, would be to permit life expectancy index-
ing of benefits at retirement. Thus, for each new retirement cohort, the 
generosity of the plan would be adjusted downward slightly to reflect 
the trend toward greater life expectancy. Once workers are retired, fur-
ther adjustments to their pensions for improvements in life expectancy 
would not be made. Under U.S. law, this innovation would not be al-
lowed because it would violate the anticutback rule. The anticutback 
rule is defined in terms of annual benefits. If it were redefined to take an 
economist’s perspective and use the present expected value of lifetime 
benefits as the measure, life expectancy indexing would not constitute a 
cutback in lifetime benefits.
Continued improvements in life expectancy mean continued in-
creases in the cost of providing defined benefit plans. Sweden in its 
social security system has a plan, the notional defined contribution 
plan, where benefits at retirement are indexed for improvements in life 
expectancy. Each year, as another cohort reaches retirement age, the 
generosity of benefits is reduced slightly to take into account the con-
tinued improvement in life expectancy. The adjustment does not reduce 
expected lifetime benefits.
Life expectancy risk can be divided into the idiosyncratic risk that 
a particular individual will live longer than expected and the cohort risk 
that an entire cohort on average will live longer than expected. Annuity 
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providers are able to deal with idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across 
large numbers of people, effectively diversifying it away. However, co-
hort risk cannot be pooled. Longevity bonds would provide a hedge, 
but a market for them has not developed. The higher the percentage of 
a cohort that is surviving, the higher the payout longevity bonds have. 
Life expectancy indexing of benefits is one way of dealing with this 
risk. The idiosyncratic risk is borne by the annuity provider, who can 
diversify it away. The cohort risk is borne by workers, who are the ben-
eficiaries of the improved life expectancy.
This feature would shift onto workers the systematic life expec-
tancy risk, which is the risk that an entire birth cohort will live longer 
on average. The plan sponsor bears the idiosyncratic life expectancy 
risk, which is the risk that a particular individual will live longer than 
expected.
With increases in life expectancy at older ages, a number of coun-
tries have raised the earliest age at which pension benefits can be 
received. Doing so has been part of a policy to encourage workers to 
retire at older ages. 
Workers who change jobs or are laid off by their employers and 
who participate in defined benefit plans suffer benefit losses. They suf-
fer benefit losses because their benefits are frozen in nominal terms 
at the point of job termination, and the real value of those benefits is 
eroded by inflation between that point and the point at which they qual-
ify for retirement benefits. Plans can make these workers wait until age 
65 to receive benefits. For laid-off workers, the loss of pension benefits 
can be more serious than the loss of wages, while for employers the loss 
of pension benefits gives them a bonus for laying off older workers. 
One policy option is to require healthy firms that lay off workers in 
corporate restructuring to price-index the benefits of those workers until 
retirement. This requirement in a certain sense would not impose a new 
cost on employers. It just mandates that they pay the benefits to these 
workers that they had promised to pay. 
Funding rules prohibit employers from contributing to defined 
benefit plans in years when those plans exceed a certain level of fund-
ing. These rules have the effect of prohibiting plan sponsors from 
contributing toward the increased liabilities of their plan in that year. 
This requirement of zero contributions in some years generally occurs 
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when the stock market and companies are performing well. Because 
pension plans are long-term commitments and because of the fluctua-
tions in the stock market, at a later date plan sponsors then are required 
to make contributions. That requirement generally occurs when the 
stock market and companies are performing poorly. This requirement 
not only increases the volatility of contributions, it forces plan spon-
sors to contribute on a time pattern that is exactly opposite of what they 
would desire. 
To reduce the volatility and timing problem of employer contribu-
tions for defined benefit plan funding, both the maximum and minimum 
contribution requirements could be eased. First, plans could be allowed 
to contribute 25 percent of normal costs in any year, regardless of the 
level of funding. This proposal would set the floor on contributions 
allowed at 25 percent of normal costs rather than zero. Thus, plan spon-
sors would be allowed to make a contribution every year, the pattern 
desired for pension plans as ongoing entities.
To ease the requirements on the minimum required contributions, 
plan sponsors could be allowed a longer period over which to amortize 
unfunded liabilities. For example, they could be allowed a period of 15 
years, rather than the current seven years set by the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006. Underfunding would be less of a problem if the proposal 
of raising the minimum allowed funding were enacted.
Employers sponsoring U.S. defined benefit plans are responsible 
for financing any shortfall, but they are unable to tap excess assets in 
the pension fund should the fund perform better than expected. Allow-
ing employers to withdraw excess assets under certain circumstances 
would likely increase the willingness of employers to adequately fund 
plans and could also affect their willingness to offer defined benefit 
plans. However, it creates the risk that a firm might be taken over for the 
purpose of withdrawing excess assets from its pension plan.
The tax system could be used to encourage broader coverage 
through defined benefit plans. For example, to tie the interests of 
management to those of workers, the allowable maximum income con-
sidered for determining defined benefit plan benefits could be raised 
in plans that provided 100 percent coverage to all full-time workers. 
Other options linking the interests of management and workers would 
include the provision that employers that provide a defined benefit plan 
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for management would be required to also provide a similar plan for 
employees.
In many large companies, the executives have completely different 
pensions from the workers and have no personal stake in the pension 
options of the workers. Linking proposals could require that companies 
that provide defined benefit plans for executives also provide defined 
benefit plans meeting minimum standards for workers. Similarly, if the 
company froze or terminated a defined benefit plan for workers, such a 
stipulation could require that it also do so for executives.
The Pension Protection Fund in the United Kingdom was estab-
lished with a goal of learning from the experience of the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation in the United States. One of its innovations is 
premiums based in part on the risk of a claim being made. 
The lost pension problem is a problem for workers who are laid off 
or who change jobs. While it is a problem in both defined contribution 
and defined benefit plans, it is more of a problem in defined benefit 
plans because they are less portable. It can be difficult to track down a 
pension from a former employer, particularly if that employer has gone 
out of business. Both the United Kingdom and Australia have gone fur-
ther than has the United States in assisting people facing this problem. 
A national registry, perhaps one created by expanding the registry main-
tained by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, would be a major 
improvement in this area.
PROPOSAL: A NEW TYPE OF HYBRID—THE LIFE- 
INDEXED DB
Some of the policy innovations just discussed could be incorpo- 
rated into a new type of hybrid plan called the life-indexed DB. This 
plan would have three features that would distinguish it from a tradi-
tional U.S. defined benefit plan. First, it would permit tax deductible 
employee contributions. Tax deductible employee contributions are per-
mitted for defined benefit plans in the state and local government sector, 
and in Canada, the United Kingdom, and a number of other countries. 
This feature would lower employers’ pension costs. To provide some 
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protection to workers during the transition to this plan, the transition 
could require that employee contributions as a percentage of pay could 
increase by at most 1 percent in a year and that they could only be made 
in conjunction with a pay increase of at least 2 percent.
Second, the plan would have life expectancy–indexed benefits. 
This feature is present in all defined contribution plans and in cash bal-
ance plans when account balances are converted to annuities based on 
current mortality rates. With life expectancy indexing of benefits, when 
benefits are calculated at retirement age, a life expectancy adjustment 
factor would be applied to the benefit formula to adjust annual benefits 
downward so that increases in life expectancy that had occurred before 
retirement age would not lead to an increased present value of lifetime 
benefits. This change would shift part of the risk of improvements in 
life expectancy back to workers. Employers would retain the risk that 
life expectancy would improve at higher ages after a cohort had reached 
its early retirement age.
Third, laid-off workers with vested benefits in healthy firms would 
be protected against the eroding effect of inflation up to the date at 
which they would be eligible to receive benefits. Their benefits would 
be price-indexed from the date of layoff to their early retirement age. 
This change would protect workers and would take away from em-
ployers the actuarial bonus they receive when laying off workers. If a 
worker is laid off at age 51 and cannot receive benefits until age 65, the 
real value of those benefits is eroded by inflation occurring during that 
period. With this aspect of the plan, the wages of workers laid off would 
be price-indexed up to the point of retirement, and the price-indexed 
wages would be used in the benefit calculation. This way, firms would 
no longer receive an actuarial bonus for laying off workers.
This is a balanced proposal. The first of the three features would 
reduce employer cost. The second of the three features would reduce 
employer risk. The third feature would reduce employee risk.
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CONCLUSION
Pension policy is an evolving product of our social institutions and 
our economy. With the decline in defined benefit plans and the increas-
ing role of 401(k) plans, much remains to be done to improve the way 
pensions are provided to American workers. One improvement would 
be to fashion a system that includes new types of plans, such as defined 
benefit plans with employee contributions and life expectancy–indexed 
benefits. By making such improvements, steps can taken toward a re-
tirement income system that provides adequate and secure benefits for 
all Americans.
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1. Issues could arise if an employer offered more than one type of defined contribu-
tion plan, such as an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and a 401(k) plan. 
One approach to these types of issues would be to regulate all 401(k) plans as 
401(k) retirement plans if the employer did not also provide a defined benefit plan 
that was not frozen. 




Aaronson, Stephanie, and Julia Coronado. 2005. Are Firms or Workers behind 
the Shift Away from DB Pension Plans? Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series, 2005-17. Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board. 
Agnew, Julie R. 2004. “An Analysis of How Individuals React to Market Re-
turns in One 401(k) Plan.” CRR Working Paper 2004-13. Chestnut Hill, MA: 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. http://crr.bc.edu/images/
stories/Working_Papers/wp_2004-13.pdf (accessed April 29, 2009).
Agnew, Julie R., and Lisa R. Szykman. 2004. “Asset Allocation and Infor-
mation Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, and 
Investor Experience.” CRR Working Paper 2004-15. Chestnut Hill, MA: 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Agnew, Julie R., Lisa R. Szykman, Stephen P. Utkus, and Jean A. Young. 2007. 
“Do Financial Literacy and Mistrust Affect 401(k) Participation?” CRR 
Issue in Brief No. 7-17. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research 
at Boston College. http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/ib_7-17.pdf (ac-
cessed September 3, 2009).
American Academy of Actuaries. 2001. “Annuitization of Social Security 
Individual Accounts.” November issue brief. Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Academy of Actuaries. http://www.actuary.org/pdf/socialsecurity/ 
annuity_nov01.pdf (accessed April 29, 2009).
Ameriks, John. 2002. “Recent Trends in the Selection of Retirement Income 
Streams among TIAA-CREF Participants.” Research Dialogue 74(Decem-
ber): 1–19. http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/pdf/research_dialogue/74.pdf 
(accessed April 29, 2009).
Ameriks, John, and Stephen P. Zeldes. 2000. “How Do Household Portfolio 
Shares Vary with Age?” Working paper. New York: Columbia University.
Andrews, Emily S. 1992. “The Growth and Distribution of 401(k) Plans.” In 
Trends in Pensions 1992, John A. Turner and Daniel Beller, eds. Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin-
istration, pp. 149–176.
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). 
Australian Taxation Office. 2001. Finding Your Lost Super: Lost Members 
Register. Canberra, Australia: Australian Taxation Office. http://www.ato
.gov.au/individuals/content.asp?doc=/content/16442.htm (accessed Sep-
tember 5, 2009).
Aviva. 2009. Important Information: A Guide to Your With-Profits Pension 
Annuity Investment and How We Manage the With-Profit Fund. Norwich, 
UK: Aviva Life Services. www.aviva.co.uk/adviser/product-literature/files/
an/an01010c.pdf (accessed September 9, 2009).
214   Turner
Barber, Brad M., and Terrance Odean. 2001. “Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, 
Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116(1): 261–292.
Barr, Nicholas. 2001. The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Un-
certainty, and the Rule of the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benartzi, Shlomo. 2001. “Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) 
Accounts to Company Stock.” Journal of Finance 56(5): 1747–1764.
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler. 2001. “Naïve Diversification Strate-
gies in Defined Contribution Savings Plans.” American Economic Review 
91(1): 79–98.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Daniel M. Garrett. 2003. “The Effects of Financial 
Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Households.” Jour-
nal of Public Economics 87(7–8): 1487–1519.
Blake, David. 1995. Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United King-
dom. New York: Clarendon Press. 
Blake, David, and John A. Turner. 2002. “Lost Pensions, Lost Pensioners: Is a 
National Registry of Pension Plans the Answer?” Benefits Quarterly 18(3): 
51–64.
Bodie, Zvi. 1995. “On the Risk of Stocks in the Long Run.” Financial Analysts 
Journal 51(3): 18–22.
Boskin, Michael J. 2003. “Deferred Taxes in the Public Finances.” NBER 
working paper. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution. 
Brown, Jeffrey R. 2001. “Redistribution and Insurance: Mandatory Annuitiza-
tion with Mortality Heterogeneity.” CRR Working Paper 2001–02. Chest-
nut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Brown, Jeffrey R., Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, and Mark J. 
Warshawsky. 2001. The Role of Annuity Markets in Financing Retirement. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bruce, Ellen A., John A. Turner, and Dongsoo Lee. 2005. “Lost Pensions: An 
Empirical Investigation.” Benefits Quarterly 21(1): 42–48.
Buessing, Marric, and Mauricio Soto. 2006. “The State of Private Pensions: 
Current 5500 Data.” CRR Issue in Brief No. 42. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center 
for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2000. Employee Benefits in State and Lo-
cal Governments, 1998. Bulletin 2531. Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebbl0018.pdf (accessed May 26, 
2009).
———. 2003. Retirement Plans in 2003. TED: The Editor’s Desk. Washing-
ton, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2003/
sept/wk5/art05.htm (accessed May 2, 2009).
———. 2007. National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private 
References   215
Business in the United States, March 2007. Summary 07-05. Washington, 
DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0006 
.pdf (accessed May 26, 2009).
Burman, Leonard, Eric Toder, and Christopher Geissler. 2008. “How Big Are 
Total Individual Income Tax Expenditures, and Who Benefits from Them?” 
Discussion Paper No. 31. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
Butrica, Barbara A., and Gordon B.T. Mermin. 2006. “Annuitized Wealth and 
Consumption at Older Ages.” CRR Working Paper 2006-26. Chestnut Hill, 
MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Chen, Yung-Ping, and John C. Scott. 2003. “Gradual Retirement: An Addi-
tional Option in Work and Retirement.” North American Actuarial Journal 
7(3): 62–74. 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian. 2004. “Plan Design 
and 401(k) Savings Outcomes.” National Tax Journal 57(2): 275–298.
———. 2006. “Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on In-
dex Mutual Funds.” NBER Working Paper 12261. Cambridge, MA: Na-
tional Bureal of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w12261 
(accessed May 1, 2009).
Clark, Robert L., Madeleine B. d’Ambrosio, Ann A. McDermed, and Kshama 
Sawant. 2004. “Sex Differences, Financial Education, and Retirement 
Goals.” In Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance, Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus, eds. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 185–206.
Clark, Robert L., and Sylvester J. Schieber. 1998. “Factors Affecting Participa-
tion Rates and Contribution Levels in 401(k) Plans.” In Living with Defined 
Contribution Pensions: Remaking Responsibility for Retirement, Olivia S. 
Mitchell and Sylvester J. Schieber, eds. Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, pp. 69–97. 
Commission of the European Communities. 2002. Joint Report by the Com-
mission and the Council on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions. Brussels, 
Belgium: European Commission.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 1993. Controlling Losses of the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation: A CBO Study. Congress of the United 
States. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.
———. 2003. Utilization of Tax Incentives for Retirement Saving: A CBO Pa-
per. Congress of the United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget 
Office.
Conversation on Coverage. 2007. Covering the Uncovered: Final Report of 
the Conversation on Coverage. Common Ground Proposals to Expand Re-
tirement Savings for American Workers. Washington, DC: Pension Rights 
Center. 
216   Turner
Copeland, Craig. 2001. “Pension Participation: February 2001.” EBRI Notes 
22(12): 1–5.
de Jong, Philip, and John A. Turner. 2001. “Privatizing Government Pensions: 
The United States and the Netherlands.” Benefits Quarterly 17(3): 51–56.
Demby, Elayne Robertson. 2002. “Game Plan: Leave It to the Boss.” Plan 
Sponsor 2002(September): 60–61.
Elliott, Kenneth R., and James H. Moore Jr. 2000. “Cash Balance Pension 
Plans: The New Wave.” Compensation and Working Conditions 5(2): 3–11. 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archive/summer2000art1.pdf (accessed May 
1, 2009).
Engelhardt, Gary V., and Anil Kumar. 2003. “Understanding the Impact of 
Employer Matching on 401(k) Saving.” TIAA-CREF Institute Research 
Dialog 76(June): 1–11.
Engström, Stefan, and Anna Westerberg. 2003. “Which Individuals Make Ac-
tive Investment Decisions in the New Swedish Pension System?” SSE/EFI 
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, No. 527. Stockholm, 
Sweden: Stockholm School of Economics.
ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). 2007. A New Benefit Platform for Life 
Security. Washington, DC: ERISA Industry Committee. http://www.eric
.org/forms/uploadFiles/ccea00000007.filename.ERIC_New_Benefit_ 
Platform_FL0614.pdf (accessed September 2, 2009). 
ESPlanner. 2005. Tutorial. Boston, MA: Economic Security Planning. http://
www.bu.edu/hr/files/documents/esplanner_tutorial.pdf (accessed Septem-
ber 9, 2009). 
Even, William E., and David A. Macpherson. 2008. “Improving Pension Cov-
erage at Small Firms.” In Overcoming Barriers to Entrepreneurship in 
the United States, Dianna Furchtgott-Roth, ed. Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, pp. 123–156.
Even, William E., and John A. Turner. 1999. “Has the Pension Coverage of 
Women Improved?” Benefits Quarterly 15(2): 37–40. 
Friedberg, Leora, and Anthony Webb. 2005. “Life Is Cheap: Using Mortal-
ity Bonds to Hedge Aggregate Mortality Risk.” CRR Working Paper 2005-
13. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. 
http://escholarship.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context= 
retirement_papers (accessed May 8, 2009).
Gale, William G., and Michael Dworsky. 2006. “Effects of Public Policies 
on the Disposition of Lump-Sum Distributions: Rational and Behavioral 
Influences.” CRR Working Paper 2006-15. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College. http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/
Working_Papers/wp_2006-15.pdf (accessed May 10, 2009). 
Gale, William G., J. Mark Iwry, Alicia H. Munnell, and Richard H. Thaler. 
References   217
2004. “Improving 401(k) Investment Performance.” Issue in Brief No. 26. 
Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Gale, William G., J. Mark Iwry, and Peter R. Orszag. 2005. The Automatic 
401(k): A Simple Way to Strengthen Retirement Savings. Policy Brief No. 
2005-1. Washington, DC: Retirement Security Project.
Gale, William G., J. Mark Iwry, and Spencer Walters. 2007. “Retirement Sav-
ing for Middle- and Lower-Income Households: The Pension Protection 
Act of 2006 and the Unfinished Agenda.” Policy Brief No. 2007-1. Wash-
ington, DC: Retirement Security Project. 
Gebhardtsbauer, Ron, and John A. Turner. 2004. “The Protection of Pension 
Covered Workers and Beneficiaries: An Analysis of the UK Legislation Es-
tablishing the Pension Protection Fund.” Unpublished paper. Washington, 
DC: American Academy of Actuaries and AARP Public Policy Institute.
General Accounting Office (GAO). 1997. 401(k) Pension Plans: Loan Pro-
visions Enhance Participation, but May Affect Income Security for Some. 
Report to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, and the Honorable 
Judd Gregg, U.S. Senate. GAO/HEHS-98-5. Washington, DC: General Ac-
counting Office; Health, Education, and Human Services Division. 
———. 2000. Cash Balance Plans: Implications for Retirement Income. Re-
port to the Chairman, Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate. 
GAO/HEHS-00-207. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office; Health, 
Education, and Human Services Division.
Ghilarducci, Teresa. 2001. “De-Linking Benefits for the Single Employer: 
Alternative Multiemployer Model.” Paper presented at the Pension Rights 
Center conference “Conversation on Coverage,” held in Washington, DC, 
July 24–25.
———. 2008. When I’m Sixty-Four: The Plot against Pensions and the Plan 
to Save Them. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ghilarducci, Teresa, and Mary Lee. 2005. How Lower Middle-Class Workers 
Obtain Employer Pensions. Final Report for Retirement Research Founda-
tion Grant No. 2003-077. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame.
Ghilarducci, Teresa, and John A. Turner, eds. 2007. Work Options for Older 
Americans. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Gillion, Colin, John A. Turner, Clive Bailey, and Denis Latulippe, eds. 2000. 
Social Security Pensions: Development and Reform. Geneva: International 
Labour Organization. 
Gustman, Alan L., and Thomas L. Steinmeier. 1995. Pension Incentives and 
Job Mobility. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Re-
search.
Harris, Jennifer D. 1998. Purchases of Service Credit: Portability for Public-
Sector Employees. Lorton, VA: Public Retirement Institute.
218   Turner
Harrysson, Lars, and Michael O’Brien. 2003. “Pension Reform in New Zea-
land and Sweden: A Comparative Analysis of Path Dependent Reform Pro-
cesses.” Paper presented at the Fourth International Research Conference 
on Social Security, “Social Security in a Long Life Society,” held in Ant-
werp, Belgium, May 5–7. 
Hermes, Sharon, and Teresa Ghilarducci. 2007. “How 401(k)s and the Stock 
Market Crash Explain Increases in Older Workers’ Labor Force Participa-
tion Rates.” In Work Options for Older Americans, Teresa Ghilarducci and 
John A. Turner, eds. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 
237–266. 
Hinz, Richard P., David D. McCarthy, and John A. Turner. 1997. “Are Women 
Conservative Investors? Gender Differences in Participant-Directed Pen-
sion Investments.” In Positioning Pensions for the Twenty-First Century, 
Michael S. Gordon, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Marc M. Twinney, eds. Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Pension Research 
Council, pp. 91–104. 
Hinz, Richard P., and John A. Turner. 1998. “Pension Coverage Initiatives: 
Why Don’t Workers Participate?” In Living with Defined Contribution Pen-
sions: Remaking Responsibility for Retirement, Olivia S. Mitchell and Syl-
vester J. Schieber, eds. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Wharton 
School, Pension Research Council, pp. 17–37. 
Hinz, Richard P., John A. Turner, and Phyllis A. Fernandez, eds. 1994. Pension 
Coverage Issues for the ‘90s. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration.
Holden, Sarah. 2007. “Trends and Developments in 401(k) Plan Savings in the 
United States.” Paper presented at the 2007 Mutual Funds and Investment 
Management Conference, held in Palm Desert, CA, March 25–28.
Holden, Sarah, and Jack VanDerhei. 2001. “401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Ac-
count Balances, and Loan Activity in 2000.” EBRI Issue Brief No. 239. 
Washington, DC: Employee Benefit Research Institute.
Honig, Marjorie, and Irena Dushi. 2003. “How Demographic Change Will 
Drive Benefits Design.” In Benefits for the Workplace of the Future, Olivia 
S. Mitchell, David S. Blitzstein, Michael Gordon, and Judith F. Mazo, eds. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 58–88. 
Horack, Sarah, and Andrew Wood. 2005. An Evaluation of Scheme Joining 
Techniques in Workplace Pension Schemes with an Employer Contribution: 
Case Study Findings of Scheme Joining Techniques. Research Report No. 
292. London: Department for Work and Pensions. http://www.dwp.gov.uk/
asd/asd5/rports2005-2006/rrep292.pdf (accessed May 12, 2009).
House of Lords. 2003. Aspects of the Economics of an Ageing Population. Vol. 
References   219
1—Report. Select Committee on Economic Affairs. HL Paper 179-I. Ses-
sion 2002–03, 4th Report. London: Stationery Office Ltd.
Huberman, Gur, Sheena S. Iyengar, and Wei Jiang. 2003. “Defined Contribu-
tion Pension Plans: Determinants of Participation and Contributions Rates.” 
Columbia University working paper. New York: Columbia University. 
Hutchens, Robert M, and Jennjou Chen. 2007. “The Role of Employers in 
Phased Retirement: Opportunities for Phased Retirement among White-
Collar Workers.” In Work Options for Older Americans, Teresa Ghilarducci 
and John A. Turner, eds. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
pp. 95–118. 
International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS) and 
International Social Security Association (ISSA). 2003. Complementary 
and Private Pensions throughout the World, 2003. Geneva: International 
Network of Pensions Regulators and Supervisors and International Social 
Security Association.
Iwry, J. Mark, and John A. Turner. 2008. “Expanding the Use of Annuities by 
401(k) Participants: Innovations in Policy, Products, Marketing, and Ad-
vice.” Draft paper. Washington, DC: Retirement Security Project.
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Mark R. Lepper. 2000. “When Choice Is Demotivat-
ing: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 79(6): 995–1006.
James, Estelle. 2005. “How It’s Done in Chile: Personal Accounts—with 
Strings Attached.” Washington Post, February 13, B:2.
James, Estelle, Guillermo Martinez, and Augusto Iglesias. 2006. “The Payout 
Stage in Chile: Who Annuitizes and Why?” Journal of Pension Economics 
and Finance 5(2): 121–154.
Kehl, David. 2002. Superannuation Preservation Rules: A Summary. Research 
Note No. 22, 2001-02. Canberra, Australia: Department of the Parliamen-
tary Library. 
Khorana, Ajay, Henri Servaes, and Peter Tufano. 2007. “Mutual Funds Fees 
around the World.” Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 
901023. Boston: Harvard Business School. http://icf.som/yale.edu/pdf/
seminars05-06/Servaes.pdf (accessed May 13, 2009).
Kritzer, Barbara E. 2000. “Social Security Privatization in Latin America.” 
Social Security Bulletin 63(2): 17–37. 
Kusko, Andrea L., James M. Poterba, and David W. Wilcox. 1998. “Employee 
Decisions with Respect to 401(k) Plans.” In Living with Defined Contribu-
tion Pensions, Olivia S. Mitchell and Sylvester J. Schieber, eds. Philadel-
phia: Pension Research Council and University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 
98–112. 
Latulippe, Denis, and John A. Turner. 2000. “Partial Retirement and Pension 
220   Turner
Policy in Industrialized Countries.” International Labour Review 139(2): 
179–195. 
Lichtenstein, Jules H., and John A. Turner. 2005. “Cash Balance Pension Plans 
and Older Workers.” AARP Public Policy Institute Issue Brief No. 78. 
Washington, DC: AARP Public Policy Institute.  
Liebman, Jeffrey B. 2002. “The Role of Annuities in a Reformed U.S. Social 
Security System.” PPI Issue Paper 2002-17. Washington, DC: AARP Public 
Policy Institute.
Lucas, Lori. 2000. “Under the Microscope: A Closer Look at the Diversifica-
tion and Risk Taking Behavior of 401(k) Participants and How Plan Spon-
sors Can Address Key Investing Issues.” Benefits Quarterly 16(4): 24–30.
Lusardi, Annamaria. 2004. “Saving and the Effectiveness of Financial Edu-
cation.” In Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance, Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus, eds. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 157–184.
———. 2007. The Case for Improving Financial Literacy. Blog entry, De-
cember 9. Hanover, NH: Financial Literacy and Ignorance blog. http://
annalusardi.blogspot.com/2007/12/case-for-improving-financial-literacy
.html (accessed September 9, 2009). 
Maas, Angela. 2005. “Managing Retirement—Automatically Managed 401(k) 
Accounts Appeal to Employers and Employees Alike.” Employee Benefit 
News 19(3): 28–31, 49.
MacKenzie, George A. 2007. “In Annuities We Trust: Annuity Markets and 
Pension Reform.” Contingencies 2007(March/April): 24–29.
Madrian, Brigitte C., and Dennis F. Shea. 2001. “The Power of Suggestion: 
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116(4): 1149–1187. 
Maser, Karen. 1995. “Who’s Saving for Retirement?” Perspectives on Labour 
and Income 7(4): 14–19.
Maunsell, Harriet. 1998. A View of the Pension Schemes Registry. OPRA Bul-
letin, Issue 6. Brighton, East Sussex, UK: Occupational Pensions Regula-
tory Authority.
———. 1999. A View of the Pension Schemes Registry: Part 2. OPRA Bulle-
tin, Issue 8. Brighton, East Sussex, UK: Occupational Pensions Regulatory 
Authority.
McCarthy, David D., and John A. Turner. 2000. “Pension Education: Does It 
Work? Does It Matter?” Benefits Quarterly 16(1): 64–72.
McGill, Dan M., Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, and Sylvester J. Schieber. 
1996. Fundamentals of Private Pensions. 7th ed. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
Medill, Colleen E. 2008. “Participant Perceptions and Decision-Making 
References   221
Concerning Retirement Benefits.” CRR Working Paper 2008-9. Chestnut 
Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. http://crr 
.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2008-9.pdf (accessed Septem-
ber 3, 2009).
Muir, Dana, and John A. Turner. 2007. “Longevity and Retirement Age in De-
fined Benefit Pension Plans.” In Work Options for Older Americans, Teresa 
Ghilarducci and John A. Turner, eds. South Bend, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, pp. 212–231.
Muller, Leslie A., and John A. Turner. 2008. “The Persistence of Employee 
401(k) Contributions over a Major Stock Market Cycle.” Paper presented at 
the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research conference “Pen-
sions, Private Accounts, and Retirement Savings over the Life Course,” 
held in Ann Arbor, MI, November 20–21.
Munnell, Alicia H., and Mauricio Soto. 2007. “Why Are Companies Freezing 
Their Pensions?” CRR Working Paper 2007-22. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center 
for Retirement Research at Boston College. 
Munnell, Alicia H., Annika E. Sundén, and Catherine Taylor. 2000. “What 
Determines 401(k) Participation and Contributions?” CRR Working Paper 
2000-12. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College. 
O’Brien, Chris, Paul Fenn, and Stephen Diacon. 2005. How Long Do People Ex-
pect to Live? Results and Implications. CRIS Research Report 2005-1. Not-
tingham, UK: University of Nottingham, Centre for Risk and Insurance Stud-
ies. http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/cris/papers/crisresearchreport 
2005-1(summary).pdf (accessed May 18, 2009).
Odean, Terrance. 1998. “Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders 
Are Above Average.” Journal of Finance 53(6): 1887–1934.
Oster, Christopher. 2003. “Good News! Insurers Extend Your Lifespan.” Wall 
Street Journal, June 24, D:1. 
Palmer, Edward. 2001. “Statement of Edward Palmer, professor, social insur-
ance economics, Uppsala University in Sweden, and chief of research and 
evaluation, Swedish National Social Insurance Board, Stockholm, Sweden: 
Sweden’s New Pension System.” U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. 
Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing before the Subcommittee on So-
cial Security, Social Security and Pension Reform: Lessons from Other 
Countries, 107th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 40–50. 
Pang, Gaobo, and Mark J. Warshawsky. 2009. “Reform of the Tax on Rever-
sions of Excess Pension Assets.” Journal of Pension Economics and Fi-
nance 8(1): 107–130.
Papke, Leslie E. 2004. “Individual Financial Decisions in Retirement Saving 
222   Turner
Plans: The Role of Participant Direction.” Journal of Public Economics 
88(1–2): 39–61.
Papke, Leslie E., and James M. Poterba. 1995. “Survey Evidence on Employer 
Match Rates and Employee Saving Behavior in 401(k) Plans.” Economic 
Letters 49(3): 313–317.
Penner, Rudolph G., Pamela Perun, and C. Eugene Steuerle. 2007. “Let-
ting Older Workers Work.” In Work Options for Older Americans, Teresa 
Ghilarducci and John A. Turner, eds. South Bend, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, pp. 125–163. 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 2003. “PBGC Pension Search 
Finds 15,000 Owed $61 Million in Benefits; 80 Million Still Unclaimed.” 
News release, January 22. Washington, DC: Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration. 
Pension Protection Fund and Pensions Regulator. 2006. The Purple Book: DB 
Pensions Universe Risk Profile. Croydon, Surrey, UK: Pension Protection 
Fund; and Brighton, E. Sussex, UK: Pensions Regulator. 
Pension Rights Center. 2007. Pension Policy Statistics: Why Pensions Are Im-
portant. Washington, DC: Pension Rights Center. http://www.pensionrights
.org/policy/stats.html (accessed August 19, 2009). 
Pensions Policy Institute. 2007. The Changing Landscape for Defined Bene-
fit Pensions Schemes. London, UK: Pensions Policy Institute. http://www
.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/uploadeddocuments/PPI_Landscape_for_
DB_Schemes_8_October_2007.pdf (accessed May 18, 2009).
Perun, Pamela, and Joseph J. Valenti. 2008. “Defined Benefit Plans: Going, 
Going, Gone?” Paper presented at the Thirtieth Annual Research Confer-
ence of the Association for Public Policy and Management, held in Los 
Angeles, CA, November 6-8.
Poterba, James M. 2001. “Taxation and Portfolio Structure: Issues and Impli-
cations.” NBER Working Paper 8223. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8223.pdf (accessed May 
18, 2009).
President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security. 2001. Strengthening 
Social Security and Creating Personal Wealth for All Americans. Report of 
the President’s Commission. Washington, DC: President’s Commission to 
Strengthen Social Security.
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (PSCA). 2005. 48th Annual Survey 
of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans. Chicago: Profit Sharing/401(k) Council 
of America.
Purcell, Patrick. 2004. Automatic Enrollment in Section 401(k) Plans. CRS 
Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
———. 2006. Retirement Savings and Household Wealth: Trends from 2001 to 
References   223
2004. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service.
Reagan, Patricia B., and John A. Turner. 2000. “Did the Decline in Marginal 
Tax Rates during the 1980s Reduce Pension Coverage?” In Employee Bene-
fits and Labor Markets in Canada and the United States, William T. Alpert 
and Stephen A. Woodbury, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, pp. 475–496. 
Rein, Martin, and John A. Turner. 2001. “Public-Private Interactions: Manda-
tory Pensions in Australia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.” Review of 
Population and Social Policy 10: 107–153. 
Samuelson, William, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1988. “Status Quo Bias in Deci-
sion Making.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1(1): 7–59.
Smith, Karen E., Richard W. Johnson, and Leslie A. Muller. 2004. “Deferring 
Income in Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans: The Dynamics of Par-
ticipant Contributions.” National Tax Journal 57(3): 639–670.
Smith, Paul A. 2001. A Longer-Term Perspective on IRA Participation: Evi-
dence from a Panel of Tax Returns. Washington, DC: Office of Tax Analy-
sis, U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
Smith, Sarah. 2006. “Persistency of Pension Contributions in the UK: Evidence 
from Aggregate and Micro-Data.” CMPO Working Paper No. 06/139. Bris-
tol, UK: Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol. 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2006/wp139.pdf (accessed 
May 22, 2009).
Social Security Administration. 2007. International Update: Recent Develop-
ments in Foreign Public and Private Pensions. SSA Publication No. 13-
11712. Washington, DC: U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of 
Policy. http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/
2007-02/2007-02.pdf (accessed May 28, 2009).
Society of Actuaries. 2004. 2003 Risks and Process of Retirement Survey: Re-
port of Findings. Washington, DC: Mathew Greenwald and Associates and 
Employee Benefit Research Institute.
Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods. 2003. Report to the Social Se-
curity Advisory Board. Washington, DC: Social Security Advisory Board. 
Thaler, Richard H., and Shlomo Benartzi. 2004. “Save More Tomorrow: Using 
Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving.” Journal of Political 
Economy 112(1): S164–S187.
Thrift Savings Plan. 2009. Annuity Calculator. Birmingham, AL: Thrift Sav-
ings Plan. http://tsp.gov/calc/annuity/annuity.cfm (accessed September 9, 
2009). 
Turner, John A. 1993. Pension Policy for a Mobile Labor Force. Kalamazoo, 
MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
224   Turner
———. 2003a. “Are Cash Balance Plans Defined Benefit or Defined Contri-
bution Plans?” Benefits Quarterly 19(2): 71–75.
———. 2003b. “Errors Workers Make in Managing 401(k) Investments.” 
Benefits Quarterly 19(4): 75–82.
———. 2004. “Individual Accounts: Lessons from Sweden.” International 
Social Security Review 57(1): 65–84.
———. 2006. Individual Accounts for Social Security Reform: International 
Perspectives on the U.S. Debate. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.
Turner, John A., and Roy Guenther. 2005. “A Comparison of Early Retire-
ment Pensions in the United States and Russia: The Pensions of Musicians.” 
Journal of Aging and Social Policy 17(4): 61–74. 
Turner, John A., and Gerard Hughes. 2008. “Large Declines in Defined Benefit 
Plans Are Not Inevitable: The Experience of Canada, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.” Discussion Paper PI-0821. Report pre-
pared for the Ontario Pension Board. London: Pensions Institute, City Uni-
versity. 
Turner, John A., and Sophie M. Korczyk. 2004. Pension Participant Knowl-
edge about Plan Fees. Public Policy Institute Data Digest No. 105. Wash-
ington, DC: AARP Public Policy Institute. 
Turner, John A., Leslie A. Muller, and Satyendra K. Verma. 2003. “Defining 
Participation in Defined Contribution Pension Plans.” Monthly Labor Re-
view 126(8): 36–43. 
Turner, John A., and David M. Rajnes. 2003. “Retirement Guarantees in Vol-
untary Defined Contribution Plans.” In The Pension Challenge: Risk Trans-
fers and Retirement Income Security, Olivia S. Mitchell and Kent Smetters, 
eds. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 251–267.
———. 2006. “Fixed Rate Guarantees during Economic Downturns.” Unpub-
lished manuscript. Washington, DC: AARP Public Policy Institute.
Turner, John A., and Satyendra K. Verma. 2005. “Extending Pension Partici-
pation: The Behavioral Economics of Why Some Workers Choose to Not 
Participate.” Unpublished AARP document. Washington, DC: AARP.
———. 2007. “Why Some Workers Don’t Take 401(k) Plan Offers: Inertia 
versus Economics.” CeRP Working Paper 56/07. Moncalieri, Italy: Center 
for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies. 
Turner, John A., and Noriyasu Watanabe. 1995. Private Pension Policies in 
Industrialized Countries: A Comparative Analysis. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). 2002. PWBA Needs to Improve Over-
sight of Cash Balance Plan Lump Sum Distributions. Report No. 09-02-
References   225
001-12-121. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspec-
tor General. 
———. 2004. Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 1999 Form 5500 
Annual Reports. No. 12, Summer 2004. Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration. http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/PDF/1999pensionplanbulletin.PDF (accessed May 26, 2009).
———. 2005a. Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2000 Form 
5500 Annual Reports. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Em-
ployee Benefits Security Administration. http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/
2000pensionplanbulletin.PDF (accessed May 26, 2009).
———. 2005b. Report of the Working Group on Retirement Distributions and 
Options. Report by the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pen-
sion Benefit Plans. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employee 
Benefits Security Administration. http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/
AC_1105A_report.html (accessed May 26, 2009).
———. 2008. Private Pension Plan Bulletin Historical Tables. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration. 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/privatepensionplanbulletinhistoricaltables.pdf 
(accessed May 26, 2009).
Valletta, Rob. 2007. “Anxious Workers.” FRBSF Economic Letter 7(13): 1–3. 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2007/el2007-13.html 
(accessed May 28, 2009).
VanDerhei, Jack L. 2002. “Prepared Statement of Jack L. VanDerhei: Re-
tirement Security and Defined Contribution Pension Plans: The Role of 
Company Stock in 401(k) Plans.” U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Finance. Senate Hearing 107–751, Retirement Security: Picking Up the 
Enron Pieces, 107th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 60–68. 
Vittas, Dimitri, and Augusto Iglesias. 1992. “The Rationale and Performance 
of Personal Pension Plans in Chile.” Policy Research Working Paper 867. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 2003. Global News Briefs: New Pension Law in 
Belgium. Brussels, Belgium: Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 
Webman, Nancy K. 2007. “Japan Could Avoid Path of Defined Contribution 
Shift; Experts Say That Risk Sharing, Flexibility Could Help Firms Keep 
Their DB Plans.” Pensions and Investments 35(26): 50.
Wesbroom, Kevin, and Tim Reay. 2005. Hybrid Pension Plans: UK and Inter-
national Experience. Department for Work and Pensions Research Report 
271. London: Department for Work and Pensions.
White, David. 2003. “Employers Support Moves to More Compulsion in Pen-
sions.” News release, June 3. London: IPE.com. 
226   Turner
Whitehouse, Edward. 1998. “Pension Reform in Britain.” Social Protection 
Discussion Paper No. 9810. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Wolff, Edward N. 2007. “The Transformation of the American Pension Sys-
tem.” In Work Options for Older Americans, Teresa Ghilarducci and John A. 
Turner, eds. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 175–211. 
World Bank. 1994. Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old 
and Promote Growth. A World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Wyatt Company. 1980. Survey of Retirement, Thrift, and Profit-Sharing Plans 
Covering Salaried Employees of the 50 Largest U.S. Industrial Companies 
as of January 1, 1980. Washington, DC: Wyatt Company.
Yoo, Kwang-Yeol, and Alain de Serres. 2005. “Tax Treatment of Private Pen-
sion Savings in OECD Countries.” OECD Economic Studies 39: 73–110. 




John A. Turner is director of the Pension Policy Center in Washington, 
D.C., which provides research and consulting on social security and pension 
policy. Previously, he worked at the AARP Public Policy Institute in Wash-
ington and at the International Labour Office in Geneva, Switzerland. He has 
also worked in research offices at the U.S. Social Security Administration and 
at the U.S. Department of Labor, where he served as deputy director of the 
pension research office for nine years. He has taught as an adjunct lecturer in 
economics at George Washington University and at Georgetown University 
in the Georgetown Public Policy Institute. He has lectured and consulted in 
more than 20 countries and has published 12 books and more than 100 articles. 
He is the author of three previous books for the Upjohn Institute, including 
Individual Accounts for Social Security Reform: International Perspectives on 
the U.S. Debate, published in 2006. Turner has a PhD in economics from the 




The italic letters f, n, and t following a page number indicate that the subject information 
of the heading is within a figure, note, or table, respectively, on that page. Double italics 
indicate multiple but consecutive elements.
401(k) plans, 2–3, 19n1, 123n
 annuities with, 18–19, 98, 104, 107– 
 108, 165, 179, 181
 annuitization of, 183–194
  primary vs. supplementary in,  
 190–194, 203–204, 212n1
  unisex pension effect on, 183–185,  
 189–190, 189t, 201
 management of invested funds in, 9,  
 17, 205
 nonparticipation in, 47, 166–167
  reasons for, 13, 37, 45–46, 142
 participation in, 1, 3, 16, 34, 35,  
 52–53, 139
  autoescalation and, 144–145
  automatic enrollment and, 5, 38,  
 40–41, 131
  matched contributions and, 40,  
 131, 204, 206
 policy about
  government and, 10, 33, 168, 172
  proposals for, 19, 203–206
 risk in, 103, 104–109
 survivor benefits and, 18, 19, 167– 
 168
 taxes and, 1, 8, 14, 84, 88, 89–90, 91t,  
 94, 98
 See also Roth 401(k) plans
ABP plan, as hybrid pension plan in, 16,  
 125, 126t, 129–130, 133, 161–162
Accounting, 30, 154
 benefit accruals in, 27–28, 60, 61–64,  
 68–71, 110, 126t, 160
 as pension policy issue, 2, 37, 155
Actuarial science, 28
 as pension policy issue, 2, 26, 50,  
 111–113
 See also Life expectancy
Ad hoc payments, defined contribution  
 plans and, 17, 166
ADEA (Age Discrimination in  
 Employment Act), 74
Administration on Aging, U.S., lost  
 pension counseling, 174
Age Discrimination in Employment Act  
 (ADEA), hurdles to flexible  
 employment in, 74
Age of retirement, 77–81
 early, 60, 72, 74, 77–78, 81, 211
 fixed, and pension law, 14, 80, 140
 maximum, 79
 neutrality of, for benefit accrual,  
 27–28, 58
 pension information at, 178–179
 raised minimum, 79–80, 81, 112–113,  
 208
Annuities, 1, 4, 118, 181–201
 adjustments for inflation at retirement  
 in, 103, 188t
 basic information about, 182–183,  
 189t, 191–193
 benefits from, 86
  notices of value in, 200, 205–206
  pension law and, 183–184, 201
  survivors and, 63–64, 107, 167– 
 168, 187t
  trade-off at retirement vs. old age  
 with, 122, 171–172
 defined benefit plans and, 112, 125,  
 127, 170, 180n1, 181
 defined contribution plans and, 12,  
 17, 18–19, 140, 166, 181–201
  featured options with, 186t–188t,  
 194–197
  income redistribution with, 188t,  
 197–199
  market innovations in, 199–200
230   Turner
Annuities, cont.
 defined contribution plans and, cont. 
 payout options with, 181–182,  
 187t, 189, 189tt
 pension law and, 10, 18, 19n2, 183– 
 184, 201
 risk and, 7, 73, 101, 106, 107–109,  
 126t, 188t
 taxation effect on, 88, 93–94, 188t,  
 193, 204
 See also 401(k) plans, annuitization  
 of; under 401(k) plans, annuities  
 with
Approved Personal Pension, UK, 31
Argentina, pension benefit insurance in, 7
Arizona Governing Committee v.  
 Norris, unisex rulings in, 18,  
 183–184, 189–190, 201
Australia
 lost pensions in, 18, 177, 210
 pension provision in, 4, 7
  employer mandate for, 24, 33
  job changes and, 18, 60
  mutual funds and, 153t, 205
  trustee management of, 139, 205
 social security vs. privatized  
 retirement income system in, 29,  
 79, 167
 tax treatment of pensions in, 87, 92,  
 93
Austria, EET pension approach in, 86
Autoescalation, 401(k) plans with,  
 144–145
Bankruptcy, 66
 annuities and, 107, 118
 employer declarations of, 7, 8, 113– 
 114, 174
 PBGC and probability of, 110, 115– 
 116, 119, 123nn3–5
Banks, fund management by, 9–10, 155
Behavioral economics, pension systems  
 and, 4, 153
Behavioral finance, 2, 16, 46–47
Belgium
 pensions in, 61, 86, 92, 93
 raised minimum retirement age in,  
 79–80
Benefit payments as pension function,  
 85, 126t, 154
 adequacy of, and pension policy,  
 171–173, 179
 annuities as, 140, 192, 206
 calculation of, 127–128, 131, 211
 receipt of, while still working, 76, 77,  
 140, 186t
 taxation of, 84, 86–87, 90, 93–94,  
 95–96
 types of, 166
  See also Ad hoc payments; Annuities;
  Installment payments; Lump sum  
 payments
British Household Panel Survey,  
 employee pension contributions  
 data from, 34–35, 143
Bush, President George W. (“43”), social  
 security proposal by, 23, 25
Business administration, as pension  
 policy issue, 2
Canada
 pension provision in, 9, 143, 153t
  benefits and, 7, 172
  trends of, 6, 7, 10, 134, 139, 207
 social security in, 96
 tax treatment of pensions in, 6, 86,  
 96, 96t
  contributions and, 62, 88–89, 91,  
 157, 170–171, 210
Capitalism, pension investments and,  
 153–154
Career average plans, 2, 110, 167
Cash balance plans, 3, 15, 16, 66
 hybrid nature of, 125, 126t, 127–128
 pension portability of, 57, 64–65, 72
 risk in, 7, 125, 126t, 128
  employees and, 127, 133–134
  employers and, 105
 shift to, 18, 71, 81
Chile
 government mandates in, 4, 7, 29
 pension benefits in, 7, 79, 93
Index   231
Chile, cont.
 pension benefits in, cont.
   inflation adjustments for, 103, 188t
  lump sum payment of, 173, 187t
  receipt of, while still working, 76,  
 186t
 pension plans in, 172
  annuities and, 108, 181,  
 186t–188t, 193–197
  investments and, 9, 153–154
China, Hong Kong, IRAs in, 12
Chrysler (firm), downsizing at, 78
Collective bargaining agreements, 76
 multiemployer alliances and, 67–68,  
 129
 pensions in, 4, 7, 22–23, 33, 44, 89
 trade-off of wages vs. pensions in, 89,  
 137
Computer algorithms, fund management  
 by, 150
Consumption tax, retirees and, 84
Contracting out of social security,  
 extending pension coverage by,  
 23–24, 27–28, 30–31, 32n2
Contributions as pension function, 84,  
 126t, 130
 employees and, 41, 87, 88–90, 91t,  
 156–157, 163, 204
  401(k)s, 84, 87, 142–143, 144– 
 145
  IRAs, 34–35, 65, 143
  pension taxation effect on, 87,  
 210–211
 employers and, 2, 24, 40–45, 87, 88,  
 143, 156, 164, 205–206, 208–209
 government role in, 8, 14, 39, 62,  
 91–92, 96–97
 private vs. public systems, 8, 27–28,  
 62, 84, 87, 98, 157
 tax treatment of, 84, 87, 92, 88, 90,  
 91t, 157, 170–171, 210–211
Corporate dissolution, 8, 174, 177–178
 failing firms prior to, 121
 takeovers as, 117–118, 138, 155, 174,  
 209
 See also Bankruptcy
Current Population Survey (CPS),  
 employee pension contribution  
 data from, 36, 37
Czech Republic, the, tax treatment of  
 pension contributions in, 87
DB(k) plans, 126t
 federal authorization of, 3, 15
 policy proposals for, 19, 131, 133
 risk in, 131, 133–134
Defined benefit plans, 2, 12, 19n1, 33,  
 35, 126t
 contracting out of, 30–31
 employer behaviors and, 1, 38, 84,  
 138–139, 154–155
 funding of, 154–163
  accounting policy and, 155
  automatic adjustment mechanisms  
 for, 161–163
  contributions in, 156–157, 164
  costs and, 10, 15, 80, 112, 113,  
 137–138, 158–160
  employer behaviors, 154–155, 204
  imbalances in, 157–158
 investments in, 1, 8
  annuities and, 112, 125, 127,  
 167–168
 pension benefits from, 7
  inflation adjustment for, 11, 13,  
 70–71, 72
  securing, and pension policy,  
 169–171
   See also below under Defined  
 benefit plans, portability at  
 retirement of
 policy proposals for, 19, 99, 206–210
 portability at retirement of, 55–73
  accrual and transferability rights  
 to, 61–64, 68–71
  back-loading in, 64–65
  contrasted, vs. defined contribution
  plans, 57–58, 66–68, 72–73
  job changes and, 58–60, 109, 208
 risk and, 1, 3, 6, 11, 14–15, 101–104,  
 105, 109–113
232   Turner
Defined benefit plans, cont. 
shifts from, 3, 10–11, 17, 30, 71, 81,  
 134, 139–140, 207
 taxes and, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91t, 92, 94,  
 140, 209–210
 See also Career average plans; Final  
 salary plans; Hybrid plans
Defined contribution plans, 2–3, 19n1
 funding of, 141–154
  contributions in, 142–145, 163
  costs for, 17, 37, 38, 41, 137–138,  
 151–153, 153t
  financial literacy and, 140, 141
  investment choices for, 145–147,  
 204–205
  investment management errors in,  
 147–151
  politics and, 153–154
 government role in, 7, 10–11
 pension benefits from, 7, 17
  inflation adjustments for, 11, 13
  portability at retirement of, 57–58,  
 65–66, 72–73
  securing, and pension policy, 165– 
 168
 pension coverage in, 12–13, 35–37
  extension of, 12–13, 37–47, 50–53
  measures of, 17, 35–36
 pension provision and, 4
  annuities in, 12, 17, 140
  retirement decisions in, 14, 16
 risk and, 1, 3, 6–7, 8, 11, 73, 79,  
 101–104, 105
 tax effect on, 87, 88
 See also 401(k) plans; Employee  
 stock ownership plan; Hybrid  
 plans; Money purchase plans
Denmark, pensions in, 23, 58, 61, 87
Double taxation, 95–96
Dutch plans. See under Netherlands, the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief  
 Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of  
 2001, pension rollovers and, 63
EET (Exempt, Exempt, Taxed) stages, 84
EGTRRA (Economic Growth and Tax  
 Relief Reconciliation Act of  
 2001), 63
Employee behaviors
 investment errors made as, 204
  diversification, 147–148
  inaction, 13, 16, 45–46, 48, 146– 
 147, 148–149
  portfolio adjustments, 148–149
 retirement preparation among, 1–2,  
 204
  investment portfolios in, 8, 42–43,  
 51, 148–149
  mistakes made in, 16–17, 45–46,  
 106, 145–146
  plan contributions in, 29, 30, 126t,  
 142–145
  voluntary participation as, 3, 5, 9,  
 12, 13, 37, 141
Employee layoffs, 3, 211
 defined benefit plans and, 1, 11, 13,  
 81, 158, 208
Employee Retirement Income Security  
 Act (ERISA) of 1974, 3, 41, 70
 flexibility hurdles in, 74, 160
 Industry Committee, and lawsuits,  
 103–104
Employee risk
 pension plan type and, 6–7, 15, 105
  hybrid plans, 7, 126t, 127, 128,  
 129, 130, 132, 133–134, 135, 211
Employee stock ownership plan  
 (ESOP), as defined contribution  
 plan, 138, 212n1
Employer behaviors
 conflicts of interest and, 138–139,  
 208, 211
 fund management among, 9, 92
 pension provision as, 4, 9, 37–39,  
 139–140, 155, 159–160
  adequate funding of, 116–118,  
 121–122, 154, 208–209
  automatic employee enrollment in,  
 5, 12, 40–41, 51–52, 131, 140
  differences for executives vs.  
 workers in, 1, 38, 43, 148, 209–210
Index   233
Employer behaviors, cont.
 pension provision as, cont. 
 lost, in corporate breakups, 178– 
 179
 retirement contributions among, 24,  
 40–45, 126t, 205
  absence of, 36–37
  joint effort with workers, 2, 40,  
 143–144, 206
Employer risk
 hybrid plans, 7, 126t, 128, 130, 211
 pension plan choice and, 6, 101, 105,  
 110–111
Employment levels. See Full-time  
 workers; Part-time workers;  
 Temporary workers
Enron (firm), collapse of, 8
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income  
 Security Act of 1974), 3, 41, 70, 74
ESOP (employee stock ownership  
 plan), 138, 212n1
ETT (Exempt, Taxed, Taxed) stages, 87
Europe, pensions in, 12
 See also specific countries within
Excise taxes, 94, 117–118
Exempt, Exempt, Taxed (EET) stages,  
 pension tax treatment in, 84, 92
Exempt, Taxed, Taxed (ETT) stages,  
 pension tax treatment in, 87
 
Family considerations, 85, 86
 pension coverage and, 34, 89
Federal Insurance Contributions Act  
 (FICA), 84
Final salary plans, 2, 102, 128, 167
Financial institutions, 112, 193
 interest rates and, 108–109, 126t
 markets as, and risk-bearing pension  
 plans, 1, 132–133
 pension fund management by, 9, 106,  
 155
Financial literacy
 education needed for, 42–43, 49–50,  
 146, 149, 192–193, 204
 as pension policy issue, 2, 141, 149– 
 151
Finland, pensions in, 4, 7, 86
Fixed annuities, 194–195
Floor offset plans, UK and, 125, 126t,  
 128–129, 133–134
France, pensions in, 4, 23, 58, 86
Full-time workers, 174
 government mandates and, 5, 22
 nondiscrimination regulations and,  
 37–38
 pension coverage for, 33, 99, 209
Fund management
 costs for, 151–153, 153t, 205
 IRAs and, 12, 24
 pension plans and, 9–10, 24, 92
  employee decisions about, 1–2,  
 16, 18, 42, 48, 51, 145–147
  errors in, 16–17, 45–46, 106,  
 145–146, 147–151
  options provided for, 103–104,  
 146–147, 150
 policy options for, 149–151
 types of
  professional, 140, 145, 150
  trusts, 29, 92, 127, 139, 161–162
Gambling behaviors, retirement  
 preparation and, 1
Gender differences, 28
 annuities and, 18, 19, 183–184, 189– 
 190, 189t, 201
 investment decisions among, 16, 48,  
 141, 148
 job tenure and, 55–56
 life expectancy among, 50, 184
 pension nonparticipation among,  
 48–50, 48t, 49t
General Motors (firm), downsizing at, 78
Germany
 pension plans in, 86, 87, 167
 pension provision in, 7
  mandates for, 4, 5, 9–10
  trends of, 4, 6
Government role in pensions, 2, 24
 mandatory practices as, 4–6, 7, 12,  
 21–32, 83, 101–123, 179
 policy options for, 71–73
234   Turner
Government role in pensions, cont. 
regulatory practices, 8, 10, 22, 29,  
 37–38, 91–92, 113, 116, 117
 state and local plans, 156–157, 210
 support as, 4–5, 6, 10–11, 38, 83–99,  
 85
 worker subsidies from, 26, 85, 87,  
 167
 See also under Pension systems, U.S.  
 federal practices
Greece, EET pension approach in, 86
Guaranteed Income Supplement, Canada, 
 social security benefits limited, 96
Health insurance, 39, 74–75, 87
High-earnings workers, 121, 144
 life expectancy and, 24, 198
 pension provisions for, 1, 38, 43, 206,  
 209–210
 tax policy and, 83, 85–86, 94, 170– 
 171
Hong Kong, mandatory IRAs in, 12
Hungary, tax treatment of pension  
 contributions in, 87
Hybrid plans, 2, 7, 101, 125–135
 international provision of, 4, 125,  
 128–129, 129–130
 proposals for new, 131–132, 210–212
 risk-bearing, analysis of, 7, 11, 15,  
 132–134
 types of, 3, 15–16, 125–130, 126t
  See also ABP plan; Cash balance  
 plans; DB(k) plans; Floor offset  
 plans; Life-indexed DB plan;  
 Pension equity plans (PEP)
Iceland, pensions in, 4, 16, 86, 161
Income taxes
 corporate, 84, 88, 94, 116, 117
 personal, 14
  employee pension contributions  
 deductible from, 88–89
  rates of, and pension coverage, 13,  
 40, 43, 84, 89
  savings incentives and, 6, 89–90
 state, 94
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),  
 10
 effects of, 4, 41
 employee contributions to, 34–35, 65,  
 89, 143
 mandatory approach to, 24, 172
 privatizing social security with, 12,  
 21–22
 taxes and, 14, 39, 66, 89–90
 types of, 3, 39
 workers’ spouses and, 43, 45, 168
Industrial alliances, pensions and, 9, 23
Inflation
 benefits indexed to, 90, 102–103, 171,  
 211
 compensation and, 206–207
 retirement benefits and adjustments  
 for, 11, 13, 14, 70–71, 72, 188t,  
 208
 risk of, 101, 102–103, 122, 126t
Inland Revenue, UK SPSS and, 180n2
Installment payments, defined  
 contribution plans and, 17, 166
Internal Revenue Service (IRS, U.S.), 93
 tax code of, 14, 74
  section 401(k) in, 1, 40, 84
International perspectives on pensions, 11
 annuities and, 186t–188t
 employer-provided pensions, 4, 5,  
 79–80, 163
 securing lost pensions and, 175–177,  
 210
 survivor benefits and, 79, 102
 tax treatment for pensions, 83, 163
 See also Organisation for Economic  
 Co-operation and Development  
 (OECD) countries; specific  
 countries
Investment
 earnings from, as pension function,  
 84, 86, 92
 fund management and, 9–10, 24, 106,  
 145, 204
  costs for, 151–153, 153t
  employee decisions about, 1–2,  
 16, 18, 42, 48, 51, 145–147
Index   235
Investment, cont.
 fund management and, cont. 
 errors in, 16–17, 45–46, 106, 145– 
 146, 147–151
  options provided for, 103–104,  
 146–147, 149–151
 government regulation of, 8, 29
 mutual funds in, 150, 152, 153t
 pension portfolios
  diversification, 147, 150–151
  taxation effect on, 88, 116
 risks of, 3, 126t
  financial markets and, 73, 101,  
 104–106, 110–111, 132–133
IRAs. See Individual Retirement  
 Accounts
Ireland
 pension plan trends in, 6, 7, 139, 207
 pension provision in, 59, 86
  mandates for, 4, 5, 61
IRS. See Internal Revenue Service
Italy, ETT approach to pensions in, 87
Japan
 contracting out in, 23, 28, 30
 pension provision in, 9, 138
  government cost for, 7, 96t
  trends re, 4, 6, 10, 139, 157–158
 tax treatment of pensions in, 86, 93, 94
JCT (Joint Committee on Taxation, 
  U.S. Congress), 96
Job changes, 60, 66, 163
 defined pension plan types in, 56–57,  
 109, 208
 lost pensions upon, 18, 41, 58–60,  
 174–175, 210
 portability of retirement benefits  
 upon, 13, 17, 45, 52–53, 58–60,  
 101
Job tenure, 55–56, 129
Korea, modified EET pension approach  
 in, 86
Labor contracting, extending pension  
 coverage by, 22–23
Labor economics, as pension policy  
 issue, 2
Labor market policy. See under Pension  
 plans, portability at retirement of
Laddering, annuities and, 200, 205
Latin America, pension mandates in, 12,  
 191
Lawsuits, 103, 148
 annuity payouts and, 183–184, 201
Layoffs. See Employee layoffs
LI-DB plan, 132, 134
Life expectancy, 14, 24
 gender differences in, 18, 19, 184
 pension costs and, 138, 158–160, 163
 pension policy and, 12, 28, 169–170,  
 172
 retirement benefits and, 77, 80–81,  
 166, 207, 211
 risk and, 15, 16, 50, 101, 106–107,  
 111–113, 126t, 128, 133–134, 135,  
 180n1
  idiosyncratic vs. systematic, 112,  
 122, 132, 160, 170, 207–208
Life-indexed DB plan, proposal for, 132,  
 134, 135, 210–212
Life insurance companies, 9, 189, 189tt
Litigation risk, 103–104
Longevity
 financial institutions and, bonds, 112,  
 208
 insurance for, with annuity purchase,  
 199–200
 pension risks and, 15, 16, 19, 50, 101,  
 106–107, 111–113, 126t
 pension withdrawals and, 106–107
 resources adequacy and, 166–167,  
 171–172, 204
Lost Members Register, Australia, 177
Lost pensions
 international perspectives on, 175– 
 177
 job changes and, 18, 41, 58–60, 174– 
 175
 securing benefits of, and pension  
 policy, 173–178, 180, 210
236   Turner
Low-earning workers, 148
 401(k) plans and, 166–167
 pension coverage and, 22, 24, 39,  
 43–45, 53
 progressive benefit formula for,  
 23–24, 169
 tax treatment of, 5, 83, 90, 94, 99
Lump sum payments, 168
 annuities vs., 88, 93–94, 98, 204,  
 205–206
 early retirement and, 78, 116, 121
 life expectancy and, 166, 173
 OECD countries and, 86, 187t, 193
 pension portability and, 17, 70–71
 risks of, 125, 127, 133–134, 166
Luxembourg, tax treatment of pension  
 contributions in, 87
Mandatory practices with pensions, 16,  
 24
 annuities and, 191–192
 exclusions from, 5, 12, 24
 private pensions and, 4–6, 7, 12,  
 21–32, 101–123
  OECD countries with, 29–31
Manufacturing industry, decline in, 140
Massachusetts Pension Assistance  
 Project, lost pension counseling  
 and, 174
Men in the workforce, 55, 148
 life expectancy among, 50, 115, 159
 pension nonparticipation among,  
 48–50, 48t, 49t
 spousal pension coverage for, 13, 45,  
 167–168, 187t, 195–196
MetLife (firm), 189, 189tt
Mexico, government mandates in, 4, 7,  
 86
Minority workers, pension coverage and,  
 53
Money purchase plans, tax treatment of,  
 88
Montana, annuities and gender in, 184
Moral hazard, PBGC and, 118–121
Multiemployer alliances
 hybrid plans of, 125, 129
 pension plans in, 67–68, 139
 pension portability in, 57–58, 72
 pension provision by, 9, 114
Mutual funds, 9, 146–147, 150, 152, 153t
National Insurance Board, Sweden, 30
National Insurance contributions, UK,  
 27–28
NEPAP (New England Pension 
Assistance Project), 174, 177–178
Netherlands, the
 hybrid pension plans in, 4, 15–16
  ABP plan for government  
 workers, 16, 125, 126t, 129–130,  
 133, 161–162
  Dutch collective defined  
 contribution, 130
 investment earnings in, 86, 92
 pension provision in, 71, 105
  collective bargaining and, 23, 33
  defined benefit plans predominate,  
 6, 10
  government mandates and, 4, 23
  multiemployer alliances and, 9,  
 23, 58
 tax treatment of pensions in, 62, 86,  
 96, 96t
New England Pension Assistance Project  
 (NEPAP), lost pension counseling  
 and, 174, 177–178
New Zealand, pensions in, 4, 5, 6, 87
Nondeductible contributions, pensions  
 and, 90, 91t
Nondiscrimination regulations, 37–38, 144
Norris, Arizona Governing Committee  
 v., unisex rulings in, 18, 183–184,  
 189–190, 201
Norway, pensions in, 4, 5, 23, 86
Notional accounting system, 57, 127,  
 133, 135
 Sweden and, 30, 109, 163, 169–170,  
 207
Occupational Pensions Regulatory  
 Authority (OPRA), UK, lost  
 pensions and, 176
Index   237
OECD. See Organisation for Economic  
 Co-operation and Development  
 countries
Older retirees. See Longevity
OMB (U.S. Office of Management and  
 Budget), 96
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries
 private pensions in, 29–31
 tax policy in, 86–87, 88, 96–98, 96t
 See also specific countries within
Part-time workers, 38, 77
 government mandates and, 5, 24
 health insurance in phased retirement  
 for, 74–75
Payroll Deduction IRA, 39
Payroll taxes, social security and, 84, 88
PBGC. See Pension Benefit Guaranty  
 Corporation
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation  
 (PBGC), 114–122, 115t
 assets of, 114, 115t
 adequate funding and, 116–118,  
 121–122
 evaluation principles for, 116–120
 lost pensions and, 175–176
 moral hazard policy, 120–121
 plans insured by, 127, 128, 129, 178
 political risk protection and, 121–122
 problems faced by, 15, 18, 114–116,  
 123nn3–5
  lost pensions, 178, 210
  moral hazard, 118–120
Pension coverage
 extension of, 12–13, 17, 33, 37–53
  employee participation  
 encouraged in, 40–47, 50–52
  employer-provided plans in,  
 37–39, 99
  pathways to, 21–25, 209–210
 measures of, 34–37
Pension equity plan (PEP), 15, 84, 88
 career lump sum in, 125, 126t, 128
Pension insurance, 7, 116
 PBGC and, 15, 18, 114–122, 115t,  
 123nn3–5
Pension law, 65
 benefits and, 70–71, 127, 140, 170,  
 183–184
 desired amendments to
  (see Pension reform)
 fixed ages in, 14, 80, 81, 172
 as policy issue, 2, 207
 requirements of, 4, 18, 37–38, 51
  employer, in U.S., 5, 22, 36–37,  
 61, 115, 119, 138, 201, 209
   (see also by specific country)
 vesting in, 59, 61–62, 110, 131, 174
Pension plans
 features of, 143–145, 167, 172
 fund management of, 9–10
 funding of, 7–8, 16–17, 126t, 137– 
 164, 171–172
  common issues in, 134–140
  defined benefit issues in, 154–163
  defined contribution issues in,  
 141–154
  employer contributions in, 116– 
 118, 121–122, 130, 211
 participation in, 21, 33, 51–52
  employee refusals for, 13, 36–37,  
 47–50, 48t, 49t
 portability at retirement of, 55–81
  defined benefit plans and, 57–58,  
 66–71
  defined contribution plans, 57–58,  
 65–66, 72–73
  job change and, 13, 17, 52–53,  
 58–60, 101
  policy options, 71–73
  transferability of, 61–64, 68–71
   (see also under Retirement,  
 phased, and pensions)
 risk in
   (see Pension risks; Risk  
 management)
 terminology, 19n1, 33
 types of, 25
   (see also Defined benefit plans; 
238   Turner
Pension plans, cont.
 types of, cont.
  (see also Defined contribution  
 plans; Hybrid plans)
 withdrawals from, 14, 17, 86
Pension policy
 effectiveness of current, 178–179
 introduction to, 2–4
 issues in, 4–11, 12, 17, 201
 overview, 11–19
 proposals for, 203–212
 securing benefits through, 165–180
  adequacy of, 166–167, 171–173,  
 179
  defined benefit plans and, 169–171
  defined contribution plans and,  
 165–168
  lost pensions and, 173–178, 180,  
 210
 U.S. development of, 2, 8, 10, 13, 212
   (see also Tax policy)
Pension Protection Act (2006, U.S.), 74,  
 90
 hybrid plan introduction by, 3, 44, 51,  
 131
 maximum employer contributions set  
 in, 156, 164, 209
Pension Protection Fund (PPF, UK), 15,  
 210
Pension reform, 24
 improving lives of retirees with, 11,  
 12, 203, 207
 proposals for, 57, 76, 98–99, 160,  
 163, 168, 203–212
 risky employers and, 115–116, 118
Pension risks, 26
 particular plans and, 101, 123n1, 134,  
 212
  cash balance, 7, 105
  defined benefit, 1, 3, 6, 11, 14–15,  
 105
  defined contribution, 1, 3, 6–7, 8,  
 11, 73, 79, 106
  hybrid, 7, 11, 15, 126t
 types of
  annuities, 107–109, 126t
  corporate dissolution, 7, 8, 110,  
 209, 211
   (see also Bankruptcy)
  inflation, 101, 102–103, 122, 126t,  
 171
  investment, 3, 73, 101, 104–106,  
 110–111, 126t
  litigation, 103–104
  longevity/mortality, 15, 16, 19, 50,  
 126t
   (see also under Life expectancy,  
 risk and)
  political, 121–122
  portability upon job change, 101
  regulatory, 113
  shared, 15, 105, 110, 125, 134
Pension Schemes Registry (PSR), UK,  
 OPRA and, 176
Pension systems
 behavioral economics and interaction  
 with, 4, 153
 purposes of, 1, 84, 203
 types of, 8, 22, 62, 90, 157
  private, 4–6, 9, 12, 29–31, 83, 87,  
 88, 129–130, 161
  public, 5, 7, 88
   (see also Social security systems)
 U.S. federal practices with, 1, 2, 6, 8,  
 80, 88, 90
  savings plan and, 48–50
  states preempted by, 2, 51
Phased annuitization, 194
Phased retirement. See under Retirement, 
 phased, and pensions
Phased withdrawals, defined contribution  
 plans and, 17, 106–107, 166, 191
Plain Old Pension Plan (POPP), 126t,  
 131–132, 133
Poland, EET pension approach in, 86
Politics, pensions and, 121–122, 140,  
 153–154
POPP (Plain Old Pension Plan), 126t,  
 131–132, 133
Portugal, modified EET pension  
 approach in, 86
Index   239
PPM (Premipensionsmyndigheten)  
 system, Sweden, 30, 45
Premium Pension, Sweden, 30, 45
PSR (Pension Schemes Registry), UK,  
 176
Registered Retirement Savings Plan  
 (RRSP), Canada, IRA equivalence  
 of, 91, 143
Regulatory practices with pensions, 139,  
 176
 government role in, 8, 10, 22, 83,  
 91–92, 113, 116, 127, 203
 investment portfolios and, 8, 37
 nondiscrimination and, 37–38, 51–52
Retirement
 age and
   (see Age of retirement; Longevity)
 inflation adjustments at, 11, 13, 208,  
 211
 phased, and pensions, 73–81
  benefit receipt while working,  
 75–77, 186t
  defined benefit plans and, 77–78,  
 80–81
  defined contribution plans and,  
 78–79
  gradual transition into, 73–75
 preparation for, 1, 14, 50, 53, 83, 167
   (see also Defined contribution  
 plans; Savings plans; Social  
 security systems)
 strong income system for, 17, 21–22,  
 65, 103, 203, 212
 taxes in, 84, 93
Retirement Risk Survey, 73–74
Reversion tax, 117–118
Riester pensions, Germany, 87
Risk management, pension plans and,  
 14–15, 114–122
Rollovers, 66, 78
 survivor benefits and, 63–64
 transferability rights of, 62–63, 65
Roth 401(k) plans, taxes and, 3, 14
Roth IRA plans, taxes and, 3
RRSP (Registered Retirement Savings  
 Plan), Canada, 91
S2P (State Second Pension) Scheme,  
 UK, 25, 31, 32n2
Save More Tomorrow (SMarT),  
 autoescalation in, 144–145
Saver’s Credit, lower income workers  
 and, 5, 44–45, 89–90
Savings Incentive Match Plan for  
 Employees (SIMPLE) IRA, 39
Savings, Pension, and Share Schemes  
 Office (SPSS), UK, tax  
 exemptions and, 176, 180n2
Savings plans, 83, 179
 autoescalation in, 144–145
 tax treatment of, 6, 84, 85–86
 types of
  401(k), 203–204
  SIMPLE, 39
  Thrift Savings Plan, 48–50, 49t,  
 184–185, 189, 189tt
SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances), 36
Self-employment, pension taxation effect  
 on, 88
SEP plan, 39
SERPS (State Earnings-Related Pension  
 Scheme), UK, 25, 30–31, 32n2
Sidecar trusts, 92
SIMPLE (Savings Incentive Match Plan  
 for Employees) IRA, 39
Simplified Employee Pension (SEP)  
 plan, IRA-based, 39
Single women, pension coverage and,  
 13, 34
SIPP. See Survey of Income and Program  
 Participation
Slovak Republic, the, modified EET  
 pension approach in, 86
Small businesses
 mandates and, 5, 12, 21
 pension plans for, 39, 44, 131
SMarT (Save More Tomorrow), 144–145
Social Security Administration, U.S., lost  
 pensions and, 175, 178
240   Turner
Social security systems, 18, 102
 alternatives to, 23–24
  privatized IRAs as, 12, 21
  privatized retirement income  
 systems as, 29, 30–31
   (see also under Voluntary  
 practices with pensions, carve-out  
 accounts)
 benefits from, 75, 86, 88, 169
  retirement age and, 77–78, 92
  taxes on, 90, 93, 94, 95–96
 funding of, 84, 88, 95, 191
 life expectancy and, 160, 207
 pension arrangement relationship to,  
 24–25
 as state-operated pension, 5, 96
Solvency trusts, 92
Spain, pensions and taxes in, 86, 94, 193
SPSS (Savings, Pension, and Share  
 Schemes Office), UK, 176, 180n2
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme  
 (SERPS), UK, predecessor of S2P,  
 25, 30–31, 32n2
State Second Pension (S2P) Scheme,  
 UK, contracting out of social  
 security with, 25, 31, 32n2
Superannuation Guarantee (“Super”),  
 Australia, 29, 79
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),  
 employee pension contribution  
 data from, 36
Survey of Income and Program  
 Participation (SIPP), pension data  
 from, 34, 36, 47–48, 48t, 49–50,  
 142–143
Survivor benefits, 17, 107
 decline in, 1, 181
 divorced spouses and, 167, 168, 187t,  
 195, 196
 international perspectives on, 79, 102
 pension law and, 18, 19n2, 63
 rollovers and, 63–64
 widows and, 167–168, 196–197
Sweden, 24, 153t
 annuities in, 181, 186t–188t, 193–197
 government mandates in, 4
  IRA provisions in, 12, 24, 29–30,  
 45
  notional accounting, 30, 109,  
 146–147, 163, 169–170, 207
 pension benefits in, 79
  lump sum payment of, 173, 187t
  receipt of, while still working, 76,  
 186t
  taxes and, 87, 92, 93
 pension plans in, 7, 58, 172
  collective bargaining and, 23, 33
 social security in, 160, 191, 207
Switzerland, 7, 80
 government pension mandates in, 4,  
 24, 33, 86
Tax credits, 44, 86
 lower income workers and, 5, 89–90,  
 99
 pension savings with, 6, 85–86, 206
Tax deductions, 39, 88
 401(k) plans and, 10, 14, 140
 employee age and, 91–92
 private vs. public pension  
 contributions and, 8, 62, 84, 98,  
 157, 170–171, 206, 210–211
Tax exemptions, 84, 87, 88
 UK and, 176, 180n2
Tax policy
 analysis of, 87–98
  contributions, 88–92, 91t
  disbursements, 93–94
  implicit taxes, 95–96
  investment earnings, 92–93
  tax expenditures, 85, 96–98, 96t
 conclusion, 98–99
 OECD countries and, 86–87, 96–98,  
 96t
 overview, 84–86
Tax shelters, employers and, 92
Taxation, 78, 84, 94
 government support in pensions  
 through, 4–5, 6, 10, 22, 33, 167
 as pension policy issue, 2, 14, 43,  
 83–99
Index   241
Taxation, cont.
 Roth plans and, 3, 14
 See also specifics, e.g., Income taxes
Teachers Insurance and Annuity  
 Association–College Retirement  
 Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF),  
 65–66, 149
Temporary workers, pensions and, 24,  
 51, 64–65
Thrift Savings Plan, U.S.
 reasons for nonparticipation in, 48– 
 50, 49t
 unisex annuity payouts from, 184– 
 185, 189, 189tt
TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance  
 and Annuity Association–College  
 Retirement Equities Fund), 65–66,  
 149
Trade-offs, 40, 94
 investment control vs. lawsuits, 103– 
 104
 lower vs. higher benefits and  
 annuities, 122, 197
 voluntary carve-out accounts and,  
 25–28
 wages vs. pensions, 7, 44, 89, 116– 
 117, 137
Trade unions, 9, 140
 collective bargaining agreements and  
 pensions, 4, 7, 22–23, 33, 44, 89
 multiemployer alliances and, 67–68
Transferability rights, 61–64, 68–71
 defined benefit plans and, 68–71
 policy options, 61–73
 portability as, 63–64, 68–71
 reciprocity agreements, 69
 rollovers, 62–63, 65
 vesting, 57, 61–62
Trusts, fund management via, 29, 92,  
 127, 139, 161–162
Turkey, modified EET pension approach  
 in, 86
United Kingdom (UK)
 contracting out in, 23, 25, 27–28,  
 30–31
 lost pensions in, 18, 59–60, 175, 176,  
 210
 pension benefits in, 7, 93
  inflation adjustments at retirement  
 for, 11, 102, 171, 188t
  lump sum payment of, 173, 187t
  receipt of, while still working, 76,  
 186t
  survivors and, 102, 197
 pension investments in, 153t
  annuities and, 181, 186t–188t,  
 193–197
 pension plans in, 139
  employee contributions to, 34–35,  
 41
  hybrids as, 16, 125, 126t, 128– 
 129, 133–134, 162–163
  restrictions and, 167, 172
 pension provision in
  government mandates for, 4, 5, 15,  
 25, 30–31, 32n2, 61, 80, 159, 210
  trends of, 7, 10, 134, 139, 159,  
 207
  vesting requirements of, 59, 61
 regulation in, 8, 91–92, 176
 tax treatment of pensions in, 62, 93,  
 96t
  contributions and, 88, 91–92, 162,  
 210
  modified EET approach to, 86,  
 176, 180n2
United States (U.S.)
 legislation enacted in, 3, 44, 63, 74,  
 84, 89–90
 mutual fund expenses in, 153t
 pension benefits in, 7, 11
 pension policy development in, 2, 8,  
 10, 13, 212
  default provision and, 51–53, 65,  
 204, 206
 pension provision in, 9
  international standards vs., 1, 6,  
 15–16, 79–81
  trends and, 7, 10, 134, 139, 207
 securing lost pensions in, 175–176,  
 210
242   Turner
Withdrawals from pension plans, 172
 employer, of surplus funds, 92, 209
 longevity risks and, 106–107
 phased, from defined contribution  
 plans, 17, 106–107, 166, 191
 taxes on, 14, 17, 86, 93
Women in the workforce, 141
 job tenure of, 55–56
 life expectancy and, 50, 102, 103,  
 122, 159, 184
 pension benefits to, 77, 93
 pension coverage for, 13, 53
 pension nonparticipation among,  
 48–50, 48t, 49t
 spousal pension coverage for, 13, 45,  
 187t, 195–196
Women’s pension issues
 benefits as, 167–168, 185, 189
 coverage as, 13, 34, 53
United States (U.S.), cont. 
tax treatment of pensions in, 6
  contributions, 8, 14, 39, 62, 88,  
 96, 96t, 157
  EET approach to, 86
 See also Pension law; Regulatory  
 practices with pensions
U.S. Congress, 96, 174
 PBGC and, 114, 119, 121–122
U.S. Dept. of Labor (USDOL), 3, 127,  
 170
U.S. Office of Management and Budget  
 (OMB), tax expenditures and, 96
U.S. Supreme Court, unisex rulings by,  
 18, 183–184, 189–190, 201
USDOL. See U.S. Dept. of Labor
Variable annuities, 194–195
Vesting
 British pension law and, 59, 61
 job changes and, 57, 61–62, 211
 lost pensions and, 41, 174
 pension law and, 110, 131
Voluntary practices with pensions, 21
 annuities and, 191–192
 carve-out accounts, 23, 25–28, 31–32
  trade-off between reduced  
 contributions and benefits, 27–28
  trade-off generosity of, 25–26
 employee choice among, 5, 9, 12, 23,  
 31–32, 37, 201
 government role in, 4–5, 7, 22, 33, 83
 inertia vs. incentive in, 13, 16, 45–46,  
 48, 148–149, 204
 private pensions and mandatory vs.,  
 4–6, 31–32
Wages
 employee layoffs and benefits based  
 on, 1, 11, 13, 211
 inflation and, 206–207, 211
 low, and pension coverage, 22, 39
 reduced, and pension trade-offs, 7, 44, 
  89, 116–117, 137
 taxes and, 84, 87, 88
With-Profits Pension Annuity, UK, 162
243
About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit re-
search organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employment- 
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unem-
ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of pub-
lications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a re-
search program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the In-
stitute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in 
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which man-
ages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the 
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic de-
velopment and local labor markets.


